>It is the positivist view that only observable realities qualify as "real"
>but we have gone a long way away from positivism toward a
>quasi-instrumental realism (perhaps a bit more than what you are calling
>"pragmatism").
May be you have gone a long way away from positivism, but 99% of
scientists (especially biologists) even did not start moving!
Your term "quasi-instrumental realism" is very confusing because
you change the meaning of words beyond their flexibility. The major
invention of logical positivism was the correspondence theory of
truth, which says that correspondence to reality is a necassary and
sufficient criterion of truth. And reality was understood as facts
(not a dream!). Positivism is based on the distinction
between theories that are instruments and facts that are reality. A
theory that contradicts to a known fact is not acceptable.
Realism/positivism offers a nice recepie for developing theories by using
correspondence to facts as the only criterion. If you use other
criteria (e.g., usefulness) then it is no longer a realism. In this
case you may select a model that is more useful even if its
correspondence to facts is weak.
Pragmatism does not mean "no realism"; it only means "as much realism
as necessary". If this is what you call "quasi-instrumental realism"
then it the same as pragmatism, and there is no need for additional term.
>In other words, epistemology is very confused about what
>"real" means, but we seem to think that seeking better (more explanatory
>and predictive) concepts of reality is important in science. I don't think
>its an issue of what we can legitimately call real, but a question of how
>far different concepts of reality extend in explaining natural phenomena.
A weak but operational definition of reality may be "communicated
experience". Then we get a hierarchy of realities depending on the
scope of communication. But positivists would not accept it.
>So, now I put on my indeterministic colors and say there is some
>epistemological basis for deciding which reality is the more inclusive. We
>cannot derive a theory of experience and thought from a mechanical
>conception of reality -- mechanism is completely exclusive of concepts of
>mind.
You cannot prove this because we have no definition of mind.
I understand this as a declaration of your belief.
-Alexei
-------------------------------------------------
Alexei Sharov Research Scientist
Dept. of Entomology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061
Tel. (540) 231-7316; FAX (540) 231-9131; e-mail sharov@vt.edu
Home page: http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/alexei.html