2. Therefore (if it exists at all) anything corresponding to a
meaningful conception of FW emerges during our development from an egg
to our adult form.
3. Thus an all-or-nothing concept of FW is incoherent (or, at least,
radically incomplete) unless it is possible to get from a situation
without FW to a situation with FW in an instant.
4. There are grave problems with identifying a coherent meaning of FW
in an absolute sense, since there seems to be no way, even in principle,
to check for the existence of FW (other than metaphysics). The events
of the universe seem equally explicable with and without FW.
5. A pragmatic approach to free-will gets around many of the
philosophical problems associated with it. The key question becomes
when is it useful to attribute it to systems and when not. The
differing degrees of usefulness means that FW is not an all-or-nothing
concept.
6. From this perspective one can start to identify some of the
properties of a system that might lead one to suppose that attributing
it the additional property of FW would be useful: the degree to which
its actions are not predictable, the degree to which its actions relate
to something we may attribute to its internal mental state rather than
its circumstances, how constrained it is as to possible action etc.
7. From these sort of considerations the evolution of FW in species
(leading to us) makes some sort of sense - there is great survival value
in being unpredictable and not constrained.
8. In this practical sense there are several candidate processes for
it.
As usual looking at the pragmatics gets rid of the philosophically
self-generated confusion.
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Bruce Edmonds,
Centre for Policy Modelling,
Manchester Metropolitan University, Aytoun Bldg.,
Aytoun St., Manchester, M1 3GH. UK.
Tel: +44 161 247 6479 Fax: +44 161 247 6802
http://bruce.edmonds.name