> This "second-order", long-term fitness is what Alexei proposed to call
> "adaptability". This is a term I should perhaps also adopt, to avoid
> confusion with the more traditional usage of "fitness".
>
Note that general short term fitness is often at odds with long term
adaptability. Thus we humans are slow afoot, poor swimmers and divers,
poor tree climbers, not very strong and have no fangs or claws.
Generally, without each other and all the weapons and defenses we've
learned to dream up, make and use, we would be sitting ducks for any
self respecting fit predators. So how can we explain our apparent
success?
Adaptability!
To me, this means that for some reason our forebears found a way to
change their genetic changing problems into thought problems. In other
words, their genes couldn't keep up with all the changing problems they
faced in their environment and ecosystems. So they changed this gene
changing problem into a thought problem. Thought enabled them to keep
up with all the changes around them.
>
> Norman McPhail:
> > Are you inferring
> >that human thought can be fully explained as a complexification of
> >elementary particles? [...]
> >I also want to suggest that these subjective non physical realities are
> >of a different logical type. This means that they can't be fully
> >explained by any systems modeling formula including a systemic systems
> >modeling formula. [...]
> >Finally, I want to suggest that there are real non physical differences
> >between what we call life and the lifeless realms of elementary
> >particles, atoms and molecules. [...]
> >I have one final set of questions for you Francis: Why do you think
> >scientists keep insisting that everything is physical?
>
> I have the impression that Norman has seriously misunderstood me here,
> accusing me of being a physical reductionist just because I note that life
> and intelligence *evolved* from elementary particles. The essence of the
> systems approach, which underlies the theory of metasystem transitions, is
> just that every level of system organization is characterized by "emergent"
> properties, that cannot be reduced to the properties of their components.
> In a sense, Norman is correct in asserting that these emergent systems (in
> particular metasystems) belong to a "different logical type". The fact that
> evolution continuously generates such emergent features illustrates the
> inherent creativity of evolution, and the impossibility to predict or
> explain its results by mere laws of physics.
>
You apparently did not fully understand the questions I was asking and
one of the main points I was trying to make. The point was that to
successfully model, understand and deal with a given system of a
particular logical type, we need to adjust our thinking so that it is in
sync with that system. This is akin to the measuring issues that Don
and Bruce are talking about.
As far as I can tell, most scientists, including yourself, fail to
adjust their methologies or thought modes to suit the logical typing of
the area they are attempting to figure out, model or deal with. This is
a mistake we humans are all prone to make.
Thus a scientist or computer specialist or mathematician might attempt
to deal with political or cultural issues with what has been called
their "monological" approach to everything. And just because they talk
about or use a wholistic systems approach or recognize what they call
emerging properties does not fundamentally change their approach. If
you can see that we can't explain social change by using the laws of
physics, you ought to be able to see that mathematics, number systems
and the scientific method are also out of sync with the real system
under examination. My question remains: Why do you think scientists in
particular keep making these mistakes over and over again?
>
> In conclusion, there are important differences between biological and
> cultural evolution, but not to the degree that both cannot be encompassed
> within the larger "blind variation and natural selection" paradigm.
>
The above statement is overwhelming evidence of the validity of the
point I tried to make above.
Norm McPhail