Re: Non Physical Experience

Don Mikulecky (mikuleck@HSC.VCU.EDU)
Tue, 23 Jun 1998 15:11:27 -0400


Don Mikulecky replies:

Alexei Sharov wrote:

> Reply to John Kineman:
>
> >What we call science relies entirely on the perceptual aspect,
> >which includes what can be measured and computed AND semantic
> >constructions. So I see a distinction also between the perceptual (which
> >includes both physical and semantic) and the experiential, which seems
> >uniquely characteristic of life. Perhaps we have a situation where both the
> >physical and the semantic stem from (or are the complimentary side of) the
> >experiential.
>
> From the anthropocentric point of view, perception is classifying
> things into pre-determined categories.

And measurement does exactly the same thing. The categories are necessary to
empiricism in order to abstract observables by mapping them into the real
numbers.

> As if we sort all objects (or
> records) by putting them on prelabeled shelves. Classic mechanics
> assumes that all shelves can be occupied at least potentially. However
> in biology this method does not work because most shelves remain empty.
> Thus instead of measuring we need a DIALOGUE! In other words, we "ask"
> an object to what shelf it whants to be placed.

Yes, and we must also ask the living system what IT uses for observables rather
than assuming that the observables we choose are correct.

>
>
> Elements of dialogue are present in quantum mechanics. Observable
> states are a small proportion of logically possible states. Thus,
> a classification of elementary particles resembles more a biological
> classification rather than universal laws of Newton.
>
> The same thing is even more obvious in biology. Brute-force measuring
> leads nowhere. Biological experiment is the art of asking right
> questions. We want to know what organisms "know" about themselves.

there you have it!...however I'm sure you also want to include the context
dependence of that information

> What do they "remember" in their DNA and why. For example, you
> will never understand another human being by measuring its weight
> and height. This is the major difference in understanding perception
> between biologists and most physicists.
>
> >The simple
> >act of comming into existence ("becoming," as in Eastern metaphysics) might
> >be the root of experience, or the same thing. Our much more elaborate human
> >experience could be the amplification of that elemental experience into a
> >more complex form (as suggested by Niels Bohr). In metaphysics, the
> >simplest form of experience is existence and is associated with the thought
> >"I am." The problem, of course, is that such experience can only be
> >explored directly -- through experiential means. Once it is explored
> >perceptually or analytically it ceases to exist (or one is experiencing
> >something else at that point - the act of observing, which if studied also
> >transforms into something else -- the act of observing the act of
> >observing, etc.).
>
> I am glad that John brought this problem of existence. Physicists
> deal with existing objects that can be traced in a phase space. On the
> contrary, biologists always deal with life and death, i.e., interruptions
> of existence. I published a paper in Russian about 20 years ago (oh,
> my God, time is ticking!) in which I considered existence as a
> condition of meaning. For example, insect wings may have various number
> of veins. But the "number of veins" has the meaning obly if wings
> exist. Wingless insects has no such characteristic. My idea is that
> the category of existence is useful as delineation of meaning,
> setting its boundary. Pure existence without parts and properties
> could be an elegant philosophic idea, but I don't see any use of it
> except as an abstract zero in mathematics.
>
> When an new organism comes into being it already carries a lot of knowledge
> with itself (the DNA). Of course, "genetic consciousness" is very
> slow and it will take the whole life to interpret its contents.
> Without this information, there will be no existence.
>
> -Alexei
> -------------------------------------------------
> Alexei Sharov Research Scientist
> Dept. of Entomology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061
> Tel. (540) 231-7316; FAX (540) 231-9131; e-mail sharov@vt.edu
> Home page: http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/alexei.html

respectfully,
Don Mikulecky