At 06:22 PM 8/25/98 -0400, you wrote:
>Reply to John Kineman:
>
>In my discussion with Don I used the word "reality" as a
>substutute for an "ultimate model" no matter if it exists or not.
OK
>For me it was important to show that we can talk about "mechanisms"
>and "non-mechanisms" only in application to models.
Agreed, but I wanted to point out that the claim that these distinctions
cannot also be associated with reality has to do with how we define
reality. This is a difficult question. For some, reality itself is defined
in terms of a model, except for an ultimate Platonic reality that exists
(presumably) independent of everything and about which nothing can be said.
> As a result,
>the notion of reality is no longer interesting, which was the purpose
>of my arguments.
>
As in the Platonic reality. Which is why most scientists deal with a
practical reality that can be studied and tested, and that reality is not
only interesting, but the main point of research! This sounds very
traditional on my part, but I don't want to loose sight of it when adding
the ultimate views. Can this practical reality then be said to involve
things that are legitimately complex or simple? I find it a little
misleading to say these concepts are "only" applicable to a model, without
adding that so is this practical reality that science is investigating.
>What you call "practical reality" is not something independent from
>our thoughts (what people usually think of reality). Instread,
>"practical reality" is a result of our activity that follows specific
>models that humans have developed in their biological and cultural
>evolution. We consider objects mechanisms if our behavior directed
>to these objects is simple. For example, a slave-owner may treat
>slaves as mechanisms. Thus, being a "mechanism" is not a property
>of an object but a property of our interaction with that object.
>
I agree in the case of a slave, which is a macroscopically complex system
being treated mechanically. However, what about the case of a machine, such
as a spinning wheel? In this case, saying that a "mechanism" is not a
property of the object completely obscures a very important distinction
between these two things. If we can say some things are living and some are
not, then we an say some are complex and some are not. On the other hand,
at some level, I agree that we can think of everything (even matter) as
living, if we don't confuse the levels.
>I agree that the notion of scale is very important and that some
>objects will simply dissolve when viewed at a different scale.
>It seems that scale is not a part of the model but it corresponds
>to the kind of interaction with an object. For each scale we may
>develop a specific model that represents best our interactions at
>that scale.
Yes, I think so too.
>My impression is that we can talk about a car even at a molecular level.
>Of course it will not function as a car, but it does not matter
>because we look at the complexity of an object and not at its
>specific functions.
This still confuses me. Are we saying that metal exhibits complex phenomena
at the molecular level? If so, then I would agree that it can still be
associated with a specific object and hence the object itself must exhibit
complex phenomena. But I thought molecules of metal behave mechanically,
that only at the sub-atomic level is complex behavior evident. In that
case, I have trouble retaining the original object definition because of
non-locality. The sub-atomic particles are associated with other particles
that are not part of the "car" and hence the definition looses meaning. But
regardless of whether we draw the line at molecules or particles, this is
radically different from a person, which exhibits complex behavior at the
coarsest level of definition.
>
>>2. Living macroscopic "things" exhibit complexity at the same scale at
>>which the "thing" is defined, hence they retain both definition and
>>complexity.
>>3. Non-living macroscopic "things" exhibit complexity only at a scale where
>>the "thing" is no longer defined (or changes definition). Hence, in these
>>cases, the "thing" does not retain both definition and complexity, and
>>hence "it" is not complex (even though something else at this level is
>>complex).
>
>I had no intention to associate Rosen's
>"complexity" with life or organization.
>Life requires a semantic
>closure (self-observation), but in our discussion with Don we always
>talked about human models of other things (which is a much simpler
>matter).
>
I don't see how restricting consideration to human mental models makes any
difference. Such a model of a car is still necessarily different from one
of a person, no matter how detailed, because the car behaves mechanically
and the person does not. To get the human model of the car to such a
detailed level where complex behavior arises, one has to describe the
quantum states, which, because of their complexity, are no longer uniquely
organized into a "car." The truely unique thing about a person is that the
complex phenomena has been somehow "captured" by the macroscopic entity
which we see as a person.
>>Do we not have difficulty
>>discussing a non-mechanical reality without using mechanically-based
concepts?
>
>This is an interesting question! I believe that some models may exhibit
>complex behavior in the following sense. Theoretically it is possible to
>follow their dynamics using cause-effect chains. However, it will not help
>us to understand how the model works because in the next run all
>cause-effect chains may change. It will take millions of years to trace
>all possible model trajectories and we still gain nothing. Theleological
>or phenomenological explanations may appear much simpler and useful.
>You can call this quasi-mechanistic models, but for me it looks like
>true complexity.
>
.........
>All models are metaphors (at least there is no way to prove that
>they are not).
>
OK, I accept that, but I'd still like a more specific example if possible
of an entirely non-mechanistic model that we can still call "scientific,"
giving appropriate latitude to that concept. My point is that we need some
part of it to be mechanical or else it can't be referenced to anything and
can't be studied by scientific means (but perhaps can be studied by direct
personal experience, such as in the case of studying one's own
psychological phenomena, which is referenced to one's own "self").
>>how about (e) consider ALL models (including mathematics and logic) to be
>>approximations of reality, mechanical models being best suited for those
>>things that behave mechanically and quasi-mechanical models being best
>>suited for those things that do not; and recognizing that in any ultimate
>>ontology, all distinctions blur and only the instance of experience itself
>>is left as a means of understanding.
>
>"Approximation" makes sence only if you have a converging series.
>Scientific revolutions do not show much of conversion. I prefer
>to talk about metaphors. This is more safe because it does not
>require convergence.
>
I am interested in convergence because, without it, we have no hope of
inferring anything about the "ultimate" reality, or of eventually relating
all the theories. I think convergence is quite evident in physical science,
but as you say, not so in life science. But we've already discussed this
and left it as a genuine difference in our views of science on a scale
ranging somewhere between dogmatic realism and wild-eyed instrumentalism.
>I would say that mechanistic models are good for modeling objects
>with which we have simple interactions. It is amazing that very
>complex processes like movement of cars on a highway in rush hour,
>which involves a lot of passion, can be modelled by a couple of
>simple mechanistic equations.
>
Yes, this fits. But why would you not also say that mechanistic models are
good for modeling simple objects that interact with complex systems? A
simple model of a billiard ball works perfectly well during a game of
billiards. A complex one is required for the billiard player. and therefore
the total system can be modeled by a coupled system model between a simple
system and a complex one. The total system may be thought of as complex,
but the billiard balls don't become complex in themselves just because we
play with them -- that's the point I'm making. Does that make sense?
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)