I believe I understand these arguments, but it seems to me that we are
missing deeper assumptions. Let me try to explain.
I understand that we can SAY (i.e., it is a philosophical option) that all
"real" systems are ULTIMATELY complex. This is a particular worldview.
Saying this ignores the concept of "levels" which I tried unsuccessfully to
introduce earlier. I take from the lack of comment on that topic, that it
is difficult to reconcile with the discussion, because they are
incommensurate views (which may both be valid). So it is this I want to dig
into a bit if you will indulge me.
What are "levels" as I am employing the concept? I suggested that it is
analogous or related to "scale" -- that these are similar concepts. Are
levels "real?" No, in Rosen's (theoretically ultimate) sense, but yes for
practical purposes (which I will try to define).
Hence, the question is, are we discussing a theoretical "reality" that
cannot be accessed by practical means, or are we discussing a practical
"reality" that can be? If the former, there are probably NO concepts that
can be accurately and definitively attached to it, not even complexity.
Because all such concepts are born from our perceptual basis, and must use
models for conceptualizing.
The present discussion assumes that models are different from "reality."
Hence the inequality between model and reality means that we cannot define
or model ultimate reality in any terms at all (this is a philosophical
singularity, because if we could model it, by our assumption it would not
be the "ultimate" reality we are modeling).
It is then a philosophical matter to assume there is "something" "out
there" that is "real" but cannot be observed or modeled or defined. This
philosophy of an inaccessible ultimate reality has prooven to be
inescapable in science because of it's practical orientation. The problem
of separation between model and ultimate reality goes away only if we do
not require descriptive, predictive or observatioinal practicality - as in
a supposedly pure experience of ultimate reality. The realities we wish to
observe or define (thus "practical realities") necessarily involve models
as the means of considering them in any way whatsoever.
Our reference to something "real" in a practical sense, by this reasoning
MUST involve some kind of model, and therefore MUST involve the concept of
level or scale, which is inherent in our definition of "things" or
"entities." Hence, in Don's TV example (or making the same arguments for an
automobile, which may be clearer) we can claim that the ultimately "real"
thing is complex, but we can't even reference that reality and retain the
discussion of the thing we started talking about; whereas the practically
"real" TV or car, the thing we can talk about, is simple for any
interaction within which a TV or car exists at all.
Here I consider two options:
a) It is only simple because we look at it through a simple model. If we
looked at it as a complex thing, then it is complex;
(b) It IS functionally simple because we MUST identify "it" before we can
contemplate "it," and thus the "it" refers to a specific scale and level of
practical reality that in every observation/interaction we or anything else
can make, is predictably and repeatably simple. It is not a matter of more
precise measurements revealing complexity, because at the level at which
this would occur (for an inanimate object), the "it" we are referencing no
longer exists. "It" is a macroscopic "it" defined only in terms of our
interaction with it at the macroscopic level. At the level where "it" is
complex, "it" is no longer "it" and we are no longer obtaining knowledge
about "it."
I can argue the truth of both (a) and (b), but on different grounds and
with different utility. For (a) to be true, we must allow the scale of
observation to change in order to have the possibility of observing a
complex behavior, and at the same time allow the entire
identification/definition of the object we are discussing to change with
that scale. Indeed, the level at which a car becomes complex is a level
where the concept of "object" itself no longer applies. The truth of (a)
then depends on not being able to define what we're talking about, which
eliminates scientific knowledge about it. I adopt this kind of approach in
spiritual and experiential matters -- "the ineffable quality of ......"
which can only be experienced but otherwise defies description.
(b) takes this problem into account and focuses attention instead on
defined things that behave differently AT THE SAME SCALE, retaining the
meaning of those definitions. This does not address their ultimate reality,
but their practical reality. Of course it introduces the problem that our
definitions are then dependent on our perspective, model, etc., and that we
must provide these meanings, but this is appropriate to our interests. What
is an interesting and meaningful question to science is what aims at
explaining what, however indirectly, WE can perceive or interact with.
A complete system of thought that is not referenced to human perspectives
(choice (a)) is by definition metaphysical. The view in (b) is prooven
(epistemologically) by the fact that we correctly constructed the TV and
automobile and they do indeed work according to the mechanical principles
we used. To adopt viewpoint (a) is to say that the TV and car are not real,
which is valid metaphysically, but not epistemologically.
Now, lets come back to the point in (a), that any macroscopic object, which
we can describe as simple, contains elements that, if viewed at a different
scale and different definitions, may be seen as complex. Still, there is
another case, i.e., a very big difference AT THE SAME SCALE if we use an
organism instead of a TV or car as our example. The organism does not
behave simply and mechanically as the car or TV does. It is not predictable
in a mechanical manner. It is fundamentally different AT THE SAME SCALE. We
do not have to resort to some inaccessible, abstract level where
definitions change, to get complex behavior from an organism, as we do with
the TV or automobile. This is the interesting distinction.
Even though, as I agrued in the first case, we cannot construct a perfectly
adequate model of the macroscopic complex behahvior, without having our
model select out certain mechanical concepts, we are compelled to try to
describe its obvious macroscopic yet complex behavior in some manner. This
is so because mechanical descriptions, in addition to being philosophically
inaccurate, in this case fail to predict the behavior of the "thing" we are
discussing (unlike the mechanical models of the TV or car). So far, the
best anyone has been able to do is use a modified mechanical view, i.e.,
talk in terms of uncertainties and probabilities. That is, since we
(generally, disregarding Rosen for the moment) cannot figure out how to
discuss complexity, we talk about the LIKLIHOOD of mechanical behaviors.
This is the QM approach, which, as Rosen would probably say, is still from
a quasi-mechanical perspective.
I am so far unconvinced that Rosen has an adequate non-mechanical
perspective that can also be practical, in the sense of telling us about
the macroscopicaly complex objects we perceive, such as organisms. I
totally agree with him that organisms are fundamentally complex and embody
aspects that are entirely non-mechanical. However, the explanation of this
by claiming that "everything is complex" evades the important question,
i.e., the distinction between those things that are observably simple at
macroscopic scales vs. those things that are not. It seems rather to blur
this important distinction into a panglossian philosophy that is
unpredictive (I expect some challenge on this -- I'm putting this out as a
straw target).
Fundamental to these points is what we choose to call "real." I personally
believe in an ultimate abstract, perhaps Platonic, reality that IS complex
in its most basic nature. From this ultimate reality, the act of
self-definition (or observation) has precipitated apparent levels of
reality within which we live and within which science and mathematics
exists. But, as an embedded aspect of this practical reality, science
cannot see except through the dark filter of perception, which is similarly
embedded and which necessarily involves models.
Hence, practical "reality," that is, anything we are able to study through
the senses, cannot be separated from models. In this sense, the QM
observership problem is particularly profound, because it raises the
question if, in fact, it isn't perception itself that has created the
"practical reality" that we can study, and that then necessarily reveals
itself in apparent "levels" or scaling of phenomena, hence leading to some
usefulness for reductionistic concepts and the inevitability of paradoxes
in any view we might create. Thus, the entire sense world cannot be
separated from a perceptual model of it, because it is perception itself
that it depends on for its existence. The main point, however, is the full
extent to which this perceptual/practical reality extends to everything we
might discuss.
To summarize:
1. The sentence "Every thing is complex" is meaningless if the word "thing"
does not have meaning.
2. Living macroscopic "things" exhibit complexity at the same scale at
which the "thing" is defined, hence they retain both definition and
complexity.
3. Non-living macroscopic "things" exhibit complexity only at a scale where
the "thing" is no longer defined (or changes definition). Hence, in these
cases, the "thing" does not retain both definition and complexity, and
hence "it" is not complex (even though something else at this level is
complex).
At 02:38 PM 8/24/98 -0400, you wrote:
>Don Mikulecky wrote:
>
>>what we manufacture is a natural system. all real natural systems are
complex.
>>however, we percieve the system through putting a formal system in its
place.
>>that formal system need not be complex, it can be a simple mechanism.
Indeed
>>when we make TV sets we work hard to make sure their complexity does not
get in
>>the way of our design of them as a simple mechanism.
>
>I agree with this. When we make a TV we intend to make a mechanism.
>But instead we end up with manufacturing a complex system which
>does not always behave as we thought. As I understand, you propose
>to start building TV sets without having a mechanism in mind. For
>example, we can make some self-organizing network that under some
>conditions may develop into a functioning TV-set. In other words, we
>will let the system to have more freedom. This is all fine.
>
>But my point was that even if we intend to make a mechanism, we
>still allow our product to have some freedom (unintentionally). For
>example, we do not specify the path for every electron in a circuit.
>Thus, the difference between bilding mechanisms and building
>non-mechanisms is more in perception of what we do and less in
>methods of manufacturing. But I agree that even methods of manufacturing
>can be improved if people realize that they never can manufacture
>a mechanism.
>
>I suggest the following summary of this discussion:
>1. All real systems are complex, and there are no mechanisms
>among real systems
>2. Models of real systems may be mechanistic (attempt to
>describe and control every detail) and non-mechanistic (that
>have some internal freedom, e.g., neural networks,
>genetic algorithms).
>3. Modelling strategies can be:
>a) using mechanistic models and believing that they are true
> representations of real systems
>b) using mechanistic models as metaphors keeping in mind that
> real systems may be quite different
>c) using non-mechanistic models and believing that they are true
> representations of real systems
>d) using non-mechanistic models as metaphors keeping in mind that
> real systems may be quite different
>
>I vote for strategies "b" and "d" and against "a" and "c". Using
>non-mechanistic models may give substantial advantages in some
>cases compared to known mechanistic models. But I would not
>consider non-mechanistic models as a panacea. In many cases
>mechanistic models give a very accurate (but metaphoric)
>description.
>
>-Alexei
>-------------------------------------------------
>Alexei Sharov Research Scientist
>Dept. of Entomology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061
>Tel. (540) 231-7316; FAX (540) 231-9131; e-mail sharov@vt.edu
>Home page: http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/alexei.html
>
>
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)