John J. Kineman wrote:
> John Kineman's comments on the summary, still playing "Devil's advocate:"
>
> At 02:38 PM 8/24/98 -0400, Alexei wrote:
> >
> >I suggest the following summary of this discussion:
> >1. All real systems are complex, and there are no mechanisms
> >among real systems
this is a statement arising from a failure to distinguish the context of the
discussion...at least my contribution. I think the statement ONLY has meaning
in
the context of the modeling relation. There it becomes.....there are NO
natural
systems for which a mechanism is a total description.
>
>
> Following my previously submitted arguments, this would seem true only
> within a metaphysically ultimate reality, not a practical, testable, one.
My above statement is both testable and provable. I believe it needs to be the
way this point nshould be stated.
>
>
> >2. Models of real systems may be mechanistic (attempt to
> >describe and control every detail) and non-mechanistic (that
> >have some internal freedom, e.g., neural networks,
> >genetic algorithms).
neural networks and genetic algorithms are NOT mechanistic in the language we
have
so carefully developed. ANYTHING algorithmic is mechanistic (capable of being
computed by a universal Turing machine in the spirit of Church's thesis)
>
>
> I would suggest classing these as mechanistic and quasi-mechanistic (i.e.,
> incorporating concepts of freedom, such as uncertainty, into otherwise
> mechanical models). I do not understand how a model can be entirely
> non-mechanical without loosing the ability to define terms or reference
> something relevant to us. Even theological models employ ideas of cause and
> effect, which is part of the mechanical program. Do we not have difficulty
> discussing a non-mechanical reality without using mechanically-based concepts?
Again I use the term mechanistic in the above sense...if we are to discuss
together, please acknowledge that.
>
>
> >3. Modelling strategies can be:
> >a) using mechanistic models and believing that they are true
> > representations of real systems
> >b) using mechanistic models as metaphors keeping in mind that
> > real systems may be quite different
> >c) using non-mechanistic models and believing that they are true
> > representations of real systems
> >d) using non-mechanistic models as metaphors keeping in mind that
> > real systems may be quite different
> >
>
> Can someone provide a specific example of an entirely "non-mechanistic"
> model that is neither metaphore nor metaphysics?
>
> >I vote for strategies "b" and "d" and against "a" and "c". Using
> >non-mechanistic models may give substantial advantages in some
> >cases compared to known mechanistic models. But I would not
> >consider non-mechanistic models as a panacea. In many cases
> >mechanistic models give a very accurate (but metaphoric)
> >description.
> >
>
> how about (e) consider ALL models (including mathematics and logic) to be
> approximations of reality, mechanical models being best suited for those
> things that behave mechanically and quasi-mechanical models being best
> suited for those things that do not; and recognizing that in any ultimate
> ontology, all distinctions blur and only the instance of experience itself
> is left as a means of understanding.
>
> >-Alexei
> >-------------------------------------------------
> >Alexei Sharov Research Scientist
> >Dept. of Entomology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061
> >Tel. (540) 231-7316; FAX (540) 231-9131; e-mail sharov@vt.edu
> >Home page: http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/alexei.html
> >
> >
> -----------------------------------------------
> John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
> National Geophysical Data Center
> 325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
> Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
> (303) 497-6900 (phone)
> (303) 497-6513 (fax)
> jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)
respectfully,
Don Mikulecky