It seems to me from all the incompleteness arguements, subject-object
problem, observership (measurement) problem, etc. that we are condemned to
"know" it only partially from a classical view. Bohr was most clear on this
point, I think. However, if we learn different ways of "knowing," then
perhaps we can "know" complexity. The practice of deep meditation is
claimed to be such a method. I have involved myself in this and am
convinced that there is a "knowledge" that results. Where it comes from is
a matter of one's faith, but the value of meditation can and is being
employed out of the religious context with many practical applications. I
think it is strongest, however, within a spiritual and artistic context.
That makes sense in terms of complex systems. Art certainly attempts to
know and comunicate something about complexity.
>2) As I could understand from past messages and from Rosen's interview,
>a complex system is a system where, depending on the observation we do
>on it, it shows a different perspective. It should be compared to a diamond
>with an infinite number of faces. And this is what concerns me. These
different
>aspects in which we can "see" a complex system are NECESSARILY INFINITE ? If
> there
>is a finite (it may be huge, but finite) only number of different
perspectives,
> then
>
>we could acquaint for a mechanistic implementation of it. So it seems that
>necessarily
>it have to be infinite.
My views on this are guesses based on analogy with quantum behavior (ala
Penrose), which certainly is a complex system (although not necessarily the
only one, which is one of the current debates). From this perspective, I
don't think the possible outcomes have to be infinite. They are finite but
fundamentally uncertain. In other words, a given possibility doesn't exist
classically until it is observed. The qualifier "classically" in that
sentence is what leads to non-computability. So even though the possible
outcomes may be finite, they cannot be predicted except in a probabalistic
way. For example, spin state is either up or down -- two possibilities. But
it behaves in a complex way in relationship to other observables (meaning
classical observations). Define one finite aspect and another finite aspect
becomes uncertain. It is thus not the number of possibilities that is
involved, but how they are defined.
Then, how to guarantee that we can find a perfect analog
> for
>
>a given complex system ? Or in other words ... are each complex system
unique ?
>If yes, and if it is not possible to make a perfect analog of it, then
> necessarily
>it is
>really impossible to know it in its entirety !
>
For better or worse, my approach has been to find an analogue to
non-classical behavior in general in quantum behavior, and associate that
with complexity. Others object to this approach, but I havn't been able to
determine why. I think you are essentially correct to say that each large
complex system, i.e., once it involves many components, is unique -- like
organisms and ecosystems. We could not, for example, create a complex
computer clone of Don Mikulecky or Robert Rosen. We're simply going to have
to read the books. But, using an elemental analogue structure that behaves
as a complex system, say a properly constructed Bose-Einstein condensate,
perhaps there are ways to involve that with a classical logic circuit and
produce a complex system / life form. We've so far produced a few
individual B-E condensates, but this idea would be analogous to the first
computer memory core, which had to be wound by hand. We would need millions
to get any significant result.
We would not be required to have a theory of what goes on within correlated
quantum matter, just to employ the phenenomena along with suitable machine
stuctures to translate and apply the results (which is what our body does).
It seems from Don's recent comment, however, that Rosen might say this
won't work -- but I have to understand that argument better yet, and in the
end I suspect I'll still think it is worth a try, if nothing else than to
test Rosen. What I'm suggesting hasn't been done and could have some very
interesting results. This is the "manhatten project" analogue mentioned a
few days ago, I think.
>3) Talking about emergence. Don said that others used emergence to explain
parts
>of complex systems as if they were mechanistic systems. But we may have the
>phenomenum of emergence in purely mechanistic systems where two simple
>systems coupled to each other form a complicated systems (just to make a
>difference from "complex" system, as Rosen did), exibiting a behavior that
can
>not be seen by each simple system in particular. It is a true case of
emergence
> of
>a behavior, dictated by the cooperation of the two simple systems. The
question
>here is ... if we have an INFINITE number of cooperating mechanistic systems,
>do we reach a complex system ?
>
If my first arguement holds up, the question of infinity should not be
relevant, except in terms of the possibilities for WHEN events occur. In
other words, free will may not control the number of possibilities, which
remains near infinite and chaotic but nevertheless classical, yet it may
determine when certain possibilities are invoked. Again, a guess on my
part, but I want to see what Rosen says about time in this regard!
The question of emergent phenomena is certainly relevant I think. There are
two kinds of emergence as I read our discussions. One is "emergence from
ignorance," i.e, multiple simple systems interacting in a chaotic and
unpredictable way that is still classical, but just too complicated for us
to calculate. The possible results pre-exist in the sense that they are
theoretically derivable. The other is fundamental, or ontic emergence,
i.e., something new arising from the uncertainty that is built into the
universe (for those who accept this view). It is unimportant that some
people think this ontic uncertainty will eventually be explained by
non-classical deterministic theory. It is rather well established that it
will ALWAYS appear uncertain from a classical (simple system) perspective,
and that uncertainty within a classical (simple) system (i.e., measuring
system) is what makes the system complex.
>4) Other question comes from the discipline of Artificial Life, as we know it
> today.
>
>Regarding complex systems, are all the research in Artificial Life (most
>backgrounded
>by computer simulation) only rubish ? Does it have NOTHING to do with REAL
life
> ?
>Or is there SOMETHING in life that IS mechanistic, which is captured by the
> current
>studies on Artificial Life ?
I think there is something very significant in life that IS mechanistic. I
think living systems must form and evolve a very specific internal
structure that is capable of capturing non-deterministic behavior and
applying the results. Even though I wrote about "autevolution" as involving
the non-computable "self," I very carefully describe this as a 2nd order
phenomenon FROM OUR CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE. The primary mode of evolution
appears mechanical. But it is extremely significant that a non-computable
phenonomena can be (and has been) caught up in evolution and employed to a
greater and greater extent in living systems. To me this fits well with
observation. It is clear that mammals and primates have a greater ability
to use uncertainty in real time than, say a plant, a virus or even an
insect. I am not talking about the role of uncertainty or variability in
genetics, which is part of the mechanical model and applies with
approximately equal significance across all life forms.
>5) Can we understand complexity by induction ? We start with simple
mechanistic
>systems,
>build complicated systems with the interaction of them, over and over
> complicating
>the system and then, ... , by induction (this incredible human artifact for
>understanding the
>infinite) we reach a complex system ? (I'm thinking here in a mental model
for a
>complex
>system)
>
To my thinking (and I belive Penrose), no. Infinite complication does not
produce complexity unless it involves a correlated state of matter that can
behave non-deterministically.
>6) Do purelly mechanistic system really exist ? It seems to me that EVERY
real
>system that is materially implemented is not a mechanistic system anymore,
but a
>TRUE COMPLEX SYSTEM. It leads to the question that we look to this complex
>system, but what we see is a mechanistic system So, true mechanistic
system do
>exist only in our thoughts. Only models are mechanistic.
I do not agree entirely with this view, for the following reason. It is
ultimately not possible to completely separate models of reality from
reality. It is nonsense to speak of a reality that cannot be perceived by
any means. Perceptions always involves a model.
To clarify the meaning of this statement, let me add that our current
psycho-physical evolved form is the result of a model and itself implies a
particular model viewpoint. We can only speak of the reality we interact
with. Our particular form dictates how this reality will appear and how it
seems structured. Beyond that we can only speculate. So in a sense, when we
develop the best scientific model we can, we ARE describing reality, while
at the same time we know that reality is more. This is a Platonic view, I'm
sure.
What it means in regard to your question is that there ARE, for all
practical purposes, mechanistic simple systems. Your lawn chair is one of
them. So is your computer. But at a very deep level (i.e., quantum level)
the lawn chair is complex. The question is what level are you interacting
with it? To our perspective, nature has levels. In reality, levels are
subjective. They're real to us, and that can't be ignored. So I say a rock
is a simple system, because you and I know what we mean by a rock and that
model of a rock has a physical empirical relationship with all the evidence
we can acquire. But if we look only at quantum particles, you won't find a
rock. And if you look at people, or ecosystems, you also won't find a rock.
Why? I think it is because the phenomena that is different and exhibited at
the quantum level (of perception) has been captured in very special
physical structures and magnified, then incorporated into the mechanical
system through evolution.
Now, apparently Rosen wouldn't describe it this way, so I'm looking into
Rosen's description. But I think mine is the practical side of it -- the
way it must appear to us, and also the way we need to look at it if we want
to build something. Rosen's view may turn out to be more comprehensive and
universally correct, but less amenable to initial construction. I don't
think we can claim that all structures that we observe exhibit complex
system behavior. That would be silly.
And this provokes the
>following
>question: Are we able to have thoughts that are NOT of mechanistic systems
? If
> we
>observe well, we will see that it is exactly the question 1) above: are we
able
> to
>understand, conceptualize, model a true complex system ? Or are we able
only to
>see a system and say ... well, THIS IS a complex system, without
understanding
> it
>at all ?
>
Yes, it is the same question, and I think the same answer. How well can you
say you understand another human being at the psychological level? We can
only look and respect the complexity. Yet in contemplative practice people
routinely experience much closer connections and "understandings." To "see"
complexity, we have to participate experientially, not observationally.
This is the "third eye."
>I have other questions too, but I will put only these as a start ...
depending
> on
>the
>answers, I will continue with the others ...
>--
> //\\\
> (o o)
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> / Intelligent Systems Development Group \
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-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)