Francis, Ill look forward to seeing if I can pull some of your papers off
the Internet through Netscape. Unfortunately, our university library here
doesnt carry the International Journal of General Systems... perhaps I can
get the article through inter-library loan...
I think it will be very fruitful to spend more time examining whether Rosen's
ideas on the measurement problem converges with what the physics
community went through earlier this century with quantum measurements.
I know Rosen was critical of the quantum probabilistic state equation as
being just another form of reductionism that had the same pitfalls... I
personally want to understand all of this better.
> As I have previously argued myself 7,8, this problem can be clearly
>illustrated by the quantum mechanical observation process. In order to
>completely describe the observation process, we need to completely describe
>the observation apparatus. But in order to describe the apparatus we need a
>second apparatus that would measure the microscopic state of the first one.
>That second apparatus on the other hand would still be incompletely
>described, and that would incite us to introduce a third apparatus to
>measure the second one, and so on. Since the result of the measurement does
>not only depend on the state of the system that is to be observed but also
>on that of the measuring instrument (unlike measurement in classical
>mechanics), the conclusion is that we will never be able to completely
>predict that result. This leads to the well-known indeterminacy of quantum
>mechanics. "
This does seem to exactly parallel what Rosen said in his most recent paper.
>The thrust of my approach is to replace infinite regresses or
>incompatible models by "bootstrapping" models where meaning emerges from
>the reciprocal relations between elements, rather than from some outside
>observer. These models can to some degree be formalized (through a
>formalism having some similarities to category theory, or perhaps hyperset
>theory), and run on a computer.
Rosen also seems to say (unless I'm misinterpreting him) that meaning can
emerge relationally between components. But I have a suspicion that Rosens
components involve some kind of infinite structure that can not be computed.
This seems to me to be a very important issue and I want to hear all of your
ideas.
Bruce writes:
>I would begin with the primary feature-detector as direct human perception,
>the phenomenology of events - of signs and symptoms, as it were - with
>which we are all individually familiar.
Rosen apparently starts before human perception...before understanding of
meaning.
>Suppose we want to
>determine if a patient's blood pressure is elevated beyond the normal.
I think Rosen would say that we take a thermometer and take the temperature...
but at this level (to be totally objective), the thermometer just outputs
meaningless symbols (which we cant understand if we are to strictly
obey objectivity). To get more information about what those symbols mean,
we would have to construct another device, and so on and so on...
We see an unpleasant incipient infinite regress in the process of information.
>This would be an indicator of faulty method, a sort of software problem.
Agreed!!!! This is the main point Rosen is driving at. He is critiquing
total objectivity. You are absolutely right that we can understand what the
symbols mean on the thermometer. We dont need an infinite number of
other devices...
>>But where does such "independent knowledge" come from? At least, it
>>comes from outside the system itself, and thus would violate the basic
>>tenant of formalization, that there is no such "outside".
>It is important to keep certain distinctions clearly in mind.
>Some information initially comes via perception from outside the system or
>organism. Only after this information has been processed and elaborated
>within some formal/conceptual system of thought do we usually speak of
>"knowledge".
I agree with this. We see what objectively would be some meaningless
symbol and then we process that information, attaching meaning that is
relative to our context, creating knowledge.
>So, in a sense, knowledge is already bound by the formal requirements of
>its conceptualization. Since this is consensual it is to that extent no
>longer completely independent. (Thus "independent knowledge" may be a bit
>of an oxymoron - a contradiction in terms.)
I agree. I think, though, that Rosen was asking the question From a purely
objective point of view: " how do we process information, attaching meaning?"
>Formalisms are relative (to the data), not absolute. Objectivity is
>not pure, but depends, among other things, on a intersubjective consensus
>related to data and experience.
Agreed.
>>because infinity finitely fragmented still yields infinities,
>>finite fragmentation can not resolve the infinite regress.
>While valid enough, I would suspect that this is a truism which is no more
>than an indication of an inappropriate method.
I think that Rosen doesn't believe in total objectivity, but he wants to
pose the issue in totally objective terms. When he does that, an infinite
regress forms. You could dismiss this development (of trying to be
totally objective) as an inappropriate method. Ultimately you are probably
right. I think what Rosen is suggesting is that it may be useful, though, to
purely objectively study an object, but that object would have to be an
impredicativity (an infinite regress turned back on itself as I understand it).
Im still in the process of formulating my opinions so any comments are
welcome.
Jeff Prideaux