Re: Is all self-organisation evolutionary?

Francis Heylighen (fheyligh@VUB.AC.BE)
Mon, 15 Mar 1999 20:23:23 +0100


Luis Rocha:
>You pointed out that choice is an anthropomorphic notion, notice that so
>is selection. You (and Ashby) say that in the transition from one state
>to another (including stochastic transition) the system is selecting
>states leading into attractor basins, and eliminating the states which
>the system does not visit in its trajectory. But really there is no
>selection at all in following transition rules, because the states out
>of the trajectories leading to attractors were never alternatives to
>begin with.

Agreed, both selection and choice are anthropomorphic terms. However, the
real point that you make is that you should distinguish between
deterministic processes (those were there are no alternatives, where there
is no "choice") and indeterministic ones (the rest). As I said, I consider
determinism a red herring. You say that there are no alternatives because
in your model you cannot conceive of any: its dynamics is determinate.
However, if I kick your nice, determinate self-organizing system, chances
are great that it will end up in another attractor than the one it "had" to
enter according to the dynamics. There is always noise, fluctuations,
variation, unexpected events in every physical (as opposed to formal)
system. The selectionist point of view merely notes that whatever the
variation, the system is biased to end up in an attractor, and thus there
is "selection" for attractors.

I agree that as long as you can trust your deterministic, formal model,
there is no NEED to speak about variation and selection. However, there is
no need to speak about self-organization either, since the deterministic
model in principle already answers every question you might ask. Selection
or self-organization are higher-order, abstract concepts that we use to
better understand why certain phenomena appear, not to make detailed
predictions. I (and Ashby) prefer to use the selection concept even when
describing deterministic, dynamic systems, since these deterministic
systems are merely a "degenerate", limit case where the unpredictable
fluctuations have probability zero.

I have argued in some of my papers that deterministic evolution is merely a
special case of variation and selection where every variation on a system's
is necessarily selected: there are no "errors"; every "trial" is always the
right one.

>In Darwinian evolution, the term selection (which unfortunately is very
>anthropomorphic leading to many confusing evolutionary arguments) means
>that those lineages or organisms which are better adapted to their local
>environments will have higher rates of reproduction and thus enlarge
>their numbers (are selected) in the population of organisms in such
>local environment. That is, natural selection is defined as a
>statistical
>bias on the rate of reproduction of lineages.
>
>This kind of selection is very different from dynamical systems
>"selecting" their trajectories.

I am afraid we are getting back into the same discussion we had when
comparing cultural and biological evolution, where I argued that they are
both based on variation and selection, while you emphasised that they were
eseentially different. Any two phenomena are both similar and different,
depending on what aspects your focus on. I agree that there are important
differences, but what I am interested in is in catching their fundamental
commonalities. For example, in mathematics you might say that number
theory, geometry and algebra are essentially different, but I might say
that they are all based on set theory, or can all be described by category
theory. What I am interested in is finding the equivalent of set theory or
category theory for describing ALL possible processes of evolution and
change. The logic of variation and selection is the best I have found yet.

>It requires the existence of
>reproduction so that rates can increase, which in turn requires coded
>construction (genetic reproduction/Von Neuman model). Though all
>components of systems participating in evolution based on natural
>selection are themselves material and therefore following dynamic
>transition and self-organization, such systems possess a kind of
>organization that distinguishes them from pure self-organization.
>Namely, description-based selected self-organization.

Again, description-based reproduction is a very important evolutionary
mechanism, but it is not the only one, and it is not always possible to
separate it from other processes. For example, you can say that all
autocatalytic molecules "reproduce" themselves, but they do not use a
description. They are dependent on the other molecules in their substrate,
though, if they want to produce more copies of themselves. In that sense,
you could say that they are selected by their environment. In a given
environment (basically a "broth" of various molecules suspended in a
liquid) some autocatalytic molecules will reproduce quicker than others,
and thus be "selected". In another environment, the situation may be
opposite. Would you call this self-organization or selection?

>However, the notion of adaptation in the following Ashby's quote is very
>incomplete:
>>
>> "every isolated, determinant dynamic system obeying unchanging laws will
>> develop
>> organisms that are adapted to their environments."
>>
>I am not sure which kind of adaptation he had in mind, but dynamic
>determinacy is clearly not enough a requirement for open-ended
>evolution. As I often discuss in this list, we need description based
>reproduction.

I agree that Ashby's notion of "adaptation" in this paper is very
simplistic, since there are very few (or no) degrees of freedom in the
system he conceives. However, that does not forbid him to use the
"adaptationistic stance", and describe deterministic systems as if they
were adapting. On the other hand, I don't see why you would NEED
description-based reproduction for open-ended evolution (see my example of
autocatalytic molecules above). I agree that it very much opens up the
field and creates infinitely more possibilities for life to evolve, but
that does not really preclude a coarse form of adaption by simple variation
and selection of elementary systems (e.g molecules) without specific
semiotic structure or function.

_________________________________________________________________________
Francis Heylighen <fheyligh@vub.ac.be> -- Center "Leo Apostel"
Free University of Brussels, Krijgskundestr. 33, 1160 Brussels, Belgium
tel +32-2-6442677; fax +32-2-6440744; http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/HEYL.html