Yes, universality is one way of seemingly escaping the value judgements of
"better" and "higher." However, universality itself is a value judgement.
Why is universal better? Perhaps it is the emergence of something very
unique that is important. I think the answer lies more in recognizing that
all such measures are relative, as Rosen implies in the modeling relation.
We always have to ask "better -- for what?"
My view is that it is much easier to understand evolution as a
complimentarity between the physical and non-physical. Specifically a
complimentarity between form and function. This provides a "driving" force
behind change and also allows for "relative" progress, that is, progress
that is defined on a case-by-case basis, by the oranism. In a way this
argues against Norman Johnson's idea of universal progress, but it could
arrive at a similar place if there are in fact certain "laws" of the
non-physical realm. One possibility here is the inescapability of some
fundamental value or semantic about existence.
Where I take this is not to further insight into universal value - I think
whoever (was it Francis?) said earlier that "survival" was the only
accepted value was getting close. I step back one notch further to
"existence" being the really basic value (again a circular value, but it is
anthropically valuable - in other words, we're here, therefore we MUST
value existence). Survival, then, is existence plus time. Time is added by
the apparent structure of the universe (apparent to a spatial-temporal
being). Intelligent organisms evolve to perceive time, i.e., to incorporate
it into their "modeling relation" with the world, then survival becomes
obvious to us because we can perceive existence through time (which is the
definition of survival). But it is not the most fundamental thing,
existence is. So "progress" must be driven by existence, period. Survival
is a result, not a goal. As such, it is not the most fundamental element on
which to base theory. Existence is better.
Now we ask, how does one make "progress" toward existence? The final answer
would be that it is unnecessary, since existence simply is (or is not).
However, I think organisms embody an uncertainty about this - that is their
special nature. With living organisms, existence is a question, not a
statement. Instead of "I am!" as the spiritual ideal, organism are saying
"I am?" And more sophisticated organisms are saying "I am what?" "I am
this." Or "I am that." This necessarily follows from Rosen's idea of an
internal model of both external and internal reality. The model is by
definition imperfect.
Now, add to this the notion that organisms involve both physical and
non-physical properties as a complex system. Call this form and function
(as ecologists have rather intinctually). Being a system of form and
function, we can assume that form implies function and function implies
form. As in my earlier tirade, they are mutually causal. Yet they are
imperfectly translated - call it error if you like, but I prefer to think
of it as uncertainty.
We thus have a problem in the correspondence between form and function. In
other words, given a functional concept of existence - any functional
concept - then the fact of existence will subject that function to
evolution, but not directly; through selection of the associated form,
coded in DNA. In other words, evolution operates on function, yet
information is coded and transferred to future generations by form: And
there is not an exact correspondance between form and function. So the
function that a structure represents determines its survival, but it
represents that function imperfectly. In other words, selection chooses the
best fit of genes to phenotype function, and it is that structure which
survives.
Now the surviving structure implies its function, though again imperfectly.
The uncertainty in structure thus alters next-generation function. This
complimentarity is what I think drives evolution, or to be more
"epistemologically correct" (EC), I would say that viewing evolution as a
complimentarity between form and function seems to hold a great deal of
promise for understanding the process and for integrating the physical and
non-physical perspectives (e.g. "biological" vs. "cultural" evolution).
Rosen's modeling relation has helped me see this more clearly. The very
idea of a model introduces uncertainty between internal and external, and
thus between model function and actual behavior/expression, which is acted
on by selection, and thus between surviving form (selected on the basis of
behavior/expression) and the next-generation model, and so on.
My point is if we discuss both the physical and non-physical aspect of this
together, we do not have to separate biological and cultural evolution as
if they are two different things. The very idea of evolution is violated if
it is not treated as one thing, because the concept is defined abstractly
as the sum total of all influences. We can discuss different mechanisms of
evolution, but they are mechanisms of one result. The Darwinian mechanism
is valid - very little question about that. But it leaves out the
non-physical processes.
>Examples in biological systems are the universal structure of DNA coding,
>differentiated nucleus and multicellular organism. We do not include in
>this idea of progress the variations between species, which all use the
>same universal structures. With a change of driving forces, species
>diversity can be altered and even return to prior states. But no amount of
>external changes will eliminate the universal structures. By this
>definition of progress, there has been little "progress" in biological
>evolution in recent times.
>
>In contrast to this, social evolution is constantly establishing new
>underlying structures, and then using these to evolve "higher" systems.
This is a bit deceptive, in my view, because we are lapsing into sloppy
language. Regarding DNA coding, the use of the word "structure" means
something physical, i.e., structured according to the
physical/material/objective model of reality that we are prone to and find
indispensible in sensory discourse. But in the second case, social
evolution, we now use the word "structure" metaphorically. We're talking
about the information itself, not the physical form in which it is encoded.
The key to my arguments above is to clearly recognize the difference. We
don't have clearly defined words, so must be clear in stating "physical
structure" vs. "organization of information". (NOTE: there is no need to
point out that physical structure itself is ultimately a result of a
modeling relation - that is philosophically true but not a practical truth
in this case. The interaction which determines physical reality takes place
on a different level of reality/perception than that kinds of organisms we
are discussing exist on.)
>Knowledge, which is one essential aspect of social evolution, is a premiere
>example of this. The knowledge within the human race is constantly being
>developed and expanded. At the interface of knowledge and the unknown,
>there is great flux and uncertainty.
Yes, this is potentially in agreement with what I said above - certainly
one part of it.
But once the uncertainty is resolved,
Here, I would claim that uncertainty is never fully resolved, but that a
state is decided both by an organism's information organization (model
function, which is then expressed in behavior), on the one hand, and the
surviving physical structure (DNA and its expression in physical form) on
the other, and that these will always be imperfectly coupled. The falicy of
much work to date has been to assume that the non-physical is "determined"
by the physical. This is no more true than the other way around.
>new knowledge is added to a commonly held base of prior knowledge (the
>universal structures). We do not include subsystem diversity in these
>underlying structures, which can be momentarily transient. Just as in
>biological systems, universal structures in knowledge, once established,
>are fixed for all later times.
How are they "fixed?" This sounds like a proposed belief rather than an
observation about how it seems to work. Even cannot even say that physical
structures are permanent. They are relatively stable and exist in our time
fairly well (e.g., the basic chemical elements), but as a theoretical
matter they result from a temporal process. Why should we need a theory
that non-physical structures, which are hard to get people to recognize at
all, need to be permanent? If anything, I would think information
structures are more changeable than physical ones, accounting for the more
rapid evolution in the "cultural" mode.
>
>Using this definition of progress for comparison between biological and
>social evolution, what we conclude is that there is a quantitative
>difference of progress in the two systems, social being much greater than
>biological.
This is observationally sensible, but I don't follow its theoretical
component. I can't imagine any argument that would succeed in claiming that
living organisms are separable into these two categories. Which organisms
follow biological evolution and which cultural? It is a mix of both and we
can only talk about relative importance. In humans cultural evolution seems
particularly strong, although it would be quite foolish to suppose that we
are not also subject to physical constraints and selection. We might say
that insects are more constrained by physical evolution, yet they clearly
exhibit "cultures" and to what extent there is something innovative at that
level we really don't know (if we reject, as I strongly argue, the idea
that innovation at the "cultural" non-physical level must be reduced to
physical explanations in all non-human cases, or in some loosely defined
category of non-human cases, or in all cases including human, as some
believe, which then invalidates "cultural" evolution completely). In more
intermediate cases, where we have stronger evidence of both processes, such
as virtually all mammals, it becomes positively schitzophrenic to enforce
separate categories.
> This difference is so great that the quantitative difference
>leads to a qualitative difference.
Again, need to be careful with the terms. Quantitative must refer to the
physical - things we can count. Qualitative refers to the non-physical -
qualities or qualia. If I had six thoughts this morning, it seems that I
can count them, but I am not counting the qualitative process of thinking
but rather the physical storage of the result in an electro-chemical
structure of the brain. That can be tested by altering the storage
structure and the memory of those six ideas is gone. The same is true for
qualitative labels. They are stored physically or else they're gone. I
think this is one of the things that is so hard for folks to grasp about
the non-physical, it is non-physical. Meaning it does not depend on space
and time. It is quite difficult then to devise a theory about how the
information is stored. If one has difficulty with this concept, consider
the same problem in quantum physics. Where is the information stored about
the possible states a quantum wave function can collapse into? Where is
information stored in non-locality? Its why the majority of scientists
reject the ideas I'm describing, it involves accepting something that is
"outside" our known universe yet is causally effective. We've been trained
not to think that way, that is, up until quantum physics came along, and
then separation of scientific disciplines still allows most scientists to
keep a more comfortable view of the universe as consisting only of what we
can perceive.
>
>How does this relate to the current interests in the Symbiotic Intelligence
>project? What we expect to find is that it will be essential to capture of
>underlying structures of knowledge as they develop and to differentiate
>these from the transient structures associated with diversity of the
>subsystems.
I know I've gone beyond the basic question here, and apologise for that.
But all these questions are related and I believe help inform each other.
Yes, I find it interesting that you conclude in favor of studying
"underlying structures of knowledge." There do seem to be principles that
can be understood. What I'm very unclear on is how we should think of them
in terms of structure. The structures of information tend to be
metaphysical, otherwise they are structures of the results of information
processes. Somehow these need to be distinguished, I think.
>
>============================================================
>
>The prior questions to this one on the FAQ sheet are:
>
>What is Social Evolution?
>What are the characteristics of social evolution?
>What proof is there that social evolution exists?
>
>
>
>.__________________________________/__________________________________.
> Norman L. Johnson, Ph.D. \ office : 505-667-9094
> Technical Staff Member / fax: 665-5926
> Theoretical Division \ e-mail: nlj@lanl.gov
> Los Alamos National Laboratory / paper addr: MS B216, T-3, LANL
> Loc: TA-03 Bldg 0123 Room 260 \ Los Alamos, NM 87545
>.__________________________________/__________________________________.
>
>
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)