I would like to point out that the difference identified here is not a
religious difference, necessarily, although religions generally comment on
anything. The difference is philosophical and epistemological.
It is not true that the epistemology of science is a final and settled
affair. Questions about what constitutes a valid pursuit of knowledge are
strongly debated and the field progresses just like the various components
of scientific investigation. The question of non-determinism is a big one
and it is inescapable in quantum physics today. The possible approaches
vary, as do the varioius opinions of what can be acceptable as a scientific
method.
It is well known, however, that scientific paradigms are based on
metaphysical assumptions. Those based on observable, and therefore
"testable" quantities and qualities are considered rigorous in a positivist
sense. However, it has been conclusively shown that not all knowledge can
be captured in this way. This opens Pandora's box because one then has to
consider the value of assumptions that go beyond the observable dimensions
(also identified as the material dimensions of space and time). What does
science do about theories that refer to unobservable realms?
The landmark in this, I believe, was the Copenhagen convention regarding
how this would be treated in quantum physics. The answer was, very simply,
two-fold. First, the apparently uncertain (from our perceptual frame of
reference) nature of physical reality would need to be considered in some
sense "real." This meant that only a statistical treatment of the results
of quantum phenomena could be considered, but that a true theory of the
causes of quantum phenomena were out of our grasp. Second, that science
itself would need to be changed from positivism to embrace certain forms of
instrumentalism. What this meant was that theories about "quantum reality,"
i.e., the "causes" that I said above were out of our rigorous grasp, could
be discussed by science, only in a different way than was traditional at
the time (positivism). This way was to abandon reductionism and positivism
as a strict idea IN THIS REALM, and to consider various theories about
causes to be only "instruments" or tools to aid understanding of quantum
behavior, but not to be accorded the status of "reality" in the same way
that positivism accords reality to classical objects and forces. The only
reality, then, of an instrumental theory is its usefulness -- the actual
elements on which it is constructed are considered arbitrary and
convenient, preserving the ethic that, in these or similar realms, we
cannot actually "know."
Now, whether I have described this just right or not, these events are well
established in the history of SCIENCE, not religion. As I pointed out
earlier, both science and religion are based on metaphysics (assumptions
about reality). The difference is the criteria for those metaphysics that
are applied. In contrast, religion develops its metaphysics from the
worldview that the "unknowable" realms are the "reality" (non-temporal,
thus eternal) and what we see is more the illusion (defined as temporal, or
temporary state). Hence faith in the unseen is a cornerstone in religion.
The difference between these points of view is not all that philosophically
different anymore - both practices (science and religious investigation)
have been forced to acknowledge the existence of the material and
non-material realms. The difference between science and religious
investigation is epistemological and methodological. That is, the
difference is in how each goes about defining and acquiring knowledge.
Science requires repeatability and confirmation through observation - hence
it is limited in what it can conclusively call "real" to observational
terms. Many religions also have an investigative component (religion itself
is practice of belief, not investigation), but the methods are different.
They rely on subjective confirmation. If I have a mystical experience, it
doesn't matter why someone else has a similar experience, or if they have a
different one, only that we each accept the "reality" (transcendent aspect)
of that experience and the implied ontology of a greater power behind it.
Science seeks predictive, worldly knowledge, whereas religious
investigation seeks appreciation of one's transcendent existence and
permanent source of that existence.
There is no sense in religion denying the temporal/spatial "worldly"
reality at least as something we can observe. Equally, there is no sense in
science denying the permanent, transcendent view of reality. These are two
philosophical views of the same thing that cannot be compared and sorted on
any basis that would distinguish their validity in a conclusive manner.
Being equally valid (or equally invalid, take your pick), the question is
which is useful for what? These two methods of seeking knowledge, in
theory, can eventually converge, but in the mean time the difference should
be identified as methodological, not substantial -- i.e., they CAN talk
about similar things, but they get at them differently and therefore build
a different structure of knowledge. The beginning of all (true) science is
the statement: "I know nothing for certain but what I can see." The
beginning of all (true) religion is the statement: "I know nothing for
certain but that I am." And each has had to acknowledge its opposite point
of view, and each, in it's own terms, has labeled the opposite point of
view as the devil. This is unnecessary.
>1) If we consider that the behavior of a system (we, as systems) is due to
>ONLY the properties of matter that constitutes the system, then we would
>say that free will can not exist.
>
>2) If we consider that there is such thing as a "soul", or "spirit", that
goes
>beyond matter (without either explaining what it would be then), then we
>are able to admit that there should be this free will, and the source of this
>free will would be exactly from this soul, or spirit. The source of free will
>is on this extra-matter component of the system.
>
Yes, I must agree with these statements.
>As science can only deal with things that are measurable, can only deal with
>MATTER, then this question of "free will" certainly goes beyond science.
Partly yes, but not entirely, as I have argued in the case of the
Copenhagen convention. Science in its present condition cannot, as you say,
deal with the cause or ontology of "free will" (except that Rosen seems to
try, which is why I'm both curious and skeptical at the same time). But
even present science CAN and HAS dealt with the EFFECTS of this kind of
phenomena ON the observable realm - which is why I bring up the quantum
case. Theories of cause (of ontological uncertainty) are considered
"instrumental" and thus "non-science" in the positivist sense, but
acceptable science in a "post-modernist" sense. I myself have been a little
schitzophrenic in arguing against "instrumentalism" in present-day biology,
but recognizing it in physics, but I have my reasons for this.
>Depending on our "religious position", the answers will be quite different.
>
I would edit this to say: Depending on our philosophical positions (about
temporal vs. non-temporal reality), the answeres will be quite different.
>So, the discussion of things like "free will", "consciousness" and alike,
>are actually religious discussions, that never leads us to a conclusion.
>UNLESS we accept the challenge of discussing religion. We will be
>touching with personal convictions and personal experiences, that
>sometimes can not be shared without skepticism.
Yes, I get your meaning here, but since I have already accepted your
"unless" condition, I see that both science and religious investigation
(again, it must be distinguished from dogmatism) CAN talk about the same
things from different perspectives.
>My suggestion is that we avoid using strong propositions like that "there is
>free will" - "there isn't free will", because they are only an indication
of our
>religious position. Better is to admit that both claims are true, and work
>with them in parallel.
YES!!!
> The one which leads to better fruits will prove to be
>the correct one. But this, only the future can say.
And again, there may never be a way to distinguish the two forms of
correctness, but we certainly, as you say, CAN identify which is useful FOR
WHAT.
>Best regards,
>Ricardo
>--
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All the best,
John Kineman
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)