I would like to offer this thought exercise for comment. You may respond
directly, or via PRNCYB-L. I would also like to get opinions as to whether
it might be appropriate to work into a node on PCP. I will probably try to
get it printed elsewhere, and on my own web site, but that might end up
with more limited distribution. The topic relates to world views and might
be titled: "What is Reality" or something more qualified if that is too
inclusive. This discussion is aimed at the problem of using strictly
objective models of reality (and epistemology) to describe processes
involving life (e.g., evolution, consciousness) vs. explanations that
employ or propose objective definitions but may include systemically
imposed driving "forces" which some scientists object to because they can
be interpreted as willful. I think it is a basic epistemological issue
behind much of the discussion on PCP and PRNCYB-L about evolution,
complexity, consciousness, free will, etc. The exercise tries to get at the
core of this problem and proposes a resolution.
A thought problem on our working definition of reality for use in
constructing scientific theories
John Jay Kineman
Let's take as a basic question the evolution of complexity and the
evolution of consciousness (whether they are related or not). S.J. Gould
(recent book) maintains that there are no evolutionary drives toward
complexity - that it is a statistical certainty based on the greater number
of complex niches available compared to simple ones. Similarly, others have
claimed there is no evolutionary drive toward consciousness, that it is an
"emergent property" of systems with objective and passive (even if complex
and chaotic) origins. Gould, for example, claims that his argument
invalidates claims that there is an evolutionary preference for (or drive
toward) complexity. I'll call this a "nothing but mathematics" argument vs.
the proposition of evolutionary "drivers" which become inseparable from
concepts of will, intention, or purpose, and thus imply (for some) the
"hand of God" problem. I think this exercise might capture some essence of
that debate. This is being put forward as a thought exercise intended to
get at the core problem.
Basic proposition: Lets consider the possibility of a theoretical
construction based on two fundamental and opposing driving forces in
operation in living systems (and at least partly responsible for patterns
of evolution, development, and life "experience"). These are: a drive to
differentiate, and a drive to unify (splitting and lumping, if you prefer).
In development, cells divide, then become unified to form organs, which
differentiate from each other, then unify to form organisms, which
differentiate as individuals perhaps with identities, then unify into
communities, and so on, seemingly at any level or organization. In
evolutionary ecology there is niche segregation vs. symbiosis, competition
vs. cooperation, aggression vs. mutualism, etc. We can thus say that the
interaction of these two tendencies, in different forms and patterns, is at
the foundation of all biological organization and evolution. Let's assume
that a theory can be developed based on these two "real" forces, just as,
say, Newtonian forces were proposed in classical physics (quantum mechanics
being a separate matter not detracting from this success).
In such a theory, processes of unification/coalescence depend on (a) the
drive to unify and (b) prior differentiation. Processes of differentiation
depend on (a) the drive to differentiate and (b) prior unity (or some form
of coalescence). This description can be applied to all natural objects or
systems subject to purposeful drivers (especially associated with life) at
any level of organization. In other words, everything is alternatively
separating and joining together in response to the relative balance of
these two forces at work in any given system. The ontology of these forces
would not be at issue in the science resulting from this view, but would
rather be accepted as foundational to the theory (the usefulness of the
theory becomes the measure of acceptability of its assumptions). The rules
governing the pattern of this interplay, however, may differ in each case,
and are thus the subject of day-to-day scientific study and theory
construction.
Only at a philosophical level, which we will now engage, might we ask why
this pattern seems so pervasive and if these forces should be considered
"real?" Here are some alternative hypotheses:
H1: These opposing tendencies are complimentary and mutually exclusive
categories for all behavior, which are constructed from logical
possibilities, not from observation of nature; and their definition is a
matter of our frame of reference (mode of perception and logical
certainties), not natural forces. (This is similar to Gould's statistical
argument about the evolution of complexity - it is also analogous to the
geometrical view of gravitational "force").
H2: These (or a refinement of them) can be treated as "real" forces of
nature for the purpose of theory construction. They are just as real as any
"physical" force we might propose for similar purposes. (This is similar to
the Newtonian view in physics, which of course is quite valid for what it
is intended to describe, and for the four basic physical forces now
considered fundamental to perhaps everything physical).
The first hypothesis frames the phenomena within a mathematical or logical
certainty to the exclusion of anything else. But since logic is built on a
similar basis (distinction of opposites and thus measurement vs.
relationships which tend to connect them in various patterns), it is then
an inappropriate means of confirming the completeness of this hypothesis?
The second hypothesis invokes the idea of forces akin to "will." It leads
directly to the logical conclusion of end-directedness and purpose. Such
views have been traditionally excluded from normal scientific discourse
because they violate objectivity (H1) by implying teleology and at least
some aspect of a "hand of God" that may intervene in otherwise predictable
processes (and is thus untestable by logic).
Thus, as long as we think in objective terms, we have a paradox between h1
and h2, since both correspond with experience, yet they are apparently
contradictory: one says everything important in science can be described as
mechanism, the other claims there are aspects that can only be described as
purposeful (hence the necessity and usefulness of this theoretical
construction).
I suggest that the direction for resolution of this problem does not
involve choosing which view is correct or incorrect. Both are applicable to
the problem, and both are equally true or equally untrue, depending on
perspective (starting assumptions) and phenomena one wishes to describe.
They can be recognized as world views (W1 and W2) underlying theories, not
hypotheses (H1 and H2) competing within a theory; and as such they become
equally valid epistemologically. One's preference would be based on utility
(consistency, generality, formalization, fruitfulness, and some other
epistemological criteria) within a given practise (science disciplines,
religion, politics, etc.). Yet a true resolution, going beyond either view,
would lie in holding BOTH propositions to be true and then searching for a
more inclusive paradigm that is consistent with that result. (This is the
method Einstein claimed to have used in resolving the classical paradox
which led to relativity theory). So let's try:
WV3: W1 and W2 are two aspects of the same reality, which at this point we
would like to infer. Then we must at least conclude that logical and
mathematical description of life, consciousness, and evolution does not
exclude intention, purpose, and will, and vice versa.
The interesting question then becomes if the operation of will vs. the
complimentary mathematical (mechanistic) description are completely
independent views, describing phenomena that can forever be kept separate
(as some authors claim) or if it is necessary to consider points where they
intersect in order to have a complete view.
dimensionality (which I suggest as a handy label for the
logical/mathematical/objective view) will necessarily fail at specific
points of singularity (like the Big Bang and at the Planck wall) where our
normal space-time dimensions become blurred or otherwise undistinguished.
Hence there are points within the dimensional view where all properties are
excluded except non-dimensional qualities. One such quality (and perhaps
the only one) is unqualified and un quantified existence. However, in this
fully unitary view (pure existence without dimension) there is no
representation of dimensionality - no place where the view might break down
except at the end of eternity, which can't be located in such a
non-dimensional realm. In this sense, one could say that the "other" realm,
the unitary/whole realm is causal to the dimensional realm where we can
apply mathematics and logic, but perhaps not vice versa (within this
philosophy).
Now, my questioning goes a bit farther. It may still be acceptable to most
scientists that the objective/dimensional realm (where math, logic, etc.
can be applied) has beginning, ending, and scalar singularities, or "edges"
where the view breaks down and dissolves into some form of seemingly
unitary reality (point origin of the universe, the universe as a whole,
non-locality, light) -- Put aside for the moment attempts to describe this
"seemingly unitary reality" in terms of yet more, untestable dimensions. It
is quite another to suggest that these singularities can be causally
involved elsewhere in our normal dimensional description. Yet that is
exactly what I suggest is evident in quantum phenomena and consciousness
(whether they prove to be related or not), and perhaps other specific
phenomena.
Just as objective descriptions of nature have been proven to be accurate,
repeatable, and predictive within an objective/dimensional realm -- and
thus useful and in that sense "real" -- the experience of will, intention,
and purpose has been equally accepted as fundamentally "real," and proven
through personal experience among those who practice the appropriate
methods of introspection. This view was strongly held by many of the most
respected physicists of this Century (see the extensive writings on the
subject by Heisenberg, Schroedinger, Einstein, De Broglie, Jeans, Plank,
Pauli, and Eddington, for example).
The objections to either view are thus mere quibbles or expressions of
one's professionally chosen limits; and the real debate is if or to what
extent these two "realities" interact directly and thus require
consideration in those otherwise separated professions. We cannot explain
where our self-awareness and experiential self originates from, except that
it appears to be associated with the singular (or unitary) nature of
existence, and thus some claim it should not be considered "real" for the
purposes of constructing objective theories. But we also cannot account for
the ontology of objective construction (including perception and the
complimentary abstractions of logic and mathematics), in absolute terms,
because these appear to be dependent on the same dimensionality that is
fundamental to the world they are constructed to describe.
It is entirely possible that the striking usefulness of mathematics
(including logic) in describing the material realm is an obvious result of
its common origins within that realm. Plato's concept of "form" should not
be equated with mathematics (as in James Jeans' "God is a mathematician") -
it went beyond that in a manner similar to that which I have indicated
above. Mathematics covers the dimensional part of it, but not the unitary
quality, which is obviously (to those equipped and trained to observe in
this realm) involved in will, love, art, and other forms of direct personal
experience.
My conclusion is that, at our stage of development, dimensionality and
unity must be considered in both science and human affairs as two aspects
of the same "reality" - aspects that everything "real" can reflect at all
times. When things appear separate, there is still their connectedness,
when they appear as a unified whole, it is still possible to inspect the
parts. But this takes us back to the question of how independent these two
"complimentary" views really are. The points of interaction mentioned above
are hardly in dispute, and they are generally viewed ontologically. So this
dualistic system may be viewed as an interconnected whole (or perhaps more
properly, "holon"), perhaps analogous to two half circles connected at the
ends. But are there other points of connection where aspects of wholeness
and aspects of dimensionality intersect? If there are, for example as is
increasingly evident in macroscopic quantum phenomena as well as in
psychological phenomena, then our objective mathematical/logical
descriptions must account for these entry points in whatever limited way is
given to this form of description. In the case of the quantum phenomena,
this appears as a quantification of uncertainty, with no more than
probabilities being predictable. Similar unitary ontologies seem to enter
in psychology, as the "force" of will or purpose, and these forces cannot
be precisely quantified except in specified circumstances (like the quantum
phenomena).
In the case of evolution, I believe self-definition has been overlooked as
a similar case where "will" enters into an otherwise mechanical process,
and its effects need to be accounted for in whatever
statistical/probabilistic way is possible before we can have a truly useful
understanding of evolution that may be applicable not only to simple
phylogeny, but evolution of more complex patterns, psychological
experience, and social phenomena. The field of cybernetics must also deal
with this indeterminate aspect of conscious control and evolution.
If the arguments here are accepted, it means that scientific, objective
analysis will always be possible for any system, yet always incomplete.
Similarly, purely psychological or spiritual experience, occurring within a
living worldly being, will also be incomplete. Much of Eastern philosophy
deals with the necessity of movement and interaction between these two realms.
For many years I can recall hearing the response from scientists to
spiritual matters as: "Science doesn't claim to deal with everything -
there are matters that can be dealt with scientifically and there are
things that are not science, like love, art, spiritual experience, etc." In
recent times, especially with the desire to explain quantum phenomena, or
to determine a complete cosmology, or to develop cybernetic systems that
approach or achieve the status of living organisms, "science" has not been
able to maintain this comfortable separation from spirituality (witness the
voluminous writings on spirituality by quantum physicists and
cosmologists). The result seems to be the differentiation of two camps of
scientists, those who claim the problem of how these realms interact is not
solvable, and those who claim that objective reality is all there is. I, on
the other hand, believe that it is possible to construct a useful world
view that does admit to this interaction, potentially in all disciplines.
Are we perhaps approaching the "nexus" of the various compartments into
which we have organized our collective mind (if you will excuse the
presumption), not coincidentally but as a direct result of the attempts to
alternatively deny or explain the connection between mind and body, between
objective and subjective realities? If so, is it thus predictable that our
epistemology must also evolve to unify these seemingly opposite views?