Re: Determinism

John J. Kineman (jjk@NGDC.NOAA.GOV)
Wed, 7 Apr 1999 12:48:26 -0600


At 11:01 AM 4/7/99 -0400, Alexei wrote:

>Francis and John try to confront determinism without abandoning
>positivistic urge for realism. They say: in REALITY things are not
>deterministic.

>This is wrong because it is our models and our language
>that make the world deterministic or not.
>
>The problem of determinism can be resolved only within pragmatism
>(developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey). Pragmatists say: there is
>an optimal level of realism for solving each practical problem. If
>I need to talk with my friend, I don't need to know every molecule
>in his body. I see no problem in the belief that theoretically a human
>body can be described deterministically. It is not wrong, it is simply
>stupid because it does not help to solve any practical problem.
>
>I know, pragmatism is hard to swallow, but it is worth trying!
>I believe it is the only philosophy that solves the problem of
>determinism and freedom.
>
>-Alexei
>-------------------------------------------------
>Alexei Sharov Research Scientist
>Dept. of Entomology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061
>Tel. (540) 231-7316; FAX (540) 231-9131; e-mail sharov@vt.edu
>Home page: http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/alexei.html

>

I'm with you most of the way, but would like to add something.

As you contrast the determinist /indeterminist positions you correctly
define different world-views of reality, I think you are saying we should
not reserve the word "reality" for only one of those views, and that I
agree with in general. The reality of an experience or a thought is just as
real than the reality of an observation. It is precisely because reality
is a function of how our models and language are based that both
deterministic and non-deterministic theory constructions are valid and can
both claim to be seeking reality.

It is the positivist view that only observable realities qualify as "real"
but we have gone a long way away from positivism toward a
quasi-instrumental realism (perhaps a bit more than what you are calling
"pragmatism"). In other words, epistemology is very confused about what
"real" means, but we seem to think that seeking better (more explanatory
and predictive) concepts of reality is important in science. I don't think
its an issue of what we can legitimately call real, but a question of how
far different concepts of reality extend in explaining natural phenomena.

So, now I put on my indeterministic colors and say there is some
epistemological basis for deciding which reality is the more inclusive. We
cannot derive a theory of experience and thought from a mechanical
conception of reality -- mechanism is completely exclusive of concepts of
mind. But I think it may be possible to derive a mechanical view from a
functional or relational view (e.g., Rosen). This follows along the
arguments that computability in mathematics results from limiting
assumptions. Hence the less limited mathematics is a larger and more
inclusive paradigm. In that sense, we could decide which was the more
inclusive view of reality.

-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)