EVOLUTIONARY SEMIOTICS
which could span biosemiotics and memetics. Here I mean evolution only
as large-scale change (as distinct from development, adaptation, or
any particular evolutionary mechanism).
On what the simplest semiotic system is, Luis, is your little
thermostat thingie (equivalent to my organism in the thermocline)
semiotically closed? Where does the goal state come from?
Now, to social vs. biological evolution.
First, the two coarse categories (biological vs. cultural) obscure
more fine-grained distinctions within each level (e.g. proto-cellular,
uni-ceullluar, multi-cellular, sexual, neural, linguistic,
digital). Each of those marks a Meta-System Transition, which Francis
notes could be considered as defining a new "floor" of complexity, and
possibly new modes of semiotic action (transmission, selection, etc.).
But given that coarse-graining, both social and biological evolution
is an observed fact (Stan's phylogeny). Genetics is a (good?) theory
to describe biological evolution. Memetics is a theory intended to
describe social evolution, although it is as of yet neither well-posed
nor tested.
Similarly, I would assert that both biological and social "progress"
over time is an observed FACT (with no necessary connotation of
goal-directedness or necessity, Luis). We see this in biologiy in the
evolution of eukaryotes, trophic hierarchy, multicellularity,
eusociality, even mammalian homeostasis (Jesper: I think mammals
actually ARE more morphologically complex than reptiles), let alone
cognitive evolution (human or otherwise). In society, this is clearly
demonstrated by increasing social "depth" (e.g. division of labor) and
ability to control energy, matter, space, and time.
Yes, attempts to produce scientific descriptions and theories of such
progress are fraught with potential danger and error. But it seems to
me that that speaks either to the inadequacy of the measures of
complexity and progress brought to bear, or that such seeming
progress, while real, is simply less significant than the underlying
mass of the system which is NOT progressing (e.g. fundamental
biochemical and general linguistic/cognitive mechanisms). But that's a
matter of judgement and attention: do we focus on what changes, or the
mass of what stays the same.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to compare and contrast the two
(hereby echoing, but hopefully summarizing, much of the prior
discussion). Yes, Luis, this is at a high level of abstraction, but
that's OK, as long as we don't forget that.
SIMILARITIES:
Both rely on informational structures (genes, hormones, pheremones,
etc. vs. human sign-tokens) which are interpreted (expressed) to
produce pragmatic consequences in the world (phenotype and animal
behavior vs. cognitive organization, human action, and problem
solving). Let's call those structures generically "tokens".
In both cases, these tokens are only to a certain extent "reifiable":
understandable as distinct, corporeal, atomic, physical entities. At
another level, each is distributed or fuzzy to a certain extent, and
as Jesper points out, always inseparable from the semiotic systems in
which they're embedded.
Both have mechanisms to transmit tokens (in biology, mechanisms for a
shared biochemistry, in particular symbiosis and sex,
vs. communication in social systems).
Both have mechanisms to generate tokens (mutation vs. creative
thought).
Both have mehcanisms to "select" (in a weak sense, meaning some tokens
persist and some don't) tokens (natural selection vs. cultural
adoption).
The overall mechanism of generation and selection in biology is
understood to be a special case of Campbellian blind variation with
selective retention (whether possibly "vicarious" or not), while the
same mechanism has at least been hypothesized for cognitive systems
(note: I don't believe this speaks to transmission).
Both have distinct "interpretive communities", or defined boundaries
which distinguish agents which can interpret transmitted tokens of
different types. For biology these are demes (species), multicellular
organisms, and other co-evolved communities; for society these are
linguistic and cultural communities.
The interpretive communities have varying degrees of fragmentation
(separation) or coalescence. Demes tend towards fragmentation, while
proto-cellular evolution resulted in one universal community (the
universal modern cell). Historically linguistic communities were
fragmented, but appear to be coalescing in modern times (e.g. English,
Arabic, Mandarin). And the common cognitive capacities of all human
provide a common semiotic frame for non-symbolic sign tokens
(e.g. pictures, gestures, facial expressions).
DIFFERENCES:
All that said, cognitive and genetic processes are also radically
different.
Cultural transmission is much easier and faster than biological, and a
larger factor in the overall evolution (and thus "Lamarkian").
Cultural generation is also much faster, flexible, and more ammenable
to the development of hierarchical complexity (i.e. growth of new
syntactic and meta-syntactic structures through design,
e.g. mathematics).
Biological generation and selection is bound to the lifespans of
individual organisms. Thus, as Turchin noted, cultural evolution
proceeds by the generation and death of IDEAS from WITHIN an
individual, not of individuals themselves.
The physical mechanisms of biological token generation, transmission,
and interpretation are much better understood, and are much more
ammendable to mechanistic descriptions (although still mechanistic
models have fundmanetal limitations).
So the key piece of argument left in this debate is over the nature of
SELECTION in genetics vs. culture. Darwinian passive selection,
entrainment to attractors (Stan), and deliberate adoption are the
choices, and likely each plays a relative role in both modes, but to
different relative extents: for biology, Darwinian (short term (and
long term?)) and entrainment; for society, all three, but with a large
dose of adoption.
OK?
O------------------------------------------------------------------------>
| Cliff Joslyn, Member of the Technical Staff (Cybernetician at Large)
| Computer Research Group (CIC-3), Los Alamos National Laboratory
| Mail Stop B265, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos NM 87545 USA
| joslyn@lanl.gov www.c3.lanl.gov/~joslyn (505) 667-9096
V All the world is biscuit-shaped. . .