Francis wrote:
>Let's move on to more interesting matters: Tom Abel's alternative vision=
of
>Humanity 3000.
>
>Tom:
>>I, for one, found your answers to the Humanity 3000 questions to be
>>astonishing. Ditto to the reactions that you posted from colleagues fo=
r =3D
>>their
>>general agreement with the tone and direction of your answers, despite =
so=3D
>>me
>>nitpicking.
>>
>>One way to characterize your answers would be as =3D93idealist=3D94, wh=
ich is
>>contrasted with =3D93materialist=3D94 social theory, as in the writings=
of
>>anthropologist Marvin Harris. In essence, you appear to believe that i=
de=3D
>>as
>>direct sociocultural trajectories--material resources and political-eco=
no=3D
>>my be
>>dammed.
>
>In a way, I was also surprised that nobody made this criticism, as I had
>kind of expected it. This means that I am ready to answer your criticism.
>
>First, the statement asks for "critical factors", which I interpret as
>factors that may make a fundamental difference for the future of humanit=
y,
>depending on how they evolve. Although physical constraints on the amoun=
t
>of energy and resources are of course very important in determining what
>will be possible and what won't, they are by definition fixed and theref=
ore
>will not make any difference. There is no way the total amount of coal o=
r
>oil on this planet can be changed: therefore it is not "critical" in the
>above sense. It is as if you would claim that gravity is critical factor=
,
>because we cannot do anything without it. But we know that gravity will
>always be there, and therefore we can ignore it in devising alternative
>scenarios for the future.
I don't want us to be hung up by definitions of "critical". There are 6
billion people in the world, and they are alive because of oil-fed plants
and animals, oil- and coal-fed transport systems, oil- and coal-run
electric and water, oil- and coal-guzzling factories and machines. There
was never a world population anything like this in history or prehistory,
and it has jumped to this size in this century because there was fossil
fuel energy and technology to make real things happen in the real world.
Gravity is eternal, coal and oil are not. I'd argue that any predictive
model for the world future must first address fuel, food, and our own
demographics.=20
>
>So what is critical in this respect?The way we *use* these given reserve=
s
>of resources. That use, in my view, depends on 3 critical factors: 1) th=
e
>efficiency with which we transform resources into products or work. This
>depends mostly on science, technology, organization, knowledge, in short
>what I have called "intelligence"; 2) our motivation or stated goals to
>save/waste resources, that is, a consensual system of values; 3) a
>political system which ensures that our agreed-upon goals of saving/wast=
ing
>resources will also be implemented on the ground, that is, that no
>individuals or groups can selfishly deviate from the agreed-upon aims, e=
..g.
>by burning up much more fossil fuels than their neigbors. <snip>
>
>Given the current trends in these critical factors, should we be
>pessimistic about the future of resources? I believe not. Concerning fac=
tor
>1), ...
<snip, ...various "efficiency" and "technological progress" arguments...>
Undeniably efficiency can make fossil fuels last longer. But the point
taken is the opposite. The reason we seek efficiency and technology is
because we must. The easy oil is gone. And as it was spent, we've tripl=
ed
the world population. We have no choice but to become efficient and sear=
ch
for substitutes. The past is filled with these "no way back" stories, in
which "demography" consumes "technological" windfalls, leaving larger
populations unable to return to a lower energy era. Unable both because
previous storages are gone (of topsoil, or timber, or etc.), and because
such human densities are unsupportable with the old technologies (of
foraging or long-fallow horticulture or whatever).
....This was illustrated by a famous 1980 bet (Tierney, 1990) between the
>economist Julian Simon, who wagered that the price of a $1000 worth of =
5
>natural resources would decrease, and the ecologist Paul Ehrlich who bet=
ted
>that they would increase. In 1990, ten years later, all five resources
>chosen by Ehrlich as being near to exhaustion, had effectively become
>cheaper, providing Simon with a handsome 600$ gain.
And don't be fooled, I'd say, by arguments from economics. Economics is
far from being a "rational science", or an "objective science". It is
itself a product of cultural systems. It is itself a product of
cultural-economic systems, within which it selects among potential
production options, and facilitates growth when growth is possible. Taki=
ng
your Simon and Ehrlich bet as an example. I'm not familiar with the bet,
and don't know which 5 natural resources it was wagered would increase or
decrease in price in 10 years. But no matter. The real bet would be, ho=
w
much of each of those resources could the average person in ten countries
around the world be able to purchase with say 10% of their yearly income.
How much bauxite (or whatever) could be had by the average Brazilian, the
average Angolan, the average Malaysian, the average Tajikistanian, the
average Equadoran, the average Nigerian, the average Venezuelan, the
average Australian, the average Mexican, or the average Iranian. I would
think less in 1990 than in 1980, and less still in 2000. Because these
countries are getting a raw deal. These economic peripheries, relative t=
o
the US, Japan, or Europe, are giving up valuable energetically productive
resources and getting toasters and tennis shoes and inflation and social
inequality in return. And Herbert Simon is able to buy his bauxite in
America for less. But the invisible hand is not reaching equitably into
the third world because...that's a whole 'nother story... But I think it
has to do with the self-organization of dissipative structures (to use
Prigogine's terms) or maximum empower (to use Odum's)...
>Concerning factors 2) and 3), there the trends are unfortunately not as
>forceful. Global discussions such as the Rio summit have until now produ=
ced
>little consensus on objectives and even less on methods to monitor and
>police their implementation. Regarding resources, this is presently the
>most critical factor, although with the growing ecological consciousness
>worldwide, I remain optimistic that such a consensus will be found,
>although we may need some minor ecological catastrophes to kickstart the
>process.
And here's where, as I said in the first post, you are representing the
"idealist" position, i.e., If people will just change their goals or
selfish values the world will be better for all. I would argue that, for
material reasons, some people are finding a need to change their values.
Some people (who can afford it) are recognizing that their standard of
living is being impacted by the overuse of surrounding ecosystems. But
even here in the West there is much conflict over when to say when. And
unfortunately, in third world regions, where much of the most intensive
consumption occurs, local economic elites are being squeezed by foreign
debt to generate foreign currency by tearing up and shipping out their
natural capital.
>>The current trajectory is slowed growth, heading toward contraction. O=
h,=3D
>> not
>>as quickly in the west, which has self-organized an
>>economic-military-legal-financial system which extracts energetically
>>productive resources from the rest of the world. But just look at the =
re=3D
>>st of
>>the world. The Asian contagion, the latest collapse in Brazil, the col=
la=3D
>>pse of
>>the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, civil and ethnic wars abound.
>
>
>I believe these throubles have nothing to do with lack of resources, but
>with lack of (collective) intelligence, adapted value systems (e.g. a va=
lue
>system that says that non-Serbs are inferior, or that you should just tr=
y
>to make as much money in as short a time as possible without thinking ab=
out
>long-term investment, are obviously unsustainable) and political
>organization. That is why the Western nations, where the latter factors
>have had more time to develop, are much less sensitive to such crises, n=
ot
>because they have more resources. This does not mean that the Western
>nations don't have a lot to learn themselves, as they obviously do.
Yea, as I said, this is idealist social theory. The question to ask is,
why is ethnic and racial violence today on the rise?
>
>>1) What is the role of =3D93neo-liberal=3D94 free-market economics in c=
apturi=3D
>>ng the
>>last remaining stores of world timber, metals, and fossil fuels for the
>>maintenance of the current life-styles of core economies, and to the de=
tr=3D
>>iment
>>of world peripheries?
>
>Interesting question. I believe that there must be curbs on free-markets=
if
>we wish to use resources more efficiently on a global scale, although on=
a
>local scale, the market can be very efficient.
I'm for that. Don't know how it will happen.
>>2) Is there any chance that world-wide communications/computer networks=
t=3D
>>hat
>>depend upon a high-technology, high-energy infrastructure and regional
>>political stability will survive for long in a contracting world econom=
y?=3D
>
>First, I don't believe the world economy will contract, for the reasons
>mentioned above. Second, even if it did, a global computer network is on=
e
>of the easiest and most useful things to maintain, as it uses practicall=
y
>no energy or materials, but very much facilitates communication,
>collaboration, etc. Just compare taking a car or plane to go and meet a
>business partner, or communicating with him/her via the net. If you want=
to
>save energy, you would obviously prefer the latter. The Internet by its
>very design is also very robust and can survive most of it network nodes
>going down at any moment.
Not sure about any of this. A computer network takes electricity, and
communication lines, and hardware that is very fragile with short turnove=
r
times, and very high-tech factories to make it. It also takes political
stability, regional coordination. None of this can be done with low ener=
gy.
Finally, you used the word "pessimistic" twice, and someone else called
this "fatalistic". Hmm, I don't see that at all. It's politically
skeptical. And as social theory, it's an attempt to integrate lessons fr=
om
the cultural/historical record into nomothetic theory that is ecological =
or
materialist based. I=92d say it=92s responsible to seriously consider li=
mits
to growth, considering what is at stake. The worst thing I'd say is that
my arguments are off the cuff, and not presented here with empirical data
to back it up. But that's the thing about listserves, I guess, you can
really rattle off at the mouth!
TA=20