This is very close to what I argue in my "Pragmatic Holism" paper
(http://bruce.edmonds.name/praghol/). I agree with Alexei.
The reason why it is "hard to swallow" is that our common sense (learned
from the macroscopic world) is that a finer-grained model (i.e. one
which includes more `parts') is better (i.e. more `true'). The trouble
is that we extrapolate this principle to domains well beyond this
orginal learning context in the form of abstract principles that are
supposedly context-free. It is here that we are mistaken.
Take an example: a human tossing a coin. There is absolutely no
*evidence* that this is a deterministic process, and plenty that it is
not. We can only *assume* it is as a result of our suppositions about
the world (as a result of a sort of wish for coherency in our
world-view).
A determinist would say that such processes are not determinable only
due to present practical limitations, but this misses the possibility
that truth (as we know it) would not be possible without these
limitations, i.e. it is may be of the *essence* of truth that it is what
works - everything else being just fanciful ways of modelling what
works.
Regards.
--------------------------------------------------
Bruce Edmonds,
Centre for Policy Modelling,
Manchester Metropolitan University, Aytoun Bldg.,
Aytoun St., Manchester, M1 3GH. UK.
Tel: +44 161 247 6479 Fax: +44 161 247 6802
http://bruce.edmonds.name