Re: The Basics of Free Will

Nathanael T Lauster (tikitavi@WSUNIX.WSU.EDU)
Thu, 11 Sep 1997 11:49:52 -0700


I appreciate the pragmatics of using "free will" as a term to explain
differences in internalized processes (processes which result in more
random and subjectively unpredictable behavior). However, might I suggest
that the term "free will", originating, I believe, in decidedly
philosophical-religious contexts, carries alot of baggage with it. It
will probably ALWAYS be associated with some vague defense of Humanism.
Perhaps another term might make the distinction more meaningful in a
behaviorist fashion?

Best Luck,
-Nathan Lauster

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Nathan Lauster - Sociology Department - Washington State University
tikitavi@wsunix.wsu.edu - http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~tikitavi
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On Thu, 11 Sep 1997, Bruce Edmonds wrote:

> 1. The indended meaning of the term "free will" (FW) means that (if it
> exists) then a newly fertilsed egg and a normal adult human are
> different with respect to it. Any theory which equates the capacity of
> FW of such an egg and us is merely confused as to what FW means.
>
> 2. Therefore (if it exists at all) anything corresponding to a
> meaningful conception of FW emerges during our development from an egg
> to our adult form.
>
> 3. Thus an all-or-nothing concept of FW is incoherent (or, at least,
> radically incomplete) unless it is possible to get from a situation
> without FW to a situation with FW in an instant.
>
> 4. There are grave problems with identifying a coherent meaning of FW
> in an absolute sense, since there seems to be no way, even in principle,
> to check for the existence of FW (other than metaphysics). The events
> of the universe seem equally explicable with and without FW.
>
> 5. A pragmatic approach to free-will gets around many of the
> philosophical problems associated with it. The key question becomes
> when is it useful to attribute it to systems and when not. The
> differing degrees of usefulness means that FW is not an all-or-nothing
> concept.
>
> 6. From this perspective one can start to identify some of the
> properties of a system that might lead one to suppose that attributing
> it the additional property of FW would be useful: the degree to which
> its actions are not predictable, the degree to which its actions relate
> to something we may attribute to its internal mental state rather than
> its circumstances, how constrained it is as to possible action etc.
>
> 7. From these sort of considerations the evolution of FW in species
> (leading to us) makes some sort of sense - there is great survival value
> in being unpredictable and not constrained.
>
> 8. In this practical sense there are several candidate processes for
> it.
>
> As usual looking at the pragmatics gets rid of the philosophically
> self-generated confusion.
>
> ---------------------------------------------------
> Bruce Edmonds,
> Centre for Policy Modelling,
> Manchester Metropolitan University, Aytoun Bldg.,
> Aytoun St., Manchester, M1 3GH. UK.
> Tel: +44 161 247 6479 Fax: +44 161 247 6802
> http://bruce.edmonds.name
>