Arno wrote:
>...this relation is something we build ourselves.
I agree. I think computations are user (observer) defined (as opposed to an
intrinsic ontological aspect of nature). We can, if we wish, come up with
mappings from nature to a computational interpretation of nature, but it
should not be forgotten that it is us who are "coming up with" the
mappings. We are necessarily involved in the loop for a computational
interpretation. We can also build material systems that absolutely
positively have no intrinsic symbolic nature to themselves (no external
referents). In this way, we can solely be the ones that provide (from
outside) the referents, symbolism, the meaning... The system itself
wouldn't be adding its own meaning (and acting on it) thus frustrating
our interpretation. An example of a material system that has no intrinsic
meaning (or symbolism) is a computer, but computers are totally
symbolic (to us) in that we have complete liberty to assign whatever meaning
we want to the meaningless symbols.
>> 3) And there can be systems that have aspects of both (matter-symbol
>> complementarity).
These would have to be systems in which there is a symbolic aspect
within themselves (where we don't have to be in the loop providing the
meaning). I think Rosen invokes this with final cause (where material,
efficient, and formal cause are the traditional causes from the realism
perspective.
Arno writes:
>Similarly, as to this third domain, a fully nominalist approach (as in 2)
>does not satisfy, nor does a fully realist approach.
>We cannot:
>a) treat all observed phenomena as causally determined processes (realism)
>nor
>b) treat all assigned relations as observer's constructs (nominalism)
>because:
>ad a)
>some processes seem to be of a symbol processing quality (e.g. dna
>production)
>and
>ad b)
>some relations seem to be read or constructed by the observed system itself
>(e.g. the 'reading' of dna by a living system itself)
>...
>That is: there are double [causal] roles, and they are mixing up.
The world may not be ontologically as neat and tidy as we
would sometimes like to believe.
Jeff Prideaux