John J. Kineman wrote:
> Conversation between John Kineman and Norm McPhail:
>
> This is the record of a conversation that took place a few weeks back
> between Norm and myself. It was partly off-line, so at Norm's suggestion I
> edited it into a synopsis of the main points (Norm, with additional remarks
> on those sections I didn't get to the first time). I have yet to catch up
> with all the commentaries since.
>
> >>> Norm's original comments/questions about 'data' and non-physical
> experience.
> >> indicates Kineman's response to
> > indicates Norm's reply off-line
>
> >
> >> I'll take a chance at answering, but with the proviso that our goal should
> >> be to converge if possible because it seems to me that we are really
> >> discussing definitions here.
> >
> >Of necessity, to the extent we are trying to deal with non physical
> >ideas, we will need to use hermeneutics to build a common lexicon we can
> >work with. Yet I think this can't help but expand out to cover a whole
> >range of related areas. Perhaps what we ought to do is agree to try to
> >stick to questions that seem central to gaining a better understanding
> >of what these non physical realms are, how they may work and how they
> >may relate to the physical realms. If that is what you have in mind as
> >"...our goal to converge...", then I agree that, as of now at least, it
> >seems like a good plan of action.
> >
>
> I found this statement of hermeutic belief: "the determination of specific
> meanings is a matter for practical judgement and common sense reasoning -
> not for a priori theory and scientific proof." This seems to be what we're
> discussing alright, but questions whether semantic meanings are really part
> of science or stem more from experience (as discussed in other messages).
> However, there are also epistemological issues, such as the very concept of
> "how [non-physical realms] work," which is part of our perceptual/objective
> worldview - strictly speaking the concept of them "working" is a mechanical
> idea that may not apply. Perhaps they don't work so much as they ARE or
> BECOME. This is hard to model.
Rosen has shown that relational models can encompass both the Newtonian paradigm
and these extensions beyond it with equal facility. in so doing he shows us how
to compare them..He argues that we can no longer avoid the epistemological
issues
because they no longer can be cleanly separated from the "scientific" questions.
I would suggest that a method which can first demonstrate its ability to handle
traditional science and then can further demonstrate its capability for going
beyond that is of great value to us.
One point he insists on is that we are using physical/non-physical in a
potentially misleading way. If we allow "organization" (for lack of a better
word
and to save space) of the type I've been talking about to be considered an
integral part of any real system, them possibly we whant our distinction to be
between the material and non-material, but even that doesn't do it. I hope you
see the problem: all real systems contain these two aspects in inseperable ways.
> >
> >>>How does data relate to these non physical experiences? Is data both a
> >>>physical and non physical phenomena? Or what if data is a non physical
> >>>phenomena that simply rides physical phenomena like light photons?
> >>
> >> "Data" as commonly discussed, are clearly not physical. Physical recording
> >> of data is another matter.
In network thermodynamics we recognize two kinds of "data" constitutive laws
relating flows and forces and the network's topology. these are distinct and
both
necessary for an understanding and modeling of the system.
> >
> >We seem to agree that data is non physical in most respects. However,
> >perhaps we can also agree that data can and does make a difference in
> >the physical realms. In other words, I don't think that we can rule out
> >the probability that data is a causal factor in the realms of physics
> >and life. Just how it spans the gap between the non phisical realms and
> >the physical realms is certainly open to a wide range of speculation.
> >The only hypothesis I've ever seen on this is Murray Gell-Mann's notion
> >that data is an integral component of the quantum realm.
> >
> >Since I'm clueless when it comes to quantum physics, perhaps there are
> >some physicists out there who would be willing to hazard a guess on what
> >Gell-Mann means by this. The only thing I can say is that this seems to
> >be at least a good place to start to see if we can figure out some
> >hypothetical model of how data seems to be able to jump from the
> >physical to the non physical realms.
> >
> >I guess I'm also saying that it may make sense to concentrate on these
> >transitional zones and processes. I think we ought to learn more what
> >is going on by comparing the physical and the non physical, assuming
> >that this is possible. It may not be, but at least we can give it a
> >try. It's a place to start.
> >
>
> Part of the problem is what we each mean by "non-physical." There is the
> distinction Don pointed out between quantitative/syntactical vs. semantic.
> Then there is the distinction between both of these, being part of
> perceptual reality, and direct experience. Experience is perhaps
> non-perceptual, which is "non-physical" in a deeper sense, i.e., not even
> founded on dimensional realities. I think we're interested in similar
> questions here but perhaps have different definitions. I have a paper on
> the Web at: http://www.bayside.net/NPO/BMI/autevol.htm where I try to deal
> with quantum ideas in this context. But the questions are so
> interdisciplinary that I don't think anyone can be an expert. I am quite
> interested in finding ways of handling the non-perceptual reality - i.e.,
> what is experience and what role does it play in consciousness. What is the
> relationship between experience and what we can perceive through the
> physical senses or conceive mentally (semantically). It seems that
> experience is related to hermeneutic meanings.
don't miss the reason for making these distinctions.....a material part of a
system is changed little by being removed and studied in isolation ...the
reductionist belief.....on the other hand, functional components, mappings,
topological connectedness, etc. are all highly, if not totally, context
dependent. they loos their meaning outside the system. These semantics are
crucial to the system's identity and generally escape being turned into syntax.
>
>
> My concept of data is perhaps more limited since I work at a data center. I
> am unfamiliar with Gell-Mann's usage. I think of data as a rather specific
> case of information that is part of perception. It exists in the mind of
> the perceiver (ignoring the various forms of storage). A less specific form
> of information seems implied in the link between physical and non-physical
> realities such as in the quantum phenomena. The "non-locality" problem for
> example implies instantaneous communication between particles apparently
> violating the speed of light limitation on all physical phenomena. Data
> cannot be transmitted faster than light if we store it in physical form.
> But it may not be data that are involved. For example, if a 2-dimensional
> society were to be intersected by a three-dimensional object, they would
> see separated points of intersection in their world that would appear to be
> instantly correlated in their movements, i.e., non-locality. No data
> travels through the 2D world between these 2D objects, but the
> "information" that connects them is their existence as a single whole
> object in 3D. That may be what is happening with non-locality. Again, the
> paradox between the whole and the part.
>
> >
> >> >Can
> >> >we say that what we call color is both physical and non physical at the
> >> >same time? Is this possible? Can there be both physical "and" non
> >> >physical phenomena that co-exist at the same time and place?
This was Goethe's idea.......see the book on goethe's science on the complexity
web pagehttp://views.vcu.edu/complex/
> >>
> >> non-physical phenomena -- meaning, I presume from the context of this
> >> discussion, not of physical existence, are therefore not spatial-temporal
> >> objects, so coincidnece in space and time cannot be discussed.
> >
> >I think you are correct on this point from the non physical realm point
> >of view. So while we still have space/time in the physical realms, the
> >non physical realms are, so far as we can tell, not spacial and not
> >temporal. I am less certain, however, that we can't, on occasion, try
> >to look at non space/time from the point of view of space and time. In
> >fact, it seems to me that one of the great difficulties we are going to
> >have is getting beyond the space/time frame of reference we assume for
> >most of the things in our every day lives.
> >
> >I think we will need to use metaphors of things, motions, space and time
> >to get comfortable with the non physical dimensions. We just need to be
> >clear about the fact that we are using these metaphors and recognize
> >their limitations if we can. Still there are lots of notions from our
> >every day experience that we use in a non physical sense. These are
> >some of the best clues we have about our vague notions of what we're
> >calling the non physical realms.
> >
> >For instance, the notion of the class of all chairs is certainly non
> >physical. So what we mean when we say the word that refers to the class
> >of all chairs, is not the same thing as the chair you are sitting on.
> >The chair you are now sitting on as you read this, is a physical object
> >with dimensions, mass, time and material properties. We can probe,
> >measure and test that chair. But the notion of chair in this message is
> >a non physical class of physical things that we agree on. So perhaps we
> >can agree that the class of all chairs and the chair you are sitting on
> >are of different logical types.
> >
> >On the other hand, the chair I am sitting on and the chair you are
> >sitting on are of the same logical type. Thus perhaps one of the first
> >things we might be able to say about the non physical as opposed to the
> >physical is that they are of different logical types. Does that make
> >sense?
> >
>
> Well, I think there are problems here distinguishing these "logical types."
> First of all, the chair I'm sitting on is a chair to you and me because we
> recognize that particular arrangement or shape as having a human function.
> It is not a chair to a termite, who sees only wood. Is it a physical
> object? Yes, but only within a particular size scale. At a quantum scale,
> it's not even wood. It has those macroscopic relationships with its
> surroundings that make it wood, or chair, or beetle nest, or whatever. The
> class of chairs and the class "chair" may not be of different logical types
> except as we accord importance to contiguous "physical" objects from our
> perspective.
the chair is replete with organization and other attributes which are more
central
to its chairness than the wood which is easily replaced by steel or plastic
without changing it from being a chair
>
>
> >> The physical
> >> quality is something we infer from data, but the experiential is something
> >> that takes place internally as a subjective phenomena.
> >
> >I'm not sure what you mean by a "... physical quality..." Aren't the
> >actual physical things we measure different from the data we refer to
> >when we write some numbers or test results down. I agree that we may,
> >under the proper circumstances, be able to make certain inferences from
> >this data, but what is the point of contrasting internal physical
> >phenomena with this inferencing process? It seems to me that we could
> >say that "the experiential" quality applies as much to the inferencing
> >process as it does to any other subjective phenomena.
> >
>
> Assuming we limit the comment to sense perception for now, that is what I
> belive involves data. The data are used internally to create a surrogate
> virtual reality (which we discussed earlier as an "Umwelt" or just
> psychological context). This is our intellectual/perceptual understanding
> or belief about external reality. Science formalized the process but did
> not invent it. This is the "physical quality" that I think is inferred from
> sense perception (data). Now there is a lot of writing that uses the term
> "experience" to refer to our reaction to data, i.e., "data from laboratory
> experience," etc. That involves experience in the sense that it involves
> one's participation, but it is NOT what I mean by experience itself.
> Experience itself exists even without sensory information. In fact, many
> contemplative traditions claim that pure experience itself is enhanced in
> meditation by removing all sensory input (or recognition of it). I this
> way, we experience who/what we "really are" as opposed to the
> interpretations and images we create from data, which are not what we
> really are (or what anything else really is). The pure experience is of
> one's existence and relationship, not one's perception of these things.
> Because we are part of the reality we study, we have two modes of accessing
> it. One lends it self to analysis because it is based on the separation of
> dimensions and gradations or classes -- i.e., the partial reality. The
> other lends itself only to experience because it IS the thing itself --
> i.e., the whole reality of existence and relationship. So one might ask if
> we have different "experiences" or if in this view there is only one
> experience. Here we have to resort to the concept of levels of experience
> because we are insufficiently practised in transcending all sensory inputs.
> So my experience during scuba diving might be closer to a pure experience
> than while writing this email. But at any level experience is aimed at the
> inclusive whole (the participatory universe), while the intellectual
> thought and data are looking at the parts (the objective universe).
I recommend Rosen's "Fundamentals of measurement" for a definition of physical
qualities through measurement and the identification of observables.
>
>
> >It is easy to see that this is a tricky area. So perhaps we should pay
> >attention to these notions of "internal" and "external" in so far as our
> >experiences are concerned. For the sake of the argument, I might take a
> >position that our definition of experience has nothing to do with
> >whether we might think of it as either internal or external.
> >
> >So what I think I'm saying is that classifying experiences as either
> >internal or external does not help at all in understanding what
> >experience is. Maybe this is the same as saying that experience goes
> >beyond space/time coordinates. This is not the same as saying that we
> >cannot experience space/time. We obviously can and do experience
> >space/time all the "time" and every "place" we go.
> >
>
> Yes. We think of experience as being internal because we're used to our
> packaging, but the whole that experience connects with, one's own existence
> and relationship to reality, is not confined to the body. If it were, it
> could not be experience. Getting mystical here.
science strips away enough from experience to bring it to a point where others
can
"share" it. the remaining aspects are then called subjective......this does not
mean that they were different from the rest, merely that they could not be
identified by others as their own.
>
>
> >>
> >>>Or must all phenomena be "either" physical "or" non physical?
> >>
> >> This depends on the level one considers the problem. The separation is a
> >> result of our frame of reference and the nature of perception. Some (myself
> >> included) presume that physical (manifest, actual, existant) and
> >> non-physical (abstract or implicit) are ultimately aspects of the same
> >> thing, but we cannot percieved it as such.
> >
> >Good point. Perhaps it is just the way we must see, talk and think
> >about things like this that forces us to split up what we are calling
> >physical and non physical. But to continue this e-mail, we are going to
> >have to keep making this distinction. Maybe the best we can do is to
> >say that what we are calling the physical realms and non physical realms
> >are both different and the same at the same time. Does that make any
> >sense?
see above pleaseok...I'm going to stop here
respectfully,
Don Mikulecky