Re: [Fwd: [Fwd: fallacy in Rosen's arguments is a ???????]]

Jerry LR Chandler (jlrchand@EROLS.COM)
Wed, 23 Jun 1999 15:26:10 -0500


Dear Don:

Your writings over the past several months on several sites have
consumed a great deal of my time. I have attempted to understand the
meaning of your words, apparently without success. Recently, I have
posted on two critical issues - the identity operation and the
correspondence relation. In both cases, the essential logic of my post
was "overlooked" in your response. These two logical relations
(identity and correspondence) are critical to the essence of category
theory and its application to natural systems. While pondering the
reasons for this "oversight," you have published two more messages
which clarify matters for me. Both illustrate your style of claiming a
superior vision of Rosen's work. I can not find a logical path from
scientific logic to your views and thus remain, sadly, a bit skeptical
of your vision of Rosen's work. The two fragments which clarified your
thinking to me were:

Don Mikulecky wrote:
>
> My intuition tells me that we are not going to resolve our differences. I
> would hope that you would be more careful before claiming to have destroyed a
> man's life's work. My reading is that you do not understand the work and are
> prone to focus on one detail or another out of context in order to find a way
to
> discount something that is contrary to your beliefs. It is not honest to
> disguise that as a refutation of anything.

> > >
> > > You have still another straw man. Rosen's discussion of software and
> > hardware
> > > is not as you portray it nor does his argument rest on that portrayal.
> > What
> > > defines a michine is the following.
> > > 1)the existence of largest models
> > > 2)analytic models= synthetic models
> > > 3)causalities are sepate
> > > 4)they are fragmentable
> > > 5)they are simulable
> > > 6)they are poor in entailment
> > > 7)they have a efficient cause from outside
> > > 8)and many more
> > > In each and every case the organism has opposite qualities. This is a
> > whole
> > > definition. I'll come back to the misinterpretation you make about
> > hardware and
> > > software later if you wish, but you attribute words to us that are not
> > ours once
> > > again.

The grounding of your views seems to be "In each and every case the
organism has opposite qualities."
BUT, the list of attributes (1-8) are:
primarily mental images,
that is, representation of machines,
that is, mathematics,
that is, imaginations of the mind about the exterior world,
that is, suppositions about empirical observations.

Hold that thought for a minute while different concept is developed.

One can make mathematical speculations that the universe can be
partioned into exactly two classes of systems. For ease of
communication, let us say that these two classes of systems are governed
by two sets of laws:
Man's Laws
Devil's Laws.
You may wish to assign one system the name "simple" and name the other
system "complex", or vice versa. It makes no logical difference. They
are just names without observational reference.

Now, hold this second thought for a moment while yet another thought, a
third thought is developed.

Pick a conceptually challenging noun which is difficult to classify.
One noun of substantial conceptual and pragmatic interest is "DNA."

Questions on these three thoughts:
1. Does DNA belong in system one
or, does DNA belong in system two.
or, does DNA belong in both systems, depending on the reference?

2. If you choose system one, what would be the reference?
If you choose system two, what would be the reference?
If you chose both, would you attempt to be vague about the true
references, picking one in some circumstances and the other in other
circumstances?

3. What would be the semantic "identity" of the name "DNA" in all three
possibilities?

4. How would one EXPERIMENTALLY demonstrate the "correspondence
relations" between DNA and the universe(s) from which it is derived?

The presupposition behind this example is straight forward. Mental
images (mathematics) are remote from natural systems themselves. In
other words, is it meaningful to divide the universe into two and
exactly two classes of systesm?

In closing, I am beginning to think that your interpretation of Rosen's
work is restricted to a mental world which includes your personal
values. The elegance of Rosen's brillant mathematical and physical
reasoning is NOT captured by the list of eight qualities. The reference
frame necessary for applications of Rosen's mathematics to natural
systems is not crisp and no correspondence relations can be formed
directly from Rosen's mathematics. Metaphors (or analogies) are not a
substitute for either identity relations or correspondence relations
which are essential to bridge the gap:
between natural systems and mental systems,
between dynamical systems and mathematical descriptions of dynamical
systems, or, between semantics and syntax.

These are not merely "details," Don, the concepts of identity and
correspondence are the essential to human scientific activities and to
the structure of mathematical reasoning, both within and outside of
category theory.

Thus, I conclude my contribution to this discussion and, personally,
wish you well in all your endeavors.

Cheers

Jerry LR Chandler

>
> This may be a partial answer to john Collier's question
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Subject: [Fwd: fallacy in Rosen's arguments is a straw man]
> Date: Wed, 23 Jun 1999 08:51:27 -0400
> From: Don Mikulecky <mikuleck@hsc.vcu.edu>
> To: NE Complex Systems Institute <NECSI@HOME.EASE.LSOFT.COM>
>
> I hadn't realize Brian had posted this twice. I thought it was a
> private communication. Since he chose to make it public, my reply
> should be also.
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Subject: Re: fallacy in Rosen's arguments is a straw man
> Date: Wed, 23 Jun 1999 08:48:54 -0400
> From: Don Mikulecky <mikuleck@hsc.vcu.edu>
> To: Brian Josephson <bdj10@cam.ac.uk>
> References: <432435.3139079917@line113.slip.csx.cam.ac.uk>
>
> Brian,
> Let's see what you claimed......you claimed that the section of the book was a
> "fallacy in Rosen's argument. You then said that all that follows is his and
my
> arguments is invalid. that is really humorous! I'll not comment on the
> arrogance.
>
> you have been around long enough to know what it takes to refute an argument.
> You first need to identify exactly which argument you proport to refute. You
> simply claim ALL arguments then fail to even give a refutation. Now let's
deal
> with what the book says and what arguments you claim to have refuted?
>
> Brian Josephson wrote:
>
> > --On Tue, Jun 22, 1999 10:43 -0400 "Don Mikulecky" <mikuleck@hsc.vcu.edu>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Ah Brian
> > > I think you still do not get the picture that the machines, or simple
> > systems we
> > > talk about are "formal systems" on the right hand side of the modeling
> > relation
> > > into which natural systems are encoded. In other words they are things
> > > scientists created in their minds. When you see a "machine" out in the
> > real
> > > world, it is a complex system. It fits all the OPPOSITE criterea from a
> > simple
> > > system! You have confused the two and think your confusion leads to a
> > fallacy
> > > in Rosen!
> > >
> > > You have still another straw man. Rosen's discussion of software and
> > hardware
> > > is not as you portray it nor does his argument rest on that portrayal.
> > What
> > > defines a michine is the following.
> > > 1)the existence of largest models
> > > 2)analytic models= synthetic models
> > > 3)causalities are sepate
> > > 4)they are fragmentable
> > > 5)they are simulable
> > > 6)they are poor in entailment
> > > 7)they have a efficient cause from outside
> > > 8)and many more
> > > In each and every case the organism has opposite qualities. This is a
> > whole
> > > definition. I'll come back to the misinterpretation you make about
> > hardware and
> > > software later if you wish, but you attribute words to us that are not
> > ours once
> > > again.
> >
> > Don,
> >
> > On p.229 of _my_ copy of 'Life Itself' at any rate, after a
> > discussion of 'mechanism' the text continues:
> >
> > "The situation is different if we are dealing with a machine. In this case,
> > we superimpose on a general mechanism the partition into hardware and
> > software, which as we have seen, reflects itself in a corresponding
> > partition of mechanism states into separate blocks".
> >
> > Are we reading the same book? Mine says at the front '(c) 1991 Columbia
> > University Press'. Should I ignore the statement I quote, which seems
> > absolutely clear cut to me, and accept that as you suggest that if I read
> > the book in its entirety I will see that it does not mean that at all? I
> > can't say I have ever come across a book written in that way before.
> >
> > Perhaps you are right to say that machines and "machines" are different.
>
> No...look at the language more carefully. There are a number of distinctions
> made. The most obvious is between simple systems and complex systems. Then
> WITHIN simple systems are machines. The Turing machine is used as an example
> for the purpose of dealing with formalisms that are algorithmic. The
> demonstration in the book is meant to focus on Turing type machines because of
> the widespread belief that the Universal Turing machine is the dsemonstration
of
> Church's Thesis. In Turing type machines there is a clear distinction
between
> hardware and software. Why is this important? Because of the difference in
> CAUSAL relations. This difference in CAUSAL relations is what is at issue
> here. When we go back to the general case THAT is what we carry back. Rosen
> spends a lot of time elsewhere on these same issues. There are many places in
> Life Itself where he assumes you have done your homework and read what came
> before.
>
> What puzzles me is that you are so struck by the fact that in the example of
the
> machine among simple systems, namely the Turing Machine, that you generalize
> from the example to the entire work. What is your problem with the idea that
in
> computers hardware and software are distinct?
>
> > This difference seems not to be referred to in Rosen. Or perhaps, to
> > confuse us all, you are using different terminology to him? You list a
> > definition of a machine in your letter, but it is hard to recognise Rosen as
> > saying the same. And the question is whether if machines are formal systems
> > that scientists create this has anything at all to do with the world of the
> > informal scientific theory. I am wondering if all this apparent talking in
> > riddles is serving any useful purpose, and we should stick to the informal
> > understanding of these things that many of us appear to have.
>
> I think we are not talking in riddles, but in different worlds. I've long ago
> adopted Rosen's epistemology and find what follows self-consistent. Your
> failure to recognize the list of traits that distinguishes simple systems from
> complex systems says that you have not followed Rosen very well. He does say
> all those things and in that book. If you like I'll cite chapter and verse.
>
> >
> >
> > Brian
> >
> > * * * * * * * Prof. Brian D. Josephson :::::::: bdj10@cam.ac.uk
> > * Mind-Matter * Cavendish Lab., Madingley Rd, Cambridge CB3 0HE, U.K.
> > * Unification * voice: +44(0)1223 337260/337200 fax: +44(0)1223 337356
> > * Project * WWW: http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~bdj10
> > * * * * * * *
>
> My intuition tells me that we are not going to resolve our differences. I
> would hope that you would be more careful before claiming to have destroyed a
> man's life's work. My reading is that you do not understand the work and are
> prone to focus on one detail or another out of context in order to find a way
to
> discount something that is contrary to your beliefs. It is not honest to
> disguise that as a refutation of anything. If I am wrong, please correct me.
I
> also do want know the significance to you that Rosen shows that in Turing type
> machines, hardware and software are separate.
> Respectfully,
> Don Mikulecky