I am very glad to see these statements being challenged. I was afraid it
would engage no discussion at all because of the narrowness of many
scientific investigations. I say that because some provocation of normal
modes of thinking is required to consider these ideas. I have been
considering this matter for a long time, from BOTH a scientific perspective
and from the perspective of subjective experience.
Forget religion in this discussion - that is a practice and repetition of
pre-established beliefs, it is not a study or investigation of new ideas,
as such. There have been as many scientific "religions" (e.g., gender vs.
intelligence, flat earth, race supremacy, etc.) as there have been
theological or spiritual "religions." These all rely on dogma. Not to say
they are without value, but are not even intended as a means of questioning
and gaining new knowledge. The proper comparison is between science and
"experience," for example introspection, contemplation of experience,
meditation, trans-personal self-psychology, intuition -- i.e., "knowing
thyself" from the inside. The epistemological question is if science can
incorporate knowledge from such experiential sources, or if that must
always be rejected because it can't be objectified. However, the issue of
free-will does not even require that level of expansion -- it can exist as
a "limit to knowledge" even WITHIN current definitions of science.
I DO very much consider this a scientific issue, but because I was aware of
the predictable criticisms along these lines (i.e. - claims that it is
either "religion" or "non-science") I included an extensive epistemological
analysis consulting modern philosophers of science in the original and
revised paper (http://www.bayside.net/NPO/BMI/autevol/ghw_epi.htm).
The arguements that "free will" can be considered in a scientific framework
(although perhaps cannot be fully modeled or explained by objective
science) are not only valid, but are inescapable in some fields (Quantum
Physics is an example, which is why I use that as a comparison). The
limitation comes when one tries to "explain" free-will, or the origin of
quantum phenomena, for example. I use QM as an example because it is a
well-developed theory that has proven value - not because it is any more
the last word than any other theory is or has been. It is highly
questionable whether either of these ontologies can be explained
"scientifically." This is a philosophical issue that has to do with what
science is based on, which is observation. QM grapples with the breakdown
of the observational paradigm. So does the question of free-will. One of my
points is that it is rediculous to reject "free-will" on the grounds that
it exceeds the observational paradigm, when our very understanding of
physical reality does so as well. If considering the existence of free-will
in psychological phenomena (and life) is "non-science," then so is all of
physics. Are you prepared to reject BOTH as capable of producing scientific
theories?
My view is that both are science, and we have to expand our understanding
of nature. This is the main value of invoking QM in the discussion - as a
comparison regarding the status of science and epistemology. So far, all
deterministic explanations of QM have failed. The Copenhagen interpretation
was to simply accept a fundamental uncertainty in nature (indistinguishable
from free will, perhaps, but by agreement to be thought of as simply a
limit to objective knowability), and an instrumental approach to any
possible ontological explanations. That is, one can construct an explatory
theory involving hyperdimensions and other assumptions that exceed our
sensory capabilities, but these can never be "known" by us from sensory
means because of our sensory limiatations - so they are only "correct" in
the sense that they have some comforting value in organizing the phenomena
we can observe.
Some today claim a "scientific" approach to constructing hyper-dimensional,
or many-world theories to get behind the apparent uncertainty limit, but
the Copenhagen arguements are still quite valid epistemologically and all
these "pseudo-determinisms" are really no more than computational myths
that we may choose to believe or not. Free-will, on the other hand, may be
similarly un-observable, but it at least has the epistemological advantage
that we DO experience it subjectively. Then we must either claim it is real
(regardless of how explained) or claim it is an illusion (or delusion).
This choice is not scientific, but metaphysical. The basic point is: If our
best knowledge of fundamental physical reality absolutely reveals a limit
to the mechanical/objective view, then certainly it is at least reasonable
to consider such limits appearing in living organisms. This is especially
reasonable when we can directly observe psychologically driven behavior
that behaves similarly to that in quantum phenomena. Either the same limits
to explanation exist in both fields of study, or a similar explanation
exists for both phenomena, or two separate explainations yield similar
phenomena. Regardless, we can't have one brand of science in one field
without the other because we cannot deny the existence of these similar
phenomena. They are too well established for that. The only way out is to
deal with them; and science needs to adapt to reality, not the other way
around.
Nevertheless, it is very easy to blur the boundary where the discussion of
free will or uncertainty exceeds what can be discussed scientifically. One
of my concerns is to very carefully identify that boundary, because I
consider myself to be a scientist as a profession. So I am very concerned
with making sure that I understand and can practice the discipline of
science -- called a discipline because it requires practice and adherence
to carefully defined methods, and also because it is something more
specific than the sum of all possibilities. Being a scientist does not,
therefore, preclude being more than that as a whole person (nor does this
mean only spirituality, one can be a scientist and an artist, for example,
even though the methods are quite different). Anyway, I won't convince the
skeptics with these statements, but at least you might relate to my
intentions.
So, having stated my intention to discuss both science and the possible
limits to science, I do not intend to discuss what lies beyond these limits
in any detail (which Alexei distinguishes well in his comments about the
non-necessity of QM), except for the claim that there must be something
that DOES lie beyond the limits of science. This is not necessarily a
religious belief (although one can arrive that way), it is an inference
from the epistemological evidence that we have all been discussing in great
detail on this list server. The question of computability, at what level
does "complexity" enter a system, what is complexity vs. complicatedness,
why Rosen rejects all mechanical views and claims there is "something more"
than what mechanistic science can incorporate, the question if Rosen's view
can be complete without the mechanical as a compliment, the ontological
problem of a system understanding its own origin, the discussion about what
is "experience" - some claiming it is a result of complicated processes
others claiming it cannot be defined in these terms but nevertheless must
be considered, new concepts of "consciousness" entering into psychology
(e.g., John Searle), etc. ---- All these are the result of paradoxes we
cannot resolve within the normal modes of thought that are mechanically
based. The pervasiveness of these problems is clear in virtually every
field that has developed objective models as far as possible, each
resulting in a definable limit to explanation, and especially in the most
rigorous of fields, physics, where the implication/inference that there has
to be "something else" is quite clear to anyone who will look.
There are a number of reactions to this situation. Some people refuse to
look at it, instead concentrating on a more well defined practise in a
specific area. If pressed on the issue, some will simply claim that there
is more to be discovered in the objective mode, and this will eventually
explain away the paradoxes. Some others are more willing to consider the
possibility that a limit to knowledge does exist, which does not in turn
correspond to the limits of reality.
Now, as a scientist, I do not believe it is useful or necessary to invoke a
"diety" to cover for the area where knowledge is unattainable. As a whole
person, it is another matter and a personal choice to engage in the
language of spiritual matters. That is simply a matter of being able to
change between complimentary views and benefit from each for different
purposes. Its of no consequence here, except that any well-trained
scientist should know that multiple worldviews are the norm in science as
well, and that each is judged not on objective criteria (because worldviews
cannot be judged objectively) but on the usefulness of the constructions of
thought they allow, i.e., the success of the theories and models they
spawn. The worldview of Zen may help us understand our own experiences,
thoughts, and mental constitution better than any "scientific" explanation
(certainly better than mechanical ones), and may help one predict certain
psychological phenomena, but in general it is not very good for predicting
material results. It would not help us unravel the workings of molecular
biology or design a nuclear reaction, for example, except at those key
points where the scientist takes an "intuitive leap" that ends up being
critical. The inadequacy of Zen to explain physical processes in
predictive, analytical terms, does not mean that it does not address an
aspect of reality.
OK, having said all that to hopefully convince some people that it is
possible to discuss science without the assumption that we are discussing
everything; and it is possible to discuss limits to science without
attacking science itself; I will attempt to respond to the comments in this
and following emails on this topic, and I will try to be as careful as
possible to identify the line that I see between science and non-science.
At 11:23 AM 9/2/98 +0200, you wrote:
>John J. Kineman wrote:
>
>> John's reply to Alexei:
>>
>> >>In simpler words, free will can alter
>> >>selective forces and thus decisions can reproduce themselves through this
>> >>means and become "registered" in future forms, altering evolutionary
>> >>pathways.
>> >
>> >I like what you say here! Many biologists erroneously view selection
>> >as a passive seive (Gould, Dawkins). They talk about fitness landscapes
>> >as if an organism has no control of it. I like saying that death is
>> >optional because there are numerous ways to live.
>> >
>> >>We've mostly been discussing semantic
>> >>closure in current time, which is ecological time. Semantic feedback
>> >>(between form and function) through time (via generations) seems
likely in
>> >>evolution. That would produce semantic pathways which would affect
>> >>phylogeny, getting very close to a causally effective end-directed
process,
>> >>or teleology. This is a very different conclusion than many evolutionary
>> >>biologists believe (e.g., SJ Gould's "Full House").
>> >
>> >I agree!
>
>Could you explain your agreement in more detail? To be honest, as a
biologist I
>agree with Dawkins, Gould, and most other biologists that natural
selection is
>nothing more than a blind seive, without teleology, and the above sounds like
>blasphemy or scientific nonsense! And what do you mean by free will? It
does not
>really exist.I would like to understand what good reasons you have to
agree on
>the opposite of the current paradigm.
One good reason is that the current mechanical model does not take into
account the role of consciousness, which we know to exist and to have
effects on ecosystems (regardless of how one explains it). Another good
reason is that ecology and evolution are kept theoretically separate only
because of the mechanical dogma. Ecology considers the behavior of
organisms and its effect on the environment, and, regardless of the
"ultimate" ontological view one takes, certainly treats organisms (include
humans) as having the ability to modify their behavior in ways that
approach if not reach free will. Mechanical evolution theory, on the other
hand, relies on the separation of organisms from their environment, and
does not account for the feedback between original behavior and
environmental selection (except to say that it gets averaged out or is
itself a result of selection). There are many references on this widely
discussed issue (some are in my paper). My view is that a dogmatic
assertion that free-will (original behavior at the phenotypic level) cannot
exist absolutely prevents the theoretical integration of ecology and
evolution theory, and is at the root of why there are so frequent claims
that theoretical ecology is a completely sick or lame science. It refuses
to define its most basic theoretical parameter, life itself because that
definition MUST be non-mechanical; and its practicioners are too scared of
the other "scientists" to break step with the falsely presumed mechanical
requirements of science. The result is that the physicists, cyberneticists,
semioticists, and other information scientists will be the real pioneers
and the biological mechanists will follow along decades later, still trying
to imitate their concept of physics, which lags well behind the changes in
physics. The physicists, albeit very reluctantly, have moved on decades
ago, which is why I invoke the comparison.
Even if you do not believe in free-will as a fundamental ontology, the
effect of apparent organismic freedom at the phenotypic level on selective
forces should be a "no-brainer." If an elephant knocks down a tree, the
tree is no longer involved in his own selective environment, and that of
other organisms in that area. To claim that his decision to knock down the
tree was SOLELY the result of previous selection, and therefore fully
determined, is to bury the issue in an endless series of evolutionary
assumptions that cannot ever be tested. Meanwhile we wave our arms at
things like "sexual selection" which obviously involves specific directed
evolutionary pathways resulting from mate "choice" and preferences, and
STILL CLAIM this is selection by the environment (which, of course,
selected for the mate preferences, etc. etc., into absurdium). Even the
possibility that a truely "original" choice could have been involved at any
point is dismissed, not on lack of evidence because the evidence is fully
consistent with this claim, but on dogma. Alternatively, if pressed on the
point, the claim will shift to the arguement that all "original" choices
can be treated as random noise, and thus still inconsequential to the
mechanical theory of evolution. This is TRUE, but only if you decide that
no scientist can ever ask what the cause of specific evolutionary pathways
is, and must instead sign an oath of allegiance to always state that it "is
ultimately attributable to the environment."
This is dogmatic religion at its worst. It is a frustrating position,
because from the outside, objective view, one truely cannot, as claimed,
distinguish intentional behavior from statistical liklihoods; yet from the
inside (our own experience) we experience intentions. This is because the
external view cannot judge what "could have been," only what is. Has there
been or will there ever be any scientific investigation of the liklihood
that a sparrow evolved instead of a different form? The odds of getting
specifically a sparrow from some ancestor are astronomically small. Yet we
say there is scientifically nothing that could have ensured a sparrow, it
was a random result and not a scientific issue, even though we act as
though WE can ensure some result in our future. This is inconsistent.
Appealing to reason, is it not our "intentions" that everyone argues about
when it comes to the future of the planet? Why should anyone attempt to
affect policy if there is no such thing as intention or if what we call
intention is not under phynotypic control? Why should we try to change
human behavior if it is not under our control in the first place? So you
must now make the mistake of separating the human species from the rest of
life.
Otherwise we have to deny our experience to accept "science," whereas
experience is supposed to be the final arbiter in science. I'm simply
saying that it has gone too far to limit science to experience only from
external, objective experiment. A good demonstration of this was provided
by the great ape field studies, where the tradition of "external observer"
was violated (with similar objections claiming "non-science" at the time)
to gain an internal experiential knowlege of gorilla, chimpanzee, and
orangutan behavior and social structure. The result? It was a wealth of
scientific knowledge that has many implications for human society and life
science in general. Is all of it objectively separate from the
interpretations of the investigators? NO, because much of the information
comes from subjective analogies. But it is nevertheless science and it has
proven predictive value. John Searle wrote similarly about psychology,
which has been seriously hampered because it has refused to adopt a view of
the mind from the more simplifying perspective of consciousness and free-will.
The current view in evolution -- the modern synthesis of neo-Darwinism --
dismisses the role of phenotypic decisions in precisely this way, with the
wave of a hand in the unfounded assumption that conscious choice cancels
out in an endless series, and one can instead view both free will and
selection solely in a simple way. It is bad science and bad epistemology.
Many philosophers of science have pointed this out, but let me try to make
the arguements even stronger.
The reason that the assumptions routinely employed in ecology (some form of
freedom - even if you think it is just complicatedness) cannot be employed
in evolution is that doing so leads to teleology, i.e., it requires a role
for "intention." If an organism's "decision" can alter selection in a
positive feedback relationship, then decisions can be self-reinforcing.
These arguments can NOT be generally rejected by modern scientists, because
they are undeniable (as a practical matter) in the human case. So instead,
we define the human species as fundamentally different from all others, and
continue to claim that a purely mechanical approach is adequate for
non-humans. That's cheating, and in my view THAT is non-science. The
uniqueness of the human species with respect to everything else has been
one of the strongest religious (theological) tennants, and it has been
science that has consistently challenged the arbitrary separation. To
support the rejection of free will, these roles reverse and the mechanist
ends up defending a religious (scientific) dogmatism, that humans are
unique. Alternatively, if one senses the inconsistency of this position and
tries to include humans in the model, then one must end up denying
free-will, freedom of choice, in humans (as many do, e.g., Honerich),
claiming that all human consciousness is an illusion, and that "hopes and
dreams" -- and intentions -- are the result of mechanical and determined
events. Socially and psychologically the result of this is death of the
human spirit (literally, in these terms). I paraphrase Peter Medawar's
statement against the creationists here (the "alternative to thinking in
terms of evolution") -- that for the scientist who wishes to develop a
consistent and general theory of life, the alternative to thinking in terms
of consciousness is not to think. Note that I fully accept the modern
synthesis of evolution, and claim that adding the effect of free-will at
the organismic level to it will improve it imensely and make it a truely
general theory that can apply in many fields and allow it to be integrated
with ecology, psychology, etc.
Here's another "common sense" type argument: If one truly believes that
free-will does not exist, then you engage in a discussion only as a means
to increase the number of ideas that your mechanical selection process has
to choose from. It chooses those ideas that correspond best with it's own
pre-determined mechanical structure. The number of possible outcomes is
thus a function of the pre-existing knowledge of the selection device
(i.e., knowledge of relative value to you as an organism MUST pre-exist in
the selection device in order to make a non-random choice, and only a
non-random choice will be reflected in evolution). This being the case,
your own mechanical selection mechanism already has all the value knowledge
(i.e, semantic knowledge, or meanings) it might obtain from conversation,
i.e., all the knowledge of "self." All that could be obtained beyond that
is data about the external evnironment. It does not explain how semantic
information was obtained in the first place to form the internal selective
mechanism that this view must claim is solely responsible for behavior. It
could not have been obtained at any point from interaction with the
environment and thus it could not evolve - so where does it come from? Now
YOU must invoke God as the creator. This is the problem of "semantic
closure" we briefly discussed earlier on the list server.
Even if you assume something magically provides the semantics, you still
have to come to the conclusion that the only reason for conversation and
thinking is to bring the organism into contact with the more complicated
states that only a larger mechanical system can provide. This makes it
behave more like the larger system, and thus it is more successful in
natural selection. But this is a self-limiting process, unless you now
attribute freedom to the universe as a whole, which presumably is also
"non-science." So the view predicts conformity and convergence as a result
of evolution, whereas we observe the frequent punctuated emergence of
unprecedented forms, new relationships, and apparently creative solutions
to new challenges. The mechanical view has to claim that we are only
witnessing the begining stages of organismic evolution where it still
appears expansive, but will eventually fill all possibilities and grind to
an equilibrium with the larger system of fixed possibilities. We'll simply
fill the posibility space and evolution will stop. PERHAPS this view is
true. PERHAPS not. It is certainly untestable in any forseeable number of
eons. The real point is that the view does not conform to our own
experience and is not especially useful, and thus it is not the one we
should adopt as a final explanation. It is a belief that some people defend
out of personal conviction. Present evidence is that new possibilities are
being generated and we have no way of knowing if the number of ultimate
possibilities in the universe if fixed or if they are being self-generated
from free-will.
I argue parsimony: the most parsimonious view based on present knowledge is
that innovation is a factor, both in evolution and in consciousness -- even
if eons from now "innovation" turns out to have limits. And even if we
treat it only as an "apparent" factor, its incorporation into otherwise
mechanical theories, such as evolution, must be considered. My concept of
this, which I called "autevolution" does not claim to replace the current
mechanical view. It supports mechanical evolution as a first order process,
then asks us to consider the effect of innovation at the phenotypic level
as a second-order term in the selective paradigm. I have yet to find any
valid arguement for why this should not be done.
>
>
>> >
>> >>At the other extreme, quantum phenomena, as you say, do not necessarily
>> >>"communicate" to future generations without some other macroscopic
process.
>> >>But we also cannot get rid of it when we have mechanical evolution> So
once
>> >>quantum phenenomena are carried along with biological reproductive
>> >>evolution, it seems that a means for communication of quantum
phenomena to
>> >>future generations exists. Without this form of communication,
however, is
>> >>seems reasonable to say that states are "communicated" only by their
>> >>non-local effects, which I assume is thermodynamically limited as you
say.
>> >>But it is this non-local phenomena (communication in space) that I
suggest
>> >>is being magnified by biological evolution (communication in time). Is
this
>> >>consistent with what you are saying, or do I not understand what you mean
>> >>by communication?
>
>The problem with quantum physics, or self organisation (an oxymoron) -
> complexity
>theory - chaos theory, etc. is that they are buzz words which promise to
explain
>everything. When QM really plays a role at the macroscopic level (as far as I
>know, the only example of quantum effects at the macroscopic level is that of
>atoms in a certain experiment, but then these atoms were accelerated to
>velocities which are rather unusual in biology. Correct?), than all our
> reasoning
>is not necessary: simply everything can be explained and even people claiming
>telepathy can say: 'But of course telepathy exists because we have
nonlocality
> as
>in QM'.
>
>
I really don't think this argument makes much sense. First of all, quantum
physics is not a buzz-word. It is a serious scientific attempt to
understand very strange phenomena that have been discovered through the
most exhaustive and rigorous experimental procedures ever performed, with
passonate attempts to reject it that so far have completely failed, leaving
even the most hardend opponents no choice but to accept the existence of
these phenomena. There is no greater example of science in history, even
though I also agree with others on this list (and many physicists) that
something greater is thus needed to reach a more comprehensive understanding.
Second, it has been demonstrated that quantum effects at the macroscopic
level are evident in biological structures, including sight and hearing -
at least 15 years ago (Bialec & Schweitzer) as argued by many before.
Penrose and Hameroff claim a biological equivalent of Bose-Einstein is not
only possible but likely in microtubules in neural cytoplasm. Bose-Einstein
states have been demonstrated in laboratory conditions, proving that
macroscopic quantum effects are indeed possible. They are working on using
this to create matter beams (like lasars). Even our present theory of
evolution relies on magnification of extremely subtle phenomena to achieve
otherwise inexplicable results. None of this can be called conclusive, but
it is certainly within the realm of science and certainly relevant to
biology, evolution, and ecology. Unless we decide that science means each
of us studying a different corner of the room and never comparing our results.
Third, QM and non-locality does not explain telepathy or other mystical
claims, but does open the door to possible discoveries that are probably a
long way off. What's wrong with that? Do you not want explanations? This
does not presume that current concepts of telepathy and other ideas will be
confirmed. More likely myths will be dispelled and new phenomena will be
discovered. For example, quantum teleportation has already been
demonstrated. It is simply that the universe is stranger than you expect,
and this is my final point about quantum physics -- we need it because of
its epistemological value, not for its specific theories. It tells us that
some very strange behavior exists at a fundamental level, and this affects
everything we know. We do not have to view this reductionistically, but we
cannot deny the observations. It could be that a semantic theory of
consciousness, or Rosen's relational biology will help explain the quantum
physics, but either way, the pheonomena are real in both realms.
>Why should we need QM all of a sudden to explain consciousness, while we
could
> do
>without to explain the rest of evolution? This is a bit like pretending
that, to
>explain human existence, you need some kind of deus ex machina solution.
As I attempted to point out, what we have now doesn't explain anything very
well regarding psychological phenomena and complex animal behavior and
forces a split between disciplines because of obvious theoretical
inconsistencies. Also, we are not debating if we need QM as a theory - the
issue is the implications of quantum phenomena (not the theory, but the
undeniable phenomena that have been discovered in experiments). What I
claim is that we need a similar concept to "uncertainty" in biology at the
phenotypic level to resolve mechanical paradoxes. Discussions on this
server DO indicate the need for something more than a mechanical view.
>Mario Vaneechoutte
>Department Clinical Chemistry, Microbiology & Immunology
>University Hospital
>De Pintelaan 185
>9000 GENT
>Belgium
>Phone: +32 9 240 36 92
>Fax: +32 9 240 36 59
>E-mail: Mario.Vaneechoutte@rug.ac.be
>
>J. Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission:
>http://jom-emit.cfpm.org/
>
>The memetic origin of language: humans as musical primates
>http://jom-emit.cfpm.org/1998/vol2/vaneechoutte_m&skoyles_jr.html
>
>
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)