This is not quite a correct analogy, as I understand it. Rosen, Penrose,
others including myself have the view that there are TWO kinds of
unknowability. One is what you describe regarding finding "the chaotic
constants" - that is our ability to do the work of knowing, due to
"complicatedness" (which both Rosen and Penrose distinguish from
complexity). But the first case, our approximation of a truly complex
system (say a living organism), is imprecise for two reasons, first the
difficulty of calculating what is theoretically knowable, and second the
fundamental unknowability of the complex system -- i.e., the part that
cannot even theoretically be calculated. That's the mystical part many
scientists object to. One criticism of this view is the definition of
"theoretical knowability." Paul Davies makes the point that if a
calculation requires more bits than the total number of particles in the
Universe, is this theoretical unknowability or practical unknowability? If
the two are the same, then what is "knowable" is perhaps changing with the
expansion of the universe. This idea doesn't seem very useful to me, and I
prefer to think in terms of epistemological undertainty (what is presumed
calculable, given the tools) and true uncertainty (what quantum mechanics
has wrestled with and nobody yet fully agrees on).
>We will be allowed to simulate things that would behave like weather,
>arbitrating a set of constants, but we would never reach nature's constants.
Yes, in either of the two cases above, this would be true.
>I make then an analogy to complex systems. Maybe we will be able to
>"design" some system performing complexity, but certainly it will not be
>a perfect model for a "real" complex system.
This depends on what you mean by "design." If it is a purely mechanical
design, then yes. If the design includes complex components, then no. For
example, we can produce children which are "real" complex systems. We
should be talking about the means.
>But the question of knowing if
>we REALLY ARE able to UNDERSTAND complexity is very challenging.
>What would be mechanism (I apologize for using this word) within human
>mind that allows this ... there should be such a mechanism, or to understand
>a complex behavior our mind would have to use a complex behavior itself ?
Yes, I agree with this line of questioning. Rather than "mechanism" let's
say "process" to avoid the machine metaphore somewhat. I have a hard time
imagining such a process, that is complex, emerging from a mechanical
structure (like a computer). Now here's the contradiction in saying that
everything is complex -- the computer is complex AT THE QUANTUM LEVEL, but
its operation AS A COMPUTER is not at the quantum level, it is at the
macroscopic classical level. Is its classical behavior as a computer only a
result of our perception of it? I say no. It EXISTS at both levels and
exhibits behavior accordingly. At the level at which it is a computer, it
IS a simple system. And it is a model of itself, if you follow my other
comments to Gary. So the important question relates to LEVELS of reality
and LEVELS of awareness. Although we can say, philosophically, that levels
are created by observation, and do not really exist, that idea also says
that nothing really exists except undefined potentials. It is not the
useful view for our purposes. A more useful view is that, as we know, we
can create levels of reality that are perceptual (models, philosophy, math,
etc.), AND NATURE CAN DO THIS TOO, otherwise we would never have existed to
make our own observations. This is why empiricism works - there really is
something consistant to measure -- it isn't just created anew every time we
look (except at the quantum level, where the observations havn't been made
and the system remains complex). Thus, I conclude that the human
psycho-physical structure must INCORPORATE something into its otherwise
mechanical structure that already has complex behavior. A very good
candidate is something aking to Bose-Einstein condensates, perhaps in
microtubules.
>
>> >These different aspects in which we can "see" a complex system are
>
>> > NECESSARILY INFINITE ?
>>
>
>> My views on this are guesses based on analogy with quantum behavior (ala
>> Penrose), which certainly is a complex system (although not necessarily the
>> only one, which is one of the current debates). From this perspective, I
>> don't think the possible outcomes have to be infinite.
>
>Hmmm ... this contradicts what Don have said ... I would stay with Don here
> ...but
>your suggestion of finitude with uncertainty is provoking ... do you really
>believe in which something can be uncertain ? Or uncertainty is only a
>lack of information by a human person ?
>
As you pointed out, Don later contradicts this earlier statement too. I
think he will clarify this. I would prefer to find infinity here too, but I
don't know how to get it. Philosophically, yes, the possible views, or as
Don puts it, "decompositions" of a complex system appear to offer infinite
possibilities. But because we are discovering that reality seems discrete
(space, time), I'm not sure it turns out to be truely infinite. Perhaps it
is sufficient to say it approaches infinity for all practical purposes??
But I think the number of possible states (following the quantum view) is
still theoretically calculable, if not practically so (i.e., complicated,
not complex). Hence, VIEWS of a complex system are simple. Does that work?
>> They are finite but
>> fundamentally uncertain. In other words, a given possibility doesn't exist
>> classically until it is observed. The qualifier "classically" in that
>> sentence is what leads to non-computability. So even though the possible
>> outcomes may be finite, they cannot be predicted except in a probabalistic
>> way. For example, spin state is either up or down -- two possibilities. But
>> it behaves in a complex way in relationship to other observables (meaning
>> classical observations). Define one finite aspect and another finite aspect
>> becomes uncertain. It is thus not the number of possibilities that is
>> involved, but how they are defined.
>
>I am not an expert on Quantum Mechanics, but I still believe that this
> notionthat
>something happens only after it is observed (the Schroedinger's cat quest) is
>only an approximate model to something that would be intrinsecally
> deterministic,
>though still not fully understood. I had a serious difficulty in
conceiving that
>something
>can be really RANDOM. I think that randomicity is only a model for something
> that
>is still unknown, but DETERMINISTIC ! And this determinism could be
originated,
>e.g. from complexity.
Well, I'm sure Don would agree here that this is a contradiction in Rosen's
view. "Complicatedness" is the deterministic analog of "complexity" in
Rosen's view, whereas "complexity" is inherently non-deterministic, thus,
in Penrose's view corresponding to the notion of ontic uncertainty. The
difference, then, between Penrose and Rosen is at what LEVEL this
uncertainty can enter. Rosen seems to imply that it can exist in any system
at any level, whereas Penrose, citing Froelich and Bohr, thinks it must be
somehow "magnified" in a suitable structure, e.g., BEC (Bose-Einstein
Condensates) and then incorporated into the system. That's the view that
makes the most sense to me, but I'm not sure enough about Rosen's view to
say he truely differs from Penrose on these points.
Your point about something "deterministic" underlying the seemingly random,
uncertain, or R-complex (meaning Rosen complex) behavior is very attractive
to many physicists right now who are working on those deterministic
theories. However, there is a serious epistemological problem here, because
beyond the classical limit the whole notion of "deterministic" looses its
meaning. We could call it that just to be comfortable, but what does it
mean in a realm where observation is impossible?
>Then, randomicity would be only a model for complexity,
> and
>as a model, just an approximation. I don't buy the idea that you may DEFINE
>complexity through randomicity in quantum events.
>
As long as you think determinstically, you are correct, it doesn't work.
Answer: stop thinking deterministically beyond those barriers where
determinism stops. As an example, (from a non-technical knowledge of this,
I must add!) there is a sort of determinism in non-locality phenomena.
Separated states (EPR experiment) are perfectly correlated until disturbed.
This implies that they are somehow connected in another "dimension." Or
perhaps they are the same object in higher dimensions. This is like a
circle intersecting a plane -- to the two-dimensional people on the plane
there are two points that appear perfectly correllated at faster than light
speed. This is explained by the geometry of the whole object in the larger
order dimensionality. But they are forever forbidden to observe in three
dimensions because their sensory apparatus, including anything they can
construct, can only see in two dimensions. Is the 3-dimensional circle
"real" and determining? Or are there other ways, perhaps in 4 or 5
dimensions to connect them. Or even in 3 dimensions, maybe its a square,
not a circle. We can ONLY create instrumental models for this kind of
higher-order dimensionality and have no way of ever knowing if they are
"deterministic" or if we will continue inventing higher and higher order
dimensionalities as we ask more subtle questions. Again, there may be no
practical point in arguing determinism. For all practical purposes, it has
been disprooven, yet we MUST continue to devise cleaver models constructed
on deterministic principles, because we can't do anything else (except
meditate). I don't think even Rosen can get out of this trap.
>> For better or worse, my approach has been to find an analogue to
>> non-classical behavior in general in quantum behavior, and associate that
>> with complexity. Others object to this approach, but I havn't been able to
>> determine why. I think you are essentially correct to say that each large
>> complex system, i.e., once it involves many components, is unique -- like
>> organisms and ecosystems. We could not, for example, create a complex
>> computer clone of Don Mikulecky or Robert Rosen. We're simply going to have
>> to read the books.
>
>In my point of view we are neither able to build a simple bacteria from
>scratch.From scratch I mean, getting attoms of C, H, O and N and building
> organic
>molecules
>in order to compose a cell. And not because we don't have artifacts for
>manipulating
>molecules, but because synthesizing an organism would be more than just
playing
>with a chemical toolset and building a chemical mechanism. We still don't
have
> the
>
>conceptual tools for dealing with the complex behavior that we would
demand in
>order to build such organism.
Yes, I agree. But the question about complexity is if it is a matter of how
the chemistry is constructed, or what kinds of components one uses. We
don't have to understand a magnet in order to use it in a machine. We also
don't have to understand quantum behavior in order to incorporate it into a
machine. In fact, quantum computers are being constructed now -- I don't
know what the progress is. When we use the right ingredients, then I full
agree with your statement, we still don't know enough about how to connect
it all up. Two options, the "let it evolve" approach and the usual
scientific trial and error approach.
>
>> To my thinking (and I belive Penrose), no. Infinite complication does not
>> produce complexity unless it involves a correlated state of matter that can
>> behave non-deterministically.
>
>If it is true, then I think that I still didn't get all of what complexity is
According to Rosen and others, it is NOT deterministic.
> ...
>
>> >6) Do purelly mechanistic system really exist ? It seems to me that EVERY
>> real
>> >system that is materially implemented is not a mechanistic system anymore,
>> but a
>> >TRUE COMPLEX SYSTEM. It leads to the question that we look to this complex
>> >system, but what we see is a mechanistic system So, true mechanistic
>> system do
>> >exist only in our thoughts. Only models are mechanistic.
>>
>> I do not agree entirely with this view, for the following reason. It is
>> ultimately not possible to completely separate models of reality from
>> reality. It is nonsense to speak of a reality that cannot be perceived by
>> any means. Perceptions always involves a model.
>
>The question is not that it can not be perceived ... if a complex system
>hasinfinite different views, I may be able to perceive each one of them,
but to
>perceive all of them would take an infinite time !
>
>> To clarify the meaning of this statement, let me add that our current
>> psycho-physical evolved form is the result of a model and itself implies a
>> particular model viewpoint.
>
>I don't agree with this ! I don't think that we were created from a model,but
> that
>we evolved by means of natural evolution. In natural evolution,
>there is no model a priori. You simply generate the systems, and let those
>that work to survive. So, there is no model of development here. There
>was no "a priori" knowledge for what it was going to reach after evolution.
See my comments to Gary on this. I apologise for confusing the matter with
this philosophical twist -- but one of our problems in discussing these
things is jumping between levels of consideration. When Rosen says that
everything is ultimately complex, that does not deal with the perceptual
levels we actually experience, and whether we consider those levels "real"
or observational models may not be entirely separable choices. I don't know
if he ever resolves this problem - still looking for two of his out of
print books. He must deal with it somehow.
>
>> We can only speak of the reality we interact
>> with. Our particular form dictates how this reality will appear and how it
>> seems structured. Beyond that we can only speculate. So in a sense, when we
>> develop the best scientific model we can, we ARE describing reality, while
>> at the same time we know that reality is more. This is a Platonic view, I'm
>> sure.
>
>With this, I agree !
>
>> What it means in regard to your question is that there ARE, for all
>> practical purposes, mechanistic simple systems. Your lawn chair is one of
>> them. So is your computer. But at a very deep level (i.e., quantum level)
>> the lawn chair is complex. The question is what level are you interacting
>> with it? To our perspective, nature has levels. In reality, levels are
>> subjective. They're real to us, and that can't be ignored. So I say a rock
>> is a simple system, because you and I know what we mean by a rock and that
>> model of a rock has a physical empirical relationship with all the evidence
>> we can acquire. But if we look only at quantum particles, you won't find a
>> rock. And if you look at people, or ecosystems, you also won't find a rock.
>> Why? I think it is because the phenomena that is different and exhibited at
>> the quantum level (of perception) has been captured in very special
>> physical structures and magnified, then incorporated into the mechanical
>> system through evolution.
>
>Your argumentation comes from the understanding that something only
existsafter
> we
>interact with them. Then you may talk about different levels of nature.
Yes.
>I am not to sympatetic to this idea. I agree that we may "interfere" with
nature
>when we interact with it, but it doesn't turn something that is complex into
>something that is mechanistic. The mechanization of our daily life
artifacts is
>only an illusion of our thought. It is only an "approximation" of its real
> complex
>
>behavior.
I understand this view, but I don't think it is testible in any way. It is
an issue of scale. If we equate "scale" with "illusion" then you are
correct. But we must always remember that the scale of what we call "real"
must match the scale of our questioning. If you say that a "rock" is really
complex, this is a misstatement because the word "rock" establishes a
macroscopic scale at which it behaves entirely mechanistically. If you
consider the scale at which it is complex, then there is nothing called a
"rock." On the other hand, the scale at which an ecosystem is complex is
the scale at which we call it an ecosystem. These are two entirely distinct
kinds of things, and the distinction is important to clarify.
>Usually good approximations, that allows us to predict (with some
>margin of error) how it will going to behave. So, there is not different
levels
>of reality, but different levels of perception of reality. The chair is the
> same
>for
>everybody.
Because the concept "chair," which defines the object under discussion,
establishes the macroscopic scale at which it behaves as a chair -
mechanistically. At other scales, it's not a chair.
>The creation of a mechanistic model for it into an interpreter's mind
>is what can happens. The chair is intrinsecally a complex system, despite we
>create a mechanistic model for explaining it, that works until some complex
>behavior appears into scene.
No complex behavior of chairs has yet appeared. So I think it is simple,
unless we change what we're looking at.
>
>> Now, apparently Rosen wouldn't describe it this way, so I'm looking into
>> Rosen's description. But I think mine is the practical side of it -- the
>> way it must appear to us, and also the way we need to look at it if we want
>> to build something. Rosen's view may turn out to be more comprehensive and
>> universally correct, but less amenable to initial construction. I don't
>> think we can claim that all structures that we observe exhibit complex
>> system behavior. That would be silly.
>
>The question is not that it does not exhibit complex behavior, but if we
areable
>to perceive this complex behavior ! Sometimes the effect of complexity
>is to small to be detected by our perceptive mechanisms.
Yes, the scales of phenomena grade into each other rather than there being
a very sharp line between what is classical (~simple) and what is not
(~complex). But uncertainty (~complexity) of an object or simple system
approaches zero very fast for anything above a small number of quantum
particles, EXCEPT those very special structures that retain a quantum
correllated condition (BEC). Are we ignoring this very clear difference
between two kinds of matter and how they behave? Surely this has an
important bearing on larger systems than can be composed of these two kinds
of matter in complicated ways.
>
>> Yes, it is the same question, and I think the same answer. How well can
you
>> say you understand another human being at the psychological level? We can
>> only look and respect the complexity. Yet in contemplative practice people
>> routinely experience much closer connections and "understandings." To "see"
>> complexity, we have to participate experientially, not observationally.
>> This is the "third eye."
>
>I am not totally against to these ideas, but I will keep them into the
> department
>ofthose things that we still don't know too much in order to make an opinion.
>
OK, I'll go along with that! But it applies to all the ideas, I think. And
I'm of the view that we should use these concepts until they are rejected,
rather than rejecting them until they are prooven, which can never be fully
done. It is quite certain that quantum phenomena will not be explained
"away." The phenomena is as real as anything we call real, and has a very
similar behavior to what we call "complex." I can't see the logic for not
exploring the connection.
>Thanks for you opinions too, John. I appreciate to put into debate these
>ideas that come from quantum mechanics, uncertainty principle and
>randomicity, despite not having a complete agreement on its adequacy
>for explaining complexity and intelligence. I preview still a lot of
discussion
>regarding this theme.
>Best regards,
>Ricardo
Thank you, Ricardo. Dealing with this stuff takes patience! I'm sure you
realize that I must state my views as convincingly as possible in order to
test them, which by no means indicates that I think I have the answers.
What we are mostly debating, I think, is what is the best avenue of
investigation to yield useful results. Do we use the existing theories to
some extent, do we try some kinds of synthesis, or do we start from new
beginnings? I agrue mostly for synthesis. I think all the views are correct
in some important features, but we have to combine them to get it right. I
like to ask: What do all the theories agree on, once we have resolved the
inconsequantial differences, such as definitions and different but
equivalent formulations?
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)