I am not trained as a scientist, as Paulo is already well aware, and
would
appreciate any comments on the validity of the following from those
with academic backgrounds.
Luis Rocha wrote:
>
> ----------
> From: Paulo Garrido[SMTP:Paulo.Garrido@DEI.UMINHO.PT]
> Sent: Friday, September 27, 1996 3:19 PM
> To: Multiple recipients of list PRNCYB-L
> Subject: super-systems, super-systems & co
>
> 2.One should be careful in ascertaining to the so called
> superbrain, properties of human brains. And in general, in analogically
> viewing society as a body organism. One may observe, for example that:
>
Society members are irreducibly
> different and their development and differenciation is much more
> asyncronous and hazaphardous.
> Bodies crucially depend on the genetic
> homogeneity of their cells, whilst societies rely heavily in the
> emergent variety of their members.
> And one could continue. Society members are free in space while cells
> are not.
> Body cells ABSOLUTELY depend on the body to exist, whilst society
> members do not (absolutely).
body to exist. We are freer in space, but are still gravity bound and
cannot occupy the same space as other matter. Also, I believe the
subatomic particles of a cell can move around, especially by changing
position with subatomic particles in other cells, bodies, other Gaian
lifeforms and the earth itself. Jeremy Rifkin wrote that every year 98%
of the atoms that make up our physical selves are changed with other
atoms. In five years the entire physical body has changed. Each breath
we takes contains a million atoms that have been breathed by everyone on
earth. In this case, the complex, earth and its inhabitants as a
lifeform concept, operates in tandem with the less complex, subatomic
level. Like all analogies, or models, there are differences as well a
similiarities or it would not be an analogy, but a clone. I think
learning can depend on seeing both the similiarities, (or recognizing a
learned pattern), and the differences, (or using the learned pattern as
a foundation to discern further patterns). The simplest pattern could
be delininated against randomness, but I believe more complex patterns
must be deliniated against less complex patterns, in a progression that
is helical rather than cyclical. When we reach too far, we do not have
enough learning to see any pattern and so paradoxically could see chaos
where a very large, complex pattern exists. I think math also follows
this type of progression.
The diversity among society members could be one of qualitive evolution
over the older concepts of society. The quantative step would of course
be the larger increment of association. Diversity does not work today
in many cases, because we are attempting to operate it under the old
competitive system used for our animal evolutionary foundation, rather
than a memetic based human system (which could also operate under a
competitive system, but more with the consequences of a game, than a
life and death struggle for some, or a housed or homeless struggle in
developed nations like the US and Canada. Like a game, rules and
honourable conduct would also become an important consideration)
> What I would like to know is to which point these and other differences
> limit the scope of the evident analogies and are the expression of
> irreducibly new phenomena.
>
> To put in another way. The body of an individual is an extremely =
> connected group of entities, genetically orchestrated into a very =
> coherent material system. Clearly, as you point out, societies, the =
> Internet, etc. Do not have an equivalent developmental conductor. =
> Rather, they are disembodied collections of embodied entities. They lack =
> the sort of tightly fit developmental , coherent organization that we =
> call a body.
The pattern may be so big, that we can not see enough of it to recognize
it as a pattern. There could be a developmental conductor that exists
light years away and uses high energy cosmic particles as its baton.
But also, I think, the lack of discernable patterns in collections of
individuals could be attributed to the concept of free will, in which
case humans are well suited to the entropic universe of Willard Gibbs,
rather than the Liebnitzian clockwork monads. The memetic nature of
these patterns is far less rigid than the genetic nature of the
individuals body, in that the patterns can change far faster
(theoretically at the speed of light), and so is more adaptive and less
likely to completely break down into disarray and randomness when
radically new situations arise (ie the larger environment as
developmental conductor calls for a change of key). Societal patterns
could also belong more to the temporal realm, than the spatial realm.
Because of this, they lack an essential circularity that =
> living and cognitive systems have: through development they are able to =
> pragmatically interact with an environment with repercursions to their =
> OWN bodies. Natural selection is based on this ability to explore =
> phenotypical alternatives through genetically encoded information, and =
> if one follows a Piagetian view of cognition, likewise, developmental =
> events have specific somatic repercursions in one's body, which dictate =
> how cognition is early on orchestrated into some direction. Since =
> societies and especially the internet do not have this selective =
> semantic closure, its actions have no direct repercursions to a body and =
> thus selection is largely eliminated.
Genetic structures seem to operate in a fiercely competitive milieu, or
one of limited symbiosis. Their requirements for relatively large
amounts of limited energy would seem to require this. Memetic
structures do not have this handicap and so can operate in a much more
cooperative manner (assuming their genetic foundations have used
humankind's ability to create the possible abundance society, by using
memes about intelligent load factors, and following Buckminster Fuller's
assertion that there is no crisis of energy, but a crisis of
ignorance). Ideas can be selected and have an effect on the body, but
in a cooperative, memetic arena, the complementary of selection is not
necessarily elimination of discarded ideas, but storage for possible use
in different circumstances, or as components of a recombination that
works well in the present environment. In essence, the system is more
open than genetic structures in that it can be more receptive to both
new and
old. In the genetic realm selection must entail elimination, both of
species and lifeform traits. (ie. a giraffe can not have a long neck for
leaves and a short neck for butting heads. Because of its temporal
abilities, memes can meet the anology of both requirements in a blink of
an eye. More openness could be considered an evolution over the more
closed system of the individual genetic structure.) Enlightened self
interest would also enable an individual to see how memetic activity
could have a very physical positive or negative effect on their own body
and the bodies of future generations.
>
> Now, having said this, I should add that I believe these attributes are =
> a question of degree. Morphogenesis is genetically regulated, and the =
> phenotype developed is tightly coupled. Consciousness seems to arise =
> from a collection of neurons that can be very different, and whose =
> genetic grip is less evident in the function of the brain. Societies are =
> not genetically coherent, but to a certain extent they also suffer =
> repercursions of its actions from an environment, though the demise of a =
> society does not require the elimination of its components as the death =
> of a living organism does. Finally, regarding the internet, and the =
> super-brain and all of that, I still need to see any sort of development =
> and selection process that could give it the status of the next =
> evolutionary step.=20
The internet would seem to be the ultimate extension of memetic
communication abilities, but there are certain undefinable elements in
face to face meetings that I think are also important. Other storage
and transmission devices, such as books, could also be a part of a
superbrain, in that they will be superseded but not replaced due to
their low cost and portability. Of course this could change further
down the road with programable book shaped devices that could download
or access any story desired. The reason that a development and
selection process is so hard to define on a global level, is because it
is not yet happening. Form follows function (follows form etc.) For a
global pattern to emerge, it is necessary that industrial age
institutions be disgarded (re Alvin Toffler) and the information age
move into the knowledge age (to use Peter Drucker's term). Until then,
memetic patterns are hard to discern in a global sense. I think this is
due to the resemblence in human affairs to George Bernard Shaw's
definition of
the earth as the lunatic asylum of the universe.
> 2. To any human brain we ascertain an individual locus of
> mind/conscience. There seems to be no reason that the same be made to
> the superbrain. Now the questions
>
> WHO is that one which eventually recognizes him/her/itself as having a
> brain made up of interactions and processing of the human brains? (The
> spirit of the human species?)
>
> Well, to play devil's advocate here, if we are to follow any sort of =
> Pask/Minsky theory, the human brain also does not have an individual =
> consciousness but is rather a society of agents. In any case, whether we =
> have one I or
> several I's, its/their existence is highly dependent on its/their body =
> which implements it/them. Whatever actions the brain pursues, they will =
> have repercursions in its embodiment. Only (fairly) coherent brain/body =
> arrangements tend to survive. The clinical cases where such arrangements =
> become incoherent serve precisely to prove their inability to survive.
I think the Buddhists also use the concept of several I's, and mood
changes alone would seem to support this deliniation. The overall
spirit of the human species could also be only a part of a larger
overall great spirit (re: Indians). In this case, autopoesis and
allopoesis would operate as a continuous continuum? Ancient writers
seemed to have recognized the Indian great spirit when they did their
invocation to the muses. John Grierson, founder of the National Film
Board of Canada, answered a scriptwriter who was asking about how an
individual could overcome writer's block, with the statement, what makes
you think it has anything to do with you. If this attitude is true,
then I guess one or some of the I's do not meet the common definition of
free
will.
> 3.
> IF human society is an organism (in the autopoietic sense) and has a
> (the super) brain
> THEN most probably we should KILL such being.
>
> Because, societies, or better, the social interaction should be a TOOL
> to enlarge individual power and freedom or, if one prefers, individual
> survival and development. There is no point in maintaining a
> society if it is not that. If a society becomes an organism, chances
> are that individual power and freedom are diminished: to exist as such
> an organism must limit the degrees of freedom of its components. And in
> the case of human societies - the components are us!
> Only one type of
> autopoietic system should be allowed to emerge as a result of social
> interactions: the one that enlarges individual power and freedom - for
> all the individuals. Maybe such a system is possible if it is built in
> the emotional domain of love, corresponding to the goal of development.
> If it is not the case, it should be destroyed. Otherwise, we may see
> ourselves with no survival or comfort problems ... and with no reason to
> live.
>
> I like what you say very much. However, no society can exist that does =
> not constrain individuals one way or another. We all know that freedom =
> comes with constraint. In one sense, a loner in some cabin in Idaho is =
> as free as can be. The liberties society may give you are of a different =
> kind. For example, you no longer have to protect yourself since you have =
> the police and the army to do that for you, you don't have to worry =
> about when to hunt and when to farm because there is always the local =
> supermarket. But all this also entails a loss of freedom (which we for =
> the most part gladly take) as you no longer can take a day off when you =
> please, you have to pay taxes, use the roads the government builds, =
> receive massified communication, etc. It is then, to a degree, =
> legitimate to make the usual argument of the society as a body. Certain =
> groups of people become specialized in different aspects of the group's =
> necessities. Just like a liver cell has no "freedom" to become an =
> retinal cell, a garbage collector has really no freedom to become a =
> society's president. The question of which society to kill then becomes =
> the age-old question of how much centralism or self-organization one =
> desires of society.
Along the lines of Jeremy Rifkin's The End of Work, I think automation
capabilities could quickly move individuals far along the road to
freedom by creating a ten hour enforced work week, much of which would
not have to be synchronized and could be done when the individual felt
like it. The free time could be used for whatever, and would probably
entail lots of time spent on work one wanted to do, in which case it
would not be work. By the same token, if the person really enjoyed the
work atmosphere, where cooperation and camraderie replace competition
and secrecy, then even the enforced ten hours would not be work. (ie. a
child has
to learn, an adult gets to learn). This mindset would also turn many
other of what are now considered constraints to have freedom, to freedom
in order to have more freedom. (ie. the individual is not free to
physically eliminate a competitor, but in a cooperative mindset, the
competitor would become interconnected with the individual in a positive
way. So people are not free to cut off their hand, but who cares if
what they want to do is be free to use their hand.) In short if people
are doing what they want to do, then they are experiencing freedom. The
constraints could shrink so much, they could be a fraction of what we
have
today. Even unpleasant tasks could be accomplished with a higher sense
of
freedom through the concept of an individual's ideas about duty. There
is
also no reason that someone who collects garbage one day a week, could
not be the president of a society. In short, automatic machines have
the
capability to reconcil much of the apparent tradeoff between freedom of
the
whole and freedom of the individual. I think a metasystem transition at
the
next level would move beyond many of the massified communications, tax
paying,
enforced 40 hour week, road travelling even, that collectively are part
of
the embodiment of the paradigm of our present system.
>
> >From what I said above, the question that I find interesting is what =
> kind of selective pressures, if any, are societies and super-organisms =
> subjected to? Is selection an essential mechanism to understand =
> super-organisms, or is self-organization enough? And if this is the =
> case, can we really call them super-organisms?
>
I think the selective pressure still remains in the old domain of evolve
or perish. Superbrain evolution could start by ensuring a sustainable
energy supply for individual entities and progress to more esoteric
things like individual entities coalescing into superbrains, on a
functional and not existential basis, for a Gaian defense mechanism
against asteroids, as well as exploration or seeding of other planets.
A Gaian superbrain could also lay the foundation for a solar system
superbrain, then galaxy superbrain, then universe(s) superbrain, then
???
I have a hard time separating the concept of self-organization from the
concept of selection. I also have trouble with the term
self-organization because it takes emphasis away from the effect of the
larger environment on the self or organism. I apolagize for rambling on
so
long, but I hope there is something of value in this for the group.
Its good to see the PCP newsgroup active on the net again.
Sincerely
Dan Parker