Re: Ontological Synthesis

John J. Kineman (jjk@NGDC.NOAA.GOV)
Wed, 22 Jul 1998 11:57:28 -0600


Here's a further comment from John Kineman to Alexei Sharov in the
"ecological complexity" discussion. It is omething I missed from the
earlier exchange. It gets off the original topic, however, so I've changed
the subject line to "Ontological Synthesis"

We were discussing the merits or lack of merits of linking ontologies of
life phenomena and quantum events:

Kineman:
>>The paper began by considering where a more organismic concept of
>>Gaia MIGHT be legetimately found (trying to rescue it from pure metaphore)
>>and decided on quantum phenomena as the obvious candidate (because it is a
>>valid existing theory structure). But it did not conclude that Gaia (or the
>>ecosystem) was in fact an organism. Rather my conclusion was that "life
>>itself" as Rosen puts it (I had not read Rosen) may indeed be responsible
>>for those spiritual qualities some people attribute to Gaia, but that they
>>REQUIRE a biologial structure capable of the magnification process
>>(otherwise those qualities are as interesting as quantum popcorn).
>

Sharov:
>From the phenomenological point of view all models are metaphoric. But
>some metaphors are more deep and more useful than others. I agree that
>"magnification" is very important. It is important for integrating
>multi-level hierarchical organizations (Pattee). But I don't see any
>need for quantum mechanics. It is much easier to use "environmental
>noise".
>

............................

Kineman:
>>In simpler words, free will can alter
>>selective forces and thus decisions can reproduce themselves through this
>>means and become "registered" in future forms, altering evolutionary
>>pathways.
>

Sharov:
>I like what you say here! Many biologists erroneously view selection
>as a passive seive (Gould, Dawkins). They talk about fitness landscapes
>as if an organism has no control of it. I like saying that death is
>optional because there are numerous ways to live.
>

Kineman:
>>We've mostly been discussing semantic
>>closure in current time, which is ecological time. Semantic feedback
>>(between form and function) through time (via generations) seems likely in
>>evolution. That would produce semantic pathways which would affect
>>phylogeny, getting very close to a causally effective end-directed process,
>>or teleology. This is a very different conclusion than many evolutionary
>>biologists believe (e.g., SJ Gould's "Full House").
>

Sharov:
>I agree!
>
-----------------------

The comment that there is no need for quantum mechanics is the one I missed
earlier and would like to comment on now. First, let me define terms: I use
the term "quantum phenomena" to denote what we KNOW from experiment,
whereas "quantum mechanics" refers to a particularly successful but still
limited model of it. Quantum phenomena are well established and virtually
incontrovertable. The theory is also well established and of proven value,
yet it is known to be incomplete. That does not prevent us from applying
its validated aspects, and if a better theory comes along, it will
certainly be consistent with what has so far been validated.

I wrote in the autevolution paper on the problem with metaphore. Yes,
everything may be metaphorical at some level, but we do make a distinction
between the epistemology of science and more colloquial metaphores. When
Bohr suggested a linkage between quantum phenomena and life/psyche he was
careful to describe the idea as a metaphore. Words like "it is surprisingly
similar" etc. But he did not know of any "mechanism" (I prefer to use the
term "process" to avoid the passive connotations here) by which they could
be linked. Darwin did the same thing because his theory preceeded knowledge
of the "mechanism." Now we do know of possible structures and processes
that can accomplish Bohr's magnification (Bose-Einstein-like matter) and a
biological analog to BE is quite possibly existent (Hammeroff and Penrose),
and it has been demonstrated that many physiological abilities cannot be
explained by classical physics but do lend themselves to quantum
explanations (e.g., sensitivity of hearing reported by Bialec and
Schweitzer, sensitivity of vision). A metaphorical similarity, when
combined with testible explanation of a plausible process by which
phenomena are linked, becomes a scientific theory -- no longer metaphore or
colloquialism, and much harder to ignore.

If the basis for psychological phenomena (and as I suggest, the existence
of primative forms of psyche in all organisms) is explained as
"environmental noise" one immediately makes assumptions about the origin of
that noise. Without linkage to other known ontologies, the assumption is
made that the origin is pure chance and a passive randomness (even though
that concept itself has problems). This allows evolution and biology to
RETAIN the "passive sieve" idea you mention (and disagree with), because
randomness is generally thought of as a passive process. "Observership" or
whatever else we call quantum phenomena, is distinct from this in that it
is decidedly an active process and a "participatory" process (Wheeler).
Although nobody knows how "observer mechanics" ultimately adds up to
intention, since it is a participatory theory it begins by involving some
kind of experience or awareness AT THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL. That makes
it very attractive as a phenomena that can obviously be "magnified" or
elaborated or complicated or complexified by normal "passive sieve"
evolution. Why should biology ignor this? It is, in contrast, certain that
"environmental noise" cannot find its way through these existing theory
structures to add up to intention. Something else must be invoked, and that
something else is then not connected to what we have already discovered as
a fundamental participatory phenomenon. In my view there is absolutely no
reason NOT to make the connection between QM and psyche given what we know
so far about the phenomena these theories describe. This is true even if
eventually or even now there are other theory structures that also offer
explanations.

This next part gets preachy, so I ask you to please excuse that in advance.
I want to try to make an emotional point here that I think is based in some
useful introspection:

To repeat an idea I wrote about in other postings, I believe the fear of
"reductionism" is completely unfounded in this regard. Reduction means
"noting but." By that I mean reduction says, for example, biology is
"nothing but" physics, by which it is usually meant nothing but materialism
and classical/Newtonian physics. In other words, it is basically
deterministic and knowable in precise space-time descriptions (which is
classical physics). But with QM, physics can be said to be "nothing but"
psychology. The shoe is on the other foot. We are not trivializing biology
by exploring the linkage between "life itself" and quantum phenomena. Far
more likely is that it scares the piss out of the physicists because it
links physics to a living ontology. They are now scrambling to tie it back
up as a machine (in multiple dimensions -- a real stretch of the concept of
a machine). Again, my estimation of the social side of this is that both
camps resist the synthesis because they want to preserve their "turf." The
biologist would prefer a theory that originates (and stays) entirely within
their discipline. Perhaps "relational biology" or something else will meet
this criterion. It, or something else, may be a fabulous theory, but to the
extent that it remains mute about physical ontology, and does not show the
connection of these phenomena, it will be incomplete, and most importantly,
it will remain IGNORABLE. There are very strong societal reasons for
avoiding a solid theory about the origins of life. There are religious
reasons, financial reasons, institutional reasons, political reasons,
marketing reasons, personal egotistical reasons, etc. There are no valid
scientific reasons except in the sense that Kuhn described, that science
tends to reflect the beliefs of society. We, as a society, believe we are
separate from nature and that we are temporary, unique, and even accidental
creations. We believe the existence of life is a highly improbable
accident. We believe we have no real right to be here except the right we
make for ourselves by our wits, because we are so exceptional to everything
we know. This makes many people very nervous and even psychotic. Some even
develop the belief, as a possible means of comfort, that our consciousness
is an illusion and that free-will doesn't really exist at all. This idea
then leads to a feeling of uselessness and helplessness - a kind of
fatalism. Some societies arrive at fatalism from other directions.
Societies cycle between these extremes - being on the one extreme
innovative and cleavor because we are so exceptional and powerful, and
consequently causing immense damage from oversights regarding the true
connectedness of our actions; to the other extreme of feeling defeated as
victims of nature and other universal forces, unable to do anything to help
ourselves out of poverty, death, environmental disaster, etc. The whole
world is polarized in this way.

Now I have to agree that nobody is going to feel liberated from the human
condition by suddenly deciding "my brain is a Bose-Einstein condensate!" Or
that we'll all buy T-shirts proclaiming "I am a quantum mechanic." That's
not the point at all. The gradual realization that our experiential nature
is intimately connected to our perceptual nature, and that each of these,
including their connection, is fundamental to the entire universe, I belive
will be a profound idea that will effect considerable social change. One
can look (as many have) at similar social reactions to scientific ideas
throughout recent history. One can trace Naziism to certain "scientific"
beliefs. Horrible laize-faire business practices to mis-application of
Darwinian mechanism -- Why is applying the most prominant theory about the
origin and evolution of life to human practices a mis-application with
disastrous results?? Because it is based on a passive, mechanical model of
reality which is obviously incomplete. Most people knew intuitively, I
believe, that biology and the human mind are somehow not explained by these
mechanical theories. But the official, scientific concept of reality is a
very powerful force. At some point it will be experimented with socially,
regardless of what intuition says. Society, and leaders, will take the
going idea and supress their feelings about it, and then we are the guinnea
pigs in the experiment. Our view of the fundamental reality of nature must
therefore be integrated, not fragmented and compartmented into separate
disciplines. I agree that the disciplines must be distinct fields of
investigation, developing their own body of knowledge and tools; however,
each must come to a common understanding of what our concept of reality is.
We must decide if we are part of a machine or are participants in reality.
The responsibility of the latter choice is frightening to many, but the
agony produced by the former choice is unbearable. I'm not arguing for
making this choice solely on moral grounds, however. The evidence supports
a participatory view of reality -- in all disciplines.

OK, that's it for the sermon. The purpose is to provide some social context
to the discussion and to expose (perhaps too plainly) some of my
motivations. I hope this doesn't too drastically exceed our purpose here,
and I want to recognize that there are other equally valid moral arguements
as well as inconsistencies in my views. But I think the idea that it is
vitally important to pursue synthesis of a common worldview that recognizes
the participatory nature of reality is my main point.

-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)