These are exactly the ideas Rosen has been publishing since 1958. It
looks like an example of "convergent evolution" of ideas between
Rosen and M&V. Rosen talks of a component as an agent of efficient
cause. That is, the component does work (which by definition means
it dissipates and is far from equilibrium). The component itself is
materially entailed (material cause) and efficiently entailed (something
else shaped, molded, or processed some precursor form to the
component). In some systems, the tracing of the efficient cause of
a component stays within the system. He calls these systems
organisms.
> This strange notion is in fact understandable in terms of
> dissipative structures. As we've seen earlier a dissipative structure
> is defined by its far-from-equilibrium. It can only exist when there
> is a sufficient energy flow through the system. In this respect the
> dissipative structure is not self-referential. It assumes an energy
> flow from outside the dissipative system. Now, each component of the
> autopoietic network may be regarded as a dissipative structure.
> Viewed in isolation each and every component of the system is
> produced from their respective outsides. That is, each component
> assumes an energy flow from their outside. HOWEVER, when viewed as a
> whole we see that the energy flow of the total system is closed. The
> chain of components forms a ring.
Rosen refers to a "mechanism" as a system in which one must go out of the
system to completely explain the causality of the components. In a
mechanism, there is only a forward causal chain. For instance, the
systems (C operates on A to make B. E operates on B to make D). In
this system, neither C nor E is explain efficiently in the system.
C and E were the result of some operation, but that operation took
place outside of the system as described above. In mechanisms, there are
no looping causal relations. There are, though, in organisms and what
this discussion group has been calling autopoietic systems (or self-
producing systems).
Rosen's big criticism of biological science (the science of life) is the
following: That in our analysis of life, we start by destroying the
organization that makes life different from non-life. That is, we
reduce the system to a bunch of mechanisms. We take a "closed to
efficient cause" system (an autopoeitic or self-producing system),
tear it apart (fractionate it into all of these parts) and study them
individually. We publish on the fact that each of these parts
behaves mechanistically. We can write some software (entailed
by the programmer) that shows similar behavior as the
observed biological part. We can provide machine metaphors for
the biological action of the parts. Machines (as I am using the term) are
always built from parts that are produced from outside the machine.
We (the biological community) thus conclude that life itself is just
the summation of the action of all of these mechanisms...there just
happens to be a closed causal loop due to efficient cause...but
nothing more really needs to be said or investigated on this fact...
Rosen claims that the above depicted lack of interest in the
ramifications of the "closure of efficient cause" profoundly limits our
understanding of life. Rosen claims that we really don't have a
biological science yet...just a science of mechanisms. We don't
really know yet what the ramifications are yet of the "closure of
efficient cause" which gives the system self-reference. So I totally
agree with Onar that "this is a very profound and non-trivial aspect
of this theory".
This is why I'm so excited about this discussion group. What we are
talking about here is the emergence of a new science.
Jeff Prideaux
Jprideaux@gems.vcu.edu
BS Electrical engineering,
MS Biomedical engineering
currently at Virginia commonwealth university pursuing Ph.D. in
Physiology