>Most of the theories in physics try to see the world as a great
>empty space, populated by entities that we call particles. Those particles
>interact to each other, creating the world we live on. Most research in
>modern physics is directed to the understanding of such particles. One of
>the most controverse theories trying to explain particles is Quantum Mechanics.
>But, if you notice, this conception of the world is intrinsecally
reductionistic.
>We reduce matter to atoms, atoms to quarks, and (maybe) quarks to superstrings.
>WHAT IF the world is not an empty space populated by particles, but a
>giant "cellular automata", where each point of the space is able to be in
>a state (among e.g. an infinite number of possible states, only to be generic),
>and the value of a state depends on its own value in previous instants of
>time and the value of its neighbour states in previous instants of time.Not
>exactly like a cellular automata, but something as a continuous cellular
>automata. And the laws governing this big continous cellular automata
>would be such that it allows for the creation of stable things as
>particles that move within this space and eventually chock to each other and
>perform something that would be chemical reactions, and so and so and so. Then,
>particles would not be really particles, but only illusions of our
>perception, just as we can see happening in standard cellular automata.
>IF this scenario could be posed, then a Holistic view of the world would
>be in terms of such cellular automata laws, instead the illusion of
>particles interacting that our perception gives us.
I agree that "cellular automata" is a more deep representation of the
world than the traditional model of "particles in empty space". At least
it does not hide the problem of defining spatio-temporal boundaries of
objects (particles). But I would not call this a "Holistic view of the
world" because your cellular automata does not include the most important
component: the observer.
I would argue that neither "particles in empty space" nor "cellular automata"
is the True (with capital "T") representation of the world. Both are
theories which are more-or-less good approximations.
I see the problem not in substitution of existing scientific theories
with more accurate theories (physicists will do it sooner or later) but
in understanting that ALL scientific theories are approximations.
There are no True or False descriptions of the world, but there
are more or less accurate and more or less convenient descriptions.
You draw a picture of how our notions of particles and their interactions
become vague if we start from cellular automata. Perhaps, I understand why
you talk about continuous CA rather than discrete: discreteness would
require additional abstractions which you try to avoid. However, CA
is a very compicated theory in itself. You would need a definition of
space which may have various metrics and various topologies. Then you
would need a model of time, and so on. Finally you may discover a
more general theory, in which cellular automata would appear to be a
vague and rough approximation.
Rosen's definition of a mechanism is aplied to a description of a
system, not to a system itself. Thus, the previous discussion about
possibility to manufacture a "complex", i.e. non-mechanistic system
becomes a contradiction in terms. We do not manufacture a description
of a system, but we manufacture a system itself which cannot be
a mechanism. Of course, the question can be turned around and we may
ask, can we manufacture a system that does not behave according to
our description? But this question is a trivial one because our artifacts
too often behave unpredictably.
-Alexei
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Alexei Sharov Research Scientist
Dept. of Entomology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061
Tel. (540) 231-7316; FAX (540) 231-9131; e-mail sharov@vt.edu
Home page: http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/alexei.html