At 10:32 AM 7/1/98 -0400, you wrote:
>Rosen has shown that relational models can encompass both the Newtonian
paradigm
>and these extensions beyond it with equal facility.
>...One point he insists on is that we are using physical/non-physical in a
>potentially misleading way. If we allow "organization" (for lack of a better
> word
>and to save space) of the type I've been talking about to be considered an
>integral part of any real system, them possibly we whant our distinction
to be
>between the material and non-material, but even that doesn't do it. I
hope you
>see the problem: all real systems contain these two aspects in inseperable
ways.
If by "material" we mean the classical 4-dimensional world we observe, this
is similar to what I think I'm describing.
>In network thermodynamics we recognize two kinds of "data" constitutive laws
>relating flows and forces and the network's topology. these are distinct and
> both necessary for an understanding and modeling of the system.
>
Help me on this one. It would seem strange to define "data" in terms of
"laws" and "topology" within a material context, hence such a definition
would not be general. If we are talking about data forming the bridge
between material realities and mental realities, then it makes sense to me
as having something to do with the "topology" of that relationship. The
law F=ma refers to the mental theoretical (mathematical) relationship
between quantitative values for force, mass, and accelleration as a way of
modeling something presumed "real." Neither the law nor the numbers are
part of nature (from an objective viewpoint), but part of our abstraction
of it. If, on the other hand, one wishes to model the psychological
interaction of the scientist as part of the system, then the numbers are
involved in linking between the material process being observed and the
mental construct of the observer, and we can say the "data" are part of the
natural system that includes psychology.
Now, using my own arguements against me for a moment, if the quantum level
is an elementary prototype for the kind of complex psychology normally
associated with thinking, science, and human-use data, then the concept of
"data" must also have its primative element in the quantum world. At that
point, perhaps we would suspect that it is the "glue" that Norm alluded to
that is involved in determining quantum states. However, at this level I'm
not convinced that it is meaningful to think of it as "data" which was a
concept invented to accommodate more baggage, such as theory, experiment,
thinking, data storage, accuracy, precision, etc. -- all attributes
associated with organism use (macroscopic perception). At the most
primative level, the exchange is synonomous with a decision about a single
state, as in Hammeroff & Penrose's self-collapse theory. As an analogy, is
a single bit in a computer memory "data." It is necessary to data, but not
sufficient without additional meanings. I think an arguement in my favor is
the inference that quantum states are spread until there is a permanent
record of an event (state, or state change). That implies that data storage
is required in the classical realm (i.e., to have macroscopically observed
states or objects), but not in the un-observed quantum realm (where states
can define themselves). The state itself is the "data" of this realm. The
idea that something else transpires to initiate a state change is a
'macro-centric' idea. At the most primative level, I think we can only talk
about "decisions" or "decision events" not "data" and unfortunately, the
cause remains mysterious, being outside our 4D world. "Data," to my
understanding, can only exist (i.e., be stored) within the 4D (macroscopic)
world. Yet the apparent paradox is that for the storage of data to have its
necessary meaning as data, there must also be a psyche to perceive it as
such, i.e., to attach its meaning. This is an apparent paradox in our
reality because we are in the macroscopic world where these things have
become separated. At the quantum level the event, the storage, and the
(primative) meaning are one. The meaning is also simple, it is the single
thought of existence (to the spiritualist, "I am"). Since these things are
not separate at that level, there is nothing transferred, hence not much
use for the idea of "data." The same seems evident when dealing with
non-local quantum phenomena. If data were involved, it would violate the
speed of light limitation to have correlated non-local events. The
existence of non-locality phenomena is a demonstration that data are not
involved, and perhaps that data, event, and decision are not separated at
that level. Hence the inference of additional dimensions where a "no data
required" connection can exist. My arguement is that the view I present
here is a more parsimonious view than presuming there is something called
"data" that is real and important at the quantum level, or that the concept
adds anything at that level. The only way I could see combining this view
with the concept that "data" are the "glue" is if we think of data as the
hidden dimension implied in non-locality -- but that's an unneccessary
redefinition of terms that we already have better words for, and it damages
our understanding of "data" as a macroscopic phenomenon. In the macroscopic
world, yes, I would agree that "data" can be thought of as the operative
element involved in perception and the glue between what is perceived and
the mental state of the observer (including all the semantic meanings about
chairs, etc.); but that's a pretty common and trivial result. It does not
get at the "glue" or perhaps the commonality between material and
non-material nature at the most fundamental level.
>
>the chair is replete with organization and other attributes which are more
> central
>to its chairness than the wood which is easily replaced by steel or plastic
>without changing it from being a chair
>
My point is that this is stated from a human perspective only, not a
general inference about nature. "Being a chair" and being "repleat with
organization and other attributes" are all observer defined meanings and
not an inherent part of the natural object, unless we define the system of
study (the natural object) to be both the chair and a human observer, in
which case we can speak of it as a chair. If we define the system of study
to be the chair and a termite, there is no "chair" in that system, nor many
of the other organizational attributes we as humans would define.
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)