Re: selection and choice vs bifurcation

Francis Heylighen (fheyligh@VUB.AC.BE)
Tue, 16 Mar 1999 11:40:40 +0100


Don Mikulecky:
>If selection and choice are too anthropomorphic, then can we retreat
>back to the notion of bifurcation? If a system is so constructed as to
>have a "model" of its environment in it (we can give an example of a
>simple feed-forward enzyme system) it can behave in such a way that we
>would anthropomorphize as "anticipation". However the system can be
>easily represented formally. If we combine this property with sets of
>bifurcations, it seems we have something that would pass as a formal
>description of "choice" and with some embellishment from the environment
>we could also handle "selection" formally without anthropomorphic
>undertones. Am I too far afield?

No, this fits perfectly into my generalized variation-and-selection
paradigm (or metaphysics, as John Kineman correctly points out).
Bifurcation corresponds to the phase of variation which creates a number of
distinct possibilities ("distinction creation" in my terminology).
Selection corresponds to the elimination of most of these possibilities,
reducing the number of remaining options ("distinction destruction").

Anticipation corresponds to what Donald Campbell
(http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CAMPBEL.html) has called "vicarious selection":
the system (organism, enzyme system, whatever), after undergoing a process
of "natural" (mostly external) selection, has adapted by developing an
internal selecting mechanism that anticipates external selection by
eliminating potentially harmful variations *before* natural selection can
act on them. For example, bacteria may develop a sense of "taste", which
makes them avoid poisonous substances before they have had the chance to
disturb their metabolism. This taste has developed by natural selection:
bacteria that did not recognize the common poisonous substances have been
eliminated, those that did survived and multiplied. However, once the
bacteria have the sense of taste in their genes, they will no longer be
subjected to natural selection because of the casual presence of these
substances.

Thus, the system becomes much more likely to survive, and much more
efficient in adaptation. In the course of evolution it will develop a
whole range of vicarious selectors. Most vicarious selectors can also be
viewed as "models", although it is my impression that the vicarious
selector concept is even more general than the one of model. These in time
tend to get organized in a hierarchy of selectors selecting other
selectors. This produces a complex perceptual-cognitive system, which can
anticipate and solve a whole range of problems, without needing to rely on
natural selection, except for its further development.

John J. Kineman:
>Natural selection fails when we ask how cognitive
>choice affects selection. If you defend the mechanical/deterministic
>paradigm, you must dismiss the question as unscientific. The paradigm
>presumes that all such questions are eventually explainable by the
>mechanism of passive selection (of material form) and hence there is no
>cognitive choice. This, unfortunately, doesn't help us understand the human
>case (and by analogy, other species) and causes serious problems with
>explaining the psyche, responsibility, and why we would get worked up over
>choices we seem to have.

As I sketched before, Campbell's concept of a hierarchy of vicarious
selectors elegantly solves the problem of human choice and cognition. The
passive mechanism of natural selection creates internal (vicarious)
selectors that make the organism much more autonomous, anticipative and
intelligent in its choices, by building up a hierarchy of cybernetic
perception and control loops. These are much better conceptualized by a
"functional" paradigm, which analyzes how these systems help the organism
to survive (their function), than by the structural, mechanistic or
physical paradigm, which sees them all as deterministic interactions
between particles.

In particular, if you conceptualize the human "psyche" as a complex
hierarchy of vicarious selectors, it becomes clear both why humans
obviously are not just trying out things at random, but have a sense of
purpose, direction and anticipation, and why in spite of that they still
hesitate, waver and have generally the feeling that there are many
different possibilities without any one obviously being the only correct
one. Vicarious selectors help us make "choices" by reducing the range of
variation (possibilities) that we need to consider, but they will never
completely eliminate variation. The world is much too complex and
unpredictable for any various selectors to be able to always tell us what
to do.

Actually, Campbell might as well have introduced the concept of "vicarious
variator": these cognitive control systems that have evolved not only
increase selectivity, but also the range of possible actions that are being
taken into consideration. It's there that the typically human creative
thought lies: by combining concepts and associations we can conceive of a
far greater range of possibilites than any animal. (cf.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/THINKING.html)

If you are interested in exploring this further, I'd advise you to read
Campbell's classic "Evolutionary Epistemology" paper. (see
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EVOLEPIST.html for more about evolutionary
epistemology and Campbell's contributions).

________________________________________________________________________
Dr. Francis Heylighen, Systems Researcher fheyligh@vub.ac.be
CLEA, Free University of Brussels, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
Tel +32-2-6442677; Fax +32-2-6440744; http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/HEYL.html