Re: ecological complexity

John J. Kineman (jjk@NGDC.NOAA.GOV)
Thu, 16 Jul 1998 16:14:26 -0600


At 04:36 PM 7/16/98 -0400, you wrote:
>Reply to John Kineman:
>
>Complexity is definitely a subjective (i.e., observer-dependent)
>category.....
>
>Your second point corresponds to the situation when a system
>observes itself (semantic closure). This kind of complexity (I
>would prefer to call it "organization") cannot be measured
>externally. However, we may adjust our measuring devices so that
>they will mimic (to some extent) the measuring devices of the
>system itself....
>
>The question if ecosystems (or biosphere) are alive is very
>interesting... My conclusion would be that ecosystems have a low-level
>organization compared to organisms. In particular, ecosystems do
>not have specialized "memory components" (something similar to DNA).
>However, some dominating species (e.g. mono-species forest) may support
>all other components of the ecosystem. The role of the dominant
>species would be similar to DNA.
>
>There is much more intregration between specific pairs of species
>(symbiosis). These often have high organization and eventually may
>become real organisms (symbiotic origin of eucaryotic cells).
>
>I agree that using different measuring devices we will come to very
>different measures of complexity. But if we talk about organization,
>then we are not free in selecting measuring devices (e.g., scale).
>If we observe some persistence in the system we may hypothesize that
>this persistence is due to some kind of semantic closure (self-
>production, heredity). It may happen that we find semantic closure
>at a lower hierarchical level (e.g., not at the level of ecosystems
>but at the level of organisms). Then we would say that observed
>patterns at the higher level is the effect of organization at a lower
>level.
>
>We need to distinguish optimal systems and systems composed of
>optimal components. The latter have no organization at the upper
>level.
>
>-Alexei

Ok. This makes a great deal of sense, and is very much along the lines I've
been thinking (and questioning). Here's a few further questions and thoughts.

I'm not quite sure how to define or distinguish the concept of "complexity"
from "organization." Is semantic closure the definitive difference? If so,
it seems inseparable from ideas of awareness & experience as we have been
discussing them. (I recognize that these alternative terms invoke more
connotations but is "semantic closure" really more informative?).
Nevertheless, we're basically talking about some kind of awareness or
experience of self as the root to being an "organism." If, as you say, this
is analogous to a system "observing itself," not being too anthropomorphic
about what we mean by observing, then this corresponds with ideas of
quantum observership (as I argue), but perhaps not with all concepts of
self-organization, because some theories seem to imply that
self-organization (e.g., dissipative structures) can be adequately
described as a purely mechanical (syntactical) system, do they not?

It seems that the criteria of "semantic closure" also corresponds to a view
where "organism" is a matter of what level a biological system has an
integrated "awareness" or "experience" of itself.

Now, from my as yet very limited reading of Rosen, he might argue that
this, if accepted as the definition, cannot be thought of merely in terms
of syntatical encoding (DNA, etc.) -- which would always leave a "semantic
reisdue." That, of course, links to his discussion of what is life, which
I'm thinking is identical to the question: What is experience? In other
words life = experience = awareness of existence = wholistic awareness (at
a given level) = "semantic closure." All of these defy definition in
classical terms.

But back to ecosystems. Ecosystems do not have well defined boundaries.
Traditional definitions pay homage to the idea that an "area" is associated
with an ecosystem, just as components are necessary features, but space
actually plays no part in the definition. The abstract definition of an
ecosystem (as opposed to completely useless definitions that attempt to be
spatial and material) is functional -- as a set of relations in "n"
ecological "dimensions." It is clear that most of the "ecological
dimensions" discussed in practice are actually attributes of the
4-dimensions we are familiar with (e.g., "availability of water" is
theoretically reducible to space-time quantities), and that adaptation,
niche strategies, selection, and evolution are presumed for the most part
to operate along these innumerable and infitely subtle dimensions. But
again, there is Rosen's "semantic residue" because one always can get to
"dimensions" that do not reduce materially (especially when discussing
strategies, decisions, etc.). Even in the seemingly incontrovertible
example of "availability of water" COULD consider how "availability" is
affected by species starategies and decisions, etc., ultimately involving
the semantic problem. The residual need for semantic closure seems
inescapable, and, as you say, can be provided for ecosystems from the
species level, the semantics of which is then merely elaborated into
resulting ecosystem patterns. This provides yet another level of semantic
closure, however, since ecosystems are the ultimate reality in evolution
theory -- being the all-powerful selective environment. Hence semantic
closure at the phenotypic level can affect evolution - which is my
"autevolution" hypothesis.

Another consequence of using "semantic closure" as the criteria (if I
understand it correctly) is that we would have to claim that a quantum
particle is a living organism, wheather it is reproductive or not. I'm
quite comfortable with this idea, for whatever that's worth, but it means
removing replication from its priveleged position in the definition of
life. Replication/reproduction would be seen rather as the means for
elaborating organisms into more intricate and persistent organisms rather
than the means for creating life.

I think its time for a beer.

-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)