John J. Kineman wrote:
I was refering to his construction of "relational biology" and the modeling
relation as a new way to view reality which does not inherit the mechanical
assumptions, yet can explain them. It thus may serve as a good general theory.
I think Rosen's point about complexity was that NO formalism can be a "general
theory". Complex systems need an infinite set of formalisms to capture them as
a
limiting process.
He was very clear about relational biology being dualistic to physics. He never
intended it to INCLUDE physics. He also was clear about it being still one more
formalism.
> >In the broader sense, he also deals with the myth of objectvity, showing
> that > it is indeed a myth. He then confronts us with a joice: limit
> science to the
> >pseudo-objective or discard the subject/object boundary we try to maintain.
> >
>
> Yes, I fully agree. Just a minor quibble about presentation though: I think
> we can say that Rosen shows the limits of the objective view. It is
> unnecessary to call it a "myth" in all cases (except to call attention to
> the important exceptions).
Then I guess you disagree with Rosen who did not believe in objectivity in the
sense we are using the word. When you take the step into recognizing the role
of
the modeling relation in our thinking, the objective/subjective distinction
disappears.
> The objective/Newtonian view is a quite good
> model for classical systems and we will not abandon it when describing
> perceptual objects such as moving bodies (cars, rocks, planets, golf balls,
> etc.) or in predicting material structures (as in engineering and most of
> physics).
As long as we are happy with the inherent limitations of doing that. A very
conscious SUBJECTIVE choice!
> There is no conflict on that ground where the two views give
> equivalent predictions (The argument is analogous to saying that we do not
> need to use the relativistic Lorentz equations at speeds significantly
> below C). I think we're both far more concerned with the greater value of
> Rosen's more general theory in those cases where mechanism and objective
> assumptions break down and do not adequately describe reality, e.g.,
> psyche, life/complexity, conscioiusness, mental activity, etc. I think it
> must also have significant if not profound implications for extremes of the
> objective world as well; sub-atomic and cosmic scales.
> -----------------------------------------------
> John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
> National Geophysical Data Center
> 325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
> Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
> (303) 497-6900 (phone)
> (303) 497-6513 (fax)
> jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)
I'd be more comfortable calling Rosen's contributions epistemological rather
than a "general theory". That notion is so contrary to the spirit of everything
he did. The main message I get from his ideas about complexity is that to think
in terms of "general theories" is to wish for a bigger and better surrogate
world
like the one the reductionists did so well.
Just my opinion,
Don