John J. Kineman wrote:
> Here's a further comment from John Kineman to Alexei Sharov in the
> "ecological complexity" discussion. It is omething I missed from the
> earlier exchange. It gets off the original topic, however, so I've changed
> the subject line to "Ontological Synthesis"
>
> We were discussing the merits or lack of merits of linking ontologies of
> life phenomena and quantum events:
>
> Kineman:
> >>The paper began by considering where a more organismic concept of
> >>Gaia MIGHT be legetimately found (trying to rescue it from pure metaphore)
> >>and decided on quantum phenomena as the obvious candidate (because it is a
> >>valid existing theory structure). But it did not conclude that Gaia (or the
> >>ecosystem) was in fact an organism. Rather my conclusion was that "life
> >>itself" as Rosen puts it (I had not read Rosen) may indeed be responsible
> >>for those spiritual qualities some people attribute to Gaia, but that they
> >>REQUIRE a biologial structure capable of the magnification process
> >>(otherwise those qualities are as interesting as quantum popcorn).
> >
>
> Sharov:
> >From the phenomenological point of view all models are metaphoric.
In the modeling relation, metaphor is defined as a decoding without
encoding.....we draw conclusions about a natural system from a formal system
without worrying whether we can encode the natural system into it. I maintain
that this is just where we are with chaotics. We can make metaphors, but we can
not make models any more. A model on the other hand is a modeling relation in
which encoding, implication in the formal system and decoding all commute with
what causality does in nature.
> But
> >some metaphors are more deep and more useful than others. I agree that
> >"magnification" is very important. It is important for integrating
> >multi-level hierarchical organizations (Pattee). But I don't see any
> >need for quantum mechanics. It is much easier to use "environmental
> >noise".
> >
>
> ...........................
>
> Kineman:
> >>In simpler words, free will can alter
> >>selective forces and thus decisions can reproduce themselves through this
> >>means and become "registered" in future forms, altering evolutionary
> >>pathways.
> >
>
> Sharov:
> >I like what you say here! Many biologists erroneously view selection
> >as a passive seive (Gould, Dawkins). They talk about fitness landscapes
> >as if an organism has no control of it. I like saying that death is
> >optional because there are numerous ways to live.
> >
>
> Kineman:
> >>We've mostly been discussing semantic
> >>closure in current time, which is ecological time. Semantic feedback
> >>(between form and function) through time (via generations) seems likely in
> >>evolution. That would produce semantic pathways which would affect
> >>phylogeny, getting very close to a causally effective end-directed process,
> >>or teleology. This is a very different conclusion than many evolutionary
> >>biologists believe (e.g., SJ Gould's "Full House").
> >
Rosen captures semantic closure as a closed loop of effiecient cause. From this
he defines "organism".
respectfully,
Don Mikulecky