super-systems, super-systems & co

Paulo Garrido (Paulo.Garrido@DEI.UMINHO.PT)
Fri, 27 Sep 1996 20:19:01 +0100


Dear PCP'ers:

1. With regard to the analogical thinking which, for example, suggests
us that social organisations are the equivalent at the social system
level of body organs - to which point are these conclusions valid and
reasonable? To which point are the suggested equivalencies
true?

Let me put this a bit more technical. Let A' be the meta-system
resulting from the meta-system transition involving systems A1, A2, etc.
In which conditions is A' isomorphic to the Ai? Maybe this is not the
right question, because if A' is isomorphic to the Ai, nothing
effectively new emerges from the meta-system transition. So, instead,
one may ask:

When a meta-system transition occurs, which properties of the elements
pj(Ai) are preserved in the properties of the meta-system pk(A'), which
properties are not preserved, and which new properties emerge?

(As I am doing research related to this, I would thank any helpful
hints).

2.One should be careful in ascertaining to the so called
superbrain, properties of human brains. And in general, in analogically
viewing society as a body organism. One may observe, for example that:

Elements of bodies have a totally homogeneous genetic material. Elements
of societies have only a quasi-homogeneous genetic material (1/1000 mean
difference between individuals).
Body cells result from meiosis, while
eggs of individuals result from mitosis followed by fusion. Body cells
are no more than clones of an egg, quasi-synchronously differenciated by
the control of gene expression. Society members are irreducibly
different and their development and differenciation is much more
asyncronous and hazaphardous.
Bodies crucially depend on the genetic
homogeneity of their cells, whilst societies rely heavily in the
emergent variety of their members.
And one could continue. Society members are free in space while cells
are not.
Body cells ABSOLUTELY depend on the body to exist, whilst society
members do not (absolutely).

What I would like to know is to which point these and other differences
limit the scope of the evident analogies and are the expression of
irreducibly new phenomena.

2. To any human brain we ascertain an individual locus of
mind/conscience. There seems to be no reason that the same be made to
the superbrain. Now the questions

WHO is that one which eventually recognizes him/her/itself as having a
brain made up of interactions and processing of the human brains? (The
spirit of the human species?)

WHICH are the facts and events he/she/it takes conscience about?

COULD we communicate with he/she/it?
Thinking downwards - will it be the case that in
each of our (brain) cells resides an individual locus of
mind/conscience?

3.
IF human society is an organism (in the autopoietic sense) and has a
(the super) brain
THEN most probably we should KILL such being.

Because, societies, or better, the social interaction should be a TOOL
to enlarge individual power and freedom or, if one prefers, individual
survival and development. There is no point in maintaining a
society if it is not that. If a society becomes an organism, chances
are that individual power and freedom are diminished: to exist as such
an organism must limit the degrees of freedom of its components. And in
the case of human societies - the components are us!
Only one type of
autopoietic system should be allowed to emerge as a result of social
interactions: the one that enlarges individual power and freedom - for
all the individuals. Maybe such a system is possible if it is built in
the emotional domain of love, corresponding to the goal of development.
If it is not the case, it should be destroyed. Otherwise, we may see
ourselves with no survival or comfort problems ... and with no reason to
live.

Regards

Paulo Garrido