Quoting Francis:
> . . . we need to completely describe
>the observation apparatus. But in order to describe the apparatus we need a
>second apparatus that would measure the microscopic state of the first one...
> etc.,etc....
But this is impossible in reality. This reach for absolute certainty
appears to be based upon a faith in the existence of an absolute causal
determinism. In this regard the hunt is going in the wrong direction,
following a quarry that does not exist.
Jeff writes:
>. . . meaning emerges from
>the reciprocal relations between elements, rather than from some outside
>observer. . . .Rosen also seems to say (unless I'm misinterpreting him) that
>>meaning can emerge relationally between components.
What does this mean? or rather What _can_ it mean? Meaning depends not
primarily upon the relations among elements but on their relation to the
purposes of the observer. Is it really contemplated that the observer can
be excluded?
This leads me to recall Popper's criticism and demolition of the notion of
so-called scientific causal determinism. In The Open Universe: An Argument
for Indeterminism, Karl Popper argued with a cogency that has not been
refuted that belief in determinism is based upon no more that a
quasi-religious prejudice that science approaches (if only in principle)
divine omniscience. But, he says, scientific theories are human inventions
- nets designed to catch the fish of the world, and also, of course, to be
true. Such theories are of our making and should not be mistaken for
complete as representations of the world. He argued that the simplicity of
our theories does not entail the intrinsic simplicity of the world.
To try to explain this a little bit more to those unfamiliar with Popper's
ideas (Popper was called the greatest philosopher of science who ever
lived, by Sir Peter Medawar, Nobel Prize winner) I might comment as
follows.
The reason, as I understand it, why notions of so-called "scientific"
causal determinism do not belong to science are not to be found only in
terms of the uncertainties of quantum mechanics. Popper holds that
scientific predictions must be precisely accountable. He says that a
prediction cannot be more precise than the initial conditions. And there
must be a way to know ahead of time if the conditions are thus adequate or
no test can be conclusive. The amount of allowable error must be known. So
'scientific' accountability requires accountablity in this 'strong' sense
that precise measurement is required. He says further that there is every
reason to think that this requirement can be approached but never
completely or adequately satisfied. He also says that increasing knowledge
of causes does not lead to greater predictability.
I think these views are relevant to any attempt to describe reality in
conceptual or so-called objective scientific terms. (Regarding alternative
methods, of course, Popper has many other things to say (q.v.).)
Jeff writes:
> Rosens
>components involve some kind of infinite structure that can not be computed.
My impression is that Rosen's argument might allow for a distinction between
(1) a theoretical concept and (2) the real world by which it may be tested
and which we use the concept to represent. It is that real world which may
be infinite, at least in relation to our possibilities for complete
knowledge of it. If the word _components_ signifies aspects of the world,
it makes sense to say that they may involve some non-computable infinite
structure. However, if we are here using the word _components_ to refer to
the elements of our theoretical constructs we may be committing a catagory
mistake, i.e. mixing the two different universes of discourse in a way that
makes nonsense of both.
I wrote:
>>I would begin with the primary feature-detector as direct human perception,
>>the phenomenology of events - of signs and symptoms, as it were - with
>>which we are all individually familiar.
Jeff:
>Rosen apparently starts before human perception...before understanding of
>meaning.
I believe this comment must be based upon misunderstanding. Perception
provides the initial data. To start before this does not make sense to me
within this framework of discussion. Even the argument that there may be
inherited dispositions to assign structure to experience (imprinted
reactions, as a duckling reacts to the wing of a hawk) would just be a way
of assigning meaning, and would not come before meaning.
>I think Rosen would say that we take a thermometer and take the
>>temperature...but at this level (to be totally objective), the thermometer
>>just outputs meaningless symbols (which we cant understand if we are to
>>strictly obey objectivity). To get more information about what those symbols
>>mean, we would have to construct another device, and so on and so on..
This seems to me to also involve some misunderstanding of the nature of
symbols and objectivity. A thermometer or any other measuring instrument is
specifically devised to register and relate a physical quantity, e.g.
pressure or temperature, against a standard of comparison It has this
symbolic meaning within the conceptual structure of science. As such it is
a definitive example of objective i.e. scientific, meaning. IMO, to find an
infinite regress in this situation is a trivial mystification.
> We see what objectively would be some meaningless
>symbol and then we process that information, attaching meaning that is
>relative to our context, creating knowledge.
I agree that knowledge and meaning are relative to context, but I also
detect some confusion of conceptual categories in this statement. Symbols,
by definition, cannot be meaningless, for they carry meaning or reference.
What we see, in terms of such symbols, are interpretations of experience in
the objectively established catagories of science. Objectivity is a
property of an elaborate theoretical and cultural framework of ideas.
Perhaps Jeff is using the term objectivity to refer to the given experience
(datum) of directly perceived phenomena. These are relatively not yet
processed for meaning, however, and are basically subjective. Such primary
perceptions, to oversimplify, have more of the nature of simple comparisons
among elements of perceived phenomena, or comparisons with memory and
expectation. And it may be doubted that we ever perceived anything that has
no subjective meaning for us. Nevertheless, objectivity refers to the
shared conceptual constructs of science, not to subjective experience of
ourselves and the world.
>I think that Rosen doesn't believe in total objectivity, but he wants to
>pose the issue in totally objective terms. When he does that, an infinite
>regress forms. You could dismiss this development (of trying to be
>totally objective) as an inappropriate method. Ultimately you are probably
>right. I think what Rosen is suggesting is that it may be useful, though, to
>purely objectively study an object, but that object would have to be an
>impredicativity (an infinite regress turned back on itself as I understand
>>it).
Well, it is not a question of belief, but one of coherence and understanding.
The question is what total objectivity might mean. If it is not possible,
then any attempt to be totally objective is an illusion, and the conceptual
products can only be illusory. It is the obligation of the proponent to
demonstrate the usefulness of such an attempt, so seek to be accountable
(in Popper's sense).
I would see the suggestion of an impredictive infinite regress as
unnecessarily complicated, not required when simpler explanations are
available, and certainly not a reflection of objective complexity in the
world.
No one said that complexity would be simple!
Cheers!
Bruce B.