Norman K. McPhail wrote:
> Alexei Sharov wrote:
> >
> > Reply to Norm McPhail:
> >
> > >What I am concerned with is the concept of what I
> > >call "multiple views." Don's/Rosen's view of a "complex system" has
> > >very little to do with how complex it is in terms of the number of parts
> > >it has and the intricacy of its interactions.
> > >
> > >If I understand it correctly, their view is that to understand such a
> > >system, one needs to view it from at least two points of view. More
> > >important, these multiple views yield a model of the complex system that
> > >can not be derived from or understood in terms of the other models of
> > >the same complex system. So what you have is a definition of a complex
> > >system that says it is at once the same as and yet differs from itself.
> >
> > Norm, it looks like you want to distinguish between mechanisms
> > that allow exhaustive modeling (i.e., any other model is derived from
> > the the exhaustive model) and organisms that do not allow such an
> > exhaustive model. I am afraid that there is no such distinction.
> > Mechanisms can be described exhaustively only if they work well
> > (i.e., in accordance with the purpose of their creation). But if
> > they fail, then they are no longer described by this exhaustive model.
>
We have a very nice dichotomy between mechanisms and organisms based on closure
of causality. It is very much like Pattee's "semantic closure". Mechanisms
involve infinite recursion and ultimate reliance on an external cause.
Organisms are closed. This also overlaps Varella and Matsurama to some
extent. The difference is that Rosen has formulated it more clearly using
category theory and the modeling relation. Now Dress has shown that it also
encompasses semiotics in a natural way!
> > For example, a tape player is a perfect mechanism until it starts
> > jamming the tape. This jamming does not fit to any single model.
> > There may be infinite models of jamming. If a Turing machine
> > starts jamming the tape, it is not a mechanism any more. Thus,
> > mechanism is not just a "simple object" but an object considered
> > from the point of view of a single function.
> >
>
yes....mechanisms abstract from a complex system a very special attribute and
then throw away the rest. That is why physics and the Newtonian paradigm are
so very special among real world descriptions!
> > My argument seems to agree with Don Mikulecky and Robert Rosen:
> > "Complexity then ceases to be an intrinsic property of a system,
> > but it is rather a function of the number of ways in which we
> > can interact with the system..."
add the word distinct...the number of distinct ways....this goes back to the
idea that a mechanism has a largest model from which all others can be
derived. for complex systems this is not the case...the various modes of
interaction and their resulting description are not derivable from each
other...they are truly distinct
> > "In a very real sense all natural systems are complex."
> >
> > I consider Rosen's ideas very valuable, but my impression was
> > that his understanding of purposes (usages, functions) largely
> > remained anthropocentric (as in most of cybernetics).
don't confuse the use of Aristotealian causality with anthropocentricism. he
does rely heavily on final cause and anticipatory characters in his idea of
complexity. This leads to an opposite from anthropocentrism. For example, one
failing of cell biology is a failure to ask what the cell uses as observables
and naively assuming that it uses what we can measure conveniently.
>
>
> Don says that Rosen uses the idea of subjective interaction, but I don't
> think this necessarily equates to an anthropocentric set of purposes for
> the formal system or the natural system. In fact, I gather that his
> notion of complex systems includes a functional understanding which to
> my way of thinking implies a purpose that is self referencing for the
> model under consideration.
>
rosen argues that the line between subjective and objective was badly drawn by
the reductionist/mechanists. In "Drawing the boundary between subject and
object:comments on the mind-brain problem, Theoretical medicine 14:89-100(1993)
he advocates extending the boundary to include self referential loops, closed
loops of causation and other impredicativities as "objective" i.e. legitimate
objects for scientific study.This would allow much more than a simple reduction
to material parts!
> Norm McPhail
> >
Respectfully,
Don