At 02:38 PM 8/24/98 -0400, Alexei wrote:
>
>I suggest the following summary of this discussion:
>1. All real systems are complex, and there are no mechanisms
>among real systems
Following my previously submitted arguments, this would seem true only
within a metaphysically ultimate reality, not a practical, testable, one.
>2. Models of real systems may be mechanistic (attempt to
>describe and control every detail) and non-mechanistic (that
>have some internal freedom, e.g., neural networks,
>genetic algorithms).
I would suggest classing these as mechanistic and quasi-mechanistic (i.e.,
incorporating concepts of freedom, such as uncertainty, into otherwise
mechanical models). I do not understand how a model can be entirely
non-mechanical without loosing the ability to define terms or reference
something relevant to us. Even theological models employ ideas of cause and
effect, which is part of the mechanical program. Do we not have difficulty
discussing a non-mechanical reality without using mechanically-based concepts?
>3. Modelling strategies can be:
>a) using mechanistic models and believing that they are true
> representations of real systems
>b) using mechanistic models as metaphors keeping in mind that
> real systems may be quite different
>c) using non-mechanistic models and believing that they are true
> representations of real systems
>d) using non-mechanistic models as metaphors keeping in mind that
> real systems may be quite different
>
Can someone provide a specific example of an entirely "non-mechanistic"
model that is neither metaphore nor metaphysics?
>I vote for strategies "b" and "d" and against "a" and "c". Using
>non-mechanistic models may give substantial advantages in some
>cases compared to known mechanistic models. But I would not
>consider non-mechanistic models as a panacea. In many cases
>mechanistic models give a very accurate (but metaphoric)
>description.
>
how about (e) consider ALL models (including mathematics and logic) to be
approximations of reality, mechanical models being best suited for those
things that behave mechanically and quasi-mechanical models being best
suited for those things that do not; and recognizing that in any ultimate
ontology, all distinctions blur and only the instance of experience itself
is left as a means of understanding.
>-Alexei
>-------------------------------------------------
>Alexei Sharov Research Scientist
>Dept. of Entomology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061
>Tel. (540) 231-7316; FAX (540) 231-9131; e-mail sharov@vt.edu
>Home page: http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/alexei.html
>
>
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)