> John Kineman's attempt to respond to Don Mikulecky:
>
> At 10:32 AM 7/1/98 -0400, you wrote:
> >Rosen has shown that relational models can encompass both the Newtonian
> paradigm
> >and these extensions beyond it with equal facility.
> >...One point he insists on is that we are using physical/non-physical in a
> >potentially misleading way. If we allow "organization" (for lack of a better
> > word
> >and to save space) of the type I've been talking about to be considered an
> >integral part of any real system, them possibly we whant our distinction
> to be
> >between the material and non-material, but even that doesn't do it. I
> hope you
> >see the problem: all real systems contain these two aspects in inseperable
> ways.
>
> If by "material" we mean the classical 4-dimensional world we observe, this
> is similar to what I think I'm describing.
>
> >In network thermodynamics we recognize two kinds of "data" constitutive laws
> >relating flows and forces and the network's topology. these are distinct and
> > both necessary for an understanding and modeling of the system.
> >
>
> Help me on this one. It would seem strange to define "data" in terms of
> "laws" and "topology" within a material context, hence such a definition
> would not be general. If we are talking about data forming the bridge
> between material realities and mental realities, then it makes sense to me
> as having something to do with the "topology" of that relationship. The
> law F=ma refers to the mental theoretical (mathematical) relationship
> between quantitative values for force, mass, and accelleration as a way of
> modeling something presumed "real." Neither the law nor the numbers are
> part of nature (from an objective viewpoint), but part of our abstraction
> of it. If, on the other hand, one wishes to model the psychological
> interaction of the scientist as part of the system, then the numbers are
> involved in linking between the material process being observed and the
> mental construct of the observer, and we can say the "data" are part of the
> natural system that includes psychology.
>
> Now, using my own arguements against me for a moment, if the quantum level
> is an elementary prototype for the kind of complex psychology normally
> associated with thinking, science, and human-use data,
Stop right here. If we use Don's notion that the quantum level is a
functional system, it won't commute into the macro world and ought not
to be thought of as a proto type for anything. If the micro/macro
levels are a complex system, then we would not expect either to be
deriveable from the other. I think this is crucial for understanding
the quality we are refering to as data.
So the very reason you are using to argue that what we think of as data
in the macro realms differs from and ought not to be confused with the
way data or differences participate in the micro realms is the reason
why I feel there is much to be gained from recognizing the qualitative
similarities of data in both the macro and micro realms.
In other words I am agreeing with your arguements that "data" in the
quantum realm is radically different. But I also think that this is why
it makes so much sense to focus on the data itself as a complex system
that mightb be both physical and non physical at the same time. I think
this confusion is what we need to understand how the overlap zone
functions. As Don says, it is the functions that are most likely to lead
to a richer understanding of these complex systems.
So we ought to resist the temptation to split up data, even though from
a strictly objective analysis that would make the most sense. What I'm
saying is that it is precisely the fact that it would make the most
sense, from a traditional analytical methodological approach, to say
there is a different quality of non physical data operating at the
quantum realm that is the reason we ought not to make this distinction.
So the very fact that your arguement makes so much sense is the reason I
think we ought not to proceed to divide data into two groups. I like to
say they are the the same and different at the same time.
then the concept of
> "data" must also have its primative element in the quantum world.
Again, "primitive" infers that one is deriveable from the other. I
don't think they are deriveable from each other. They are different
aspects of a " complex system." We can understand them better if we do
not succumb to the temptation to split them into "parts."
At that
> point, perhaps we would suspect that it is the "glue" that Norm alluded to
> that is involved in determining quantum states.
This is not exactly the way I meant the use of the word "glue" to be
interpreted. What I had in mind was related more to the different roles
that data plays in various realms that seem to bind things and processes
together. In contrast, our ways of percieving the likes of things and
motions also uses data, but in our virtual world, we tend to split them
into seperate parts. I explain more about this later.
However, at this level I'm
> not convinced that it is meaningful to think of it as "data" which was a
> concept invented to accommodate more baggage, such as theory, experiment,
> thinking, data storage, accuracy, precision, etc. -- all attributes
> associated with organism use (macroscopic perception).
One of the reasons I like the word data is because it is so
multifaceted. It is everywhere and into everything. That is exactly
what I want as a connotation.
At the most
> primative level, the exchange is synonomous with a decision about a single
> state, as in Hammeroff & Penrose's self-collapse theory.
Again you may be making assumptions about parts and systems in thinking
processes that may not hold up. It could be that the microtubules P and
H refer to operate non locally in what amounts to a state that
replicates a Bose-Einstein condensate. This would than act like a multi
dimensional blank slate. Such a blank space could act like a read and
write medium for the multi dimensional processing of data. I am just
using this as an example to keep open a wide range of possibilities
about how the mind works instead of falling into the usual trap of
assuming that it must fit into some "scientifically acceptable
framework."
In his own way this is also what Penrose is trying to do. All the
lights on this tree have just not come on yet. But this kind of
thinking is a good example of why the physicists generally have a lot
easier time with these complex systems than most of the biologists and
anthropologists do. To my way of thinking, the latter scientists are so
deeply immersed in the complexities of their specialties that they are
forced to stick to the assumptions of traditional science. The irony is
that as these local complexities escalate, there is an increasing need
to understand the ideas that Don and Rosen articulate so well.
As an analogy, is
> a single bit in a computer memory "data." It is necessary to data, but not
> sufficient without additional meanings. I think an arguement in my favor is
> the inference that quantum states are spread until there is a permanent
> record of an event (state, or state change). That implies that data storage
> is required in the classical realm (i.e., to have macroscopically observed
> states or objects), but not in the un-observed quantum realm (where states
> can define themselves).
I think this is an accurate account of the transition zone between the
micro and macro realms. And if it is close to the mark, it should be no
surprise that this thing we are calling non physical data is going to go
through a metamorphasis. To me what is interesting is to try to track
these discontinuities. Here is where I think there is much to be
learned.
The state itself is the "data" of this realm. The
> idea that something else transpires to initiate a state change is a
> 'macro-centric' idea. At the most primative level, I think we can only talk
> about "decisions" or "decision events" not "data" and unfortunately, the
> cause remains mysterious, being outside our 4D world.
I think this is what Murray Gell-Mann is talking about when he says that
information is integral part of the quantum realm. Don says we should
ask the "Why" questions. Why do these non physical differences occur?
To me this is the central question. Keep in mind that I'm saying that
these non physical differences are nothing more or less than data. Data
is just a difference of some sort. But why do these differences pop up
in the first place? Are new differences opening up as we speak? Or is
there some kind of a conservation of differences rule. My guess is that
new data pops up all the time. This may be an essential quality that
enables self-organizing processes to come into being.
I also have another WAG that I will let you laugh at. Astronomers just
discovered that the rate of apparent expansion in the known universe is
increasing. My WAG is that this may be a symptom of the self organizing
processes. Only a small part of these differences may get trapped in
the material universe we call 4D reality.
"Data," to my
> understanding, can only exist (i.e., be stored) within the 4D (macroscopic)
> world.
So I'm saying that your assumption may not turn out to be correct. In
fact, I think that the non physical aspects of data can be traded,
stored and participate in changes in the physical 4D realms, but they
are not confined to this format or context.
Yet the apparent paradox is that for the storage of data to have its
> necessary meaning as data, there must also be a psyche to perceive it as
> such, i.e., to attach its meaning.
I don't agree with this. Perhaps you ought to read my account of the
understand rock. http://204.94.86.93/30.html Phyche infers human
understanding, awareness, experience etc. I think if you think about it
you will see why data is being traded back and forth all around us. It
was zipping around the universe long before the dawn of human
understanding. I have no doubt that it was going on well before the
advent of life. And I suspect that the first cracks in the wall that
led to the big bang were nothing more or less than a difference. DATA.
This is an apparent paradox in our
> reality because we are in the macroscopic world where these things have
> become separated. At the quantum level the event, the storage, and the
> (primative) meaning are one.
Well said. That's what differences are. I think this is what Gell-Mann
has in mind.
The meaning is also simple, it is the single
> thought of existence (to the spiritualist, "I am"). Since these things are
> not separate at that level, there is nothing transferred, hence not much
> use for the idea of "data."
I don't see why the notion of transfer or movement is appropriate here.
After all, transferance implies space/time. The very existence of
space/time is in itself a difference, or more precisely a lot of
differences.
It is really hard to get out of our 3 or 4D world. Even for those of us
who have spent a lot of time thinking about these things. In fact, the
very processes of thinking are mainly geared to the logic of these macro
physical realms. So the thinking itself almost forces us to revert to
these realms. Our language and visual models push us to the same ways
of modeling. They work fine when we are focused on the macro physical
realms exclusively. But they can cause all sorts of grief when we try
to go beyond our day to day concerns.
The same seems evident when dealing with
> non-local quantum phenomena. If data were involved, it would violate the
> speed of light limitation to have correlated non-local events.
Time may reverse or do all sorts of crazy things in the quantum realms.
If time is out of whack, what sense does it make to say that data would
violate the speed of light limitation? You correctly segue into non
local phenomena here.
The
> existence of non-locality phenomena is a demonstration that data are not
> involved, and perhaps that data, event, and decision are not separated at
> that level.
I think we might need to work through the meaning of event and decision
here. Hermeneutics style. Still, I am inclined to go along with the
notion that data, events and decision along with matter, energy, space
and time may all be up for grabs.
That is the central point and the revolutionary implications of
Gell-Mann's conjecture. Here is a physicist with world class stature
who flat out says that non physical data or information may be an
integral part of the quantum realm. I don't know about anyone else, but
this notion set off all kinds of bells, whistles and lights in my poor
overworked head.
Hence the inference of additional dimensions where a "no data
> required" connection can exist.
I would say it differently, but your view has a certain validity to it
that I would not argue with. I would say that the data changes and is
processed and integrated differently in different contexts. In the
context you are refering to here, the space/time dimensions seem to drop
out. But these dimensions are also data bound. So we have just lost
the space/time data bound dimensions. I can't agree that this would
necessarily wipe out the date operating in other dimensions. Don't some
of the current theories postulate up to 23 dimensions?
Keep in mind that the very notion of different dimensions or contexts
infers the presence of data. Data is on all sides of all equations.
This may be why most scientists and mathematicians usually drop it out.
I think this is one of those thought mode mistakes that we humans are so
prone to make.
My arguement is that the view I present
> here is a more parsimonious view than presuming there is something called
> "data" that is real and important at the quantum level, or that the concept
> adds anything at that level.
To my way of thinking, this is the traditional error that most
scientists and mathematicians are prone to make. I say it is a mistake
for the same reason that I tried to point out that it was a mistake to
drop the notion of data out of some equations. Without the notion of
non physical differences that can make a physical difference, quantum
mechanics evaporates into nothing anyway. Nothing is there whether we
like it or not. So why not assume that this nothing may be important?
What's more, it appropriate to note here that Gell-Mann was the
co-discoveror of quarks. He ought to know about parsimony. I assume
that parsimony is one of the reasons he suggests that data ought to be a
part of the quantum mix. So I'm going to stick with him on this
question.
I don't know what your experience and qualifications are in the realm of
quantum physics, but I am happy to admit that I haven't got a clue about
what happens at the quantum level. I often find it the case that the
less I know about things the more certain I am of my uninformed
opinions. Maybe we should ask Gell-Mann for his thoughts on this
subject.
The only way I could see combining this view
> with the concept that "data" are the "glue" is if we think of data as the
> hidden dimension implied in non-locality --
I might guess just the reverse. Since non locality implies no
differences in space/time, it might be a lack of data that is at the
heart of this phenomena.
By the way, a friend of mine says that this non locality phenemena and
what is commonly known as viewing at a distance, are being intensively
studied at no fewer than six major labs around the world. He says that
these Manhattan type projects are working on some new weapons that will
make all our existing weapons of mass destruction obsolete. Perhaps you
have heard of this too.
but that's an unneccessary
> redefinition of terms that we already have better words for, and it damages
> our understanding of "data" as a macroscopic phenomenon.
Can you explain what you mean by damages. To me it opens up a much
broader and deeper understanding of how to integrate data and
information theory into complex systems and modeling relation.
In the macroscopic
> world, yes, I would agree that "data" can be thought of as the operative
> element involved in perception and the glue between what is perceived and
> the mental state of the observer (including all the semantic meanings about
> chairs, etc.); but that's a pretty common and trivial result.
A pretty common and trivial result? Can you be more specific as to why
you say this. To me it is one of the best ways understanding what
complex systems are. Again, perhaps you are thinking that this notion
of data is trivial in explaining physical systems and their parts.
Where it really comes into its own is in understanding from the
functional perspective. Then a whole multiverse of qualitative
dimensions come bursting through and our understanding expands in
comparable ways. This may be trivial to you, but it is anything but
trivial to me.
It does not
> get at the "glue" or perhaps the commonality between material and
> non-material nature at the most fundamental level.
Here you are not using the notion of glue in the way I originally
intended it. What I was trying to say was that this non physical notion
of data allows us to see how things and motions are the same and
different at the same time. Non physical data binds matter and motions
into the same physical processes.
In contrast, our minds are mainly geared to seperate matter from
motions. So for me, the notion of non physical data is just another way
to understand what Don and Rosen say when they describe complex systems
that are both the same and different at the same time.
I think you may be assuming that the most fundamental level of the
"commonality between material and non material nature" is in the quantum
realm. On the other hand, I suspect that this nature is not derivable
from the quantum domain alone but rather is a quality that shows up in
self organizing and other functions which radically change based on
context.
So from what I can tell, I'm with Don and Rosen on these questions. I
don't think reductionism and determinism lead anywhere other than to
half truths even in the realms of physics. If they did, I think we
would have already found the "commonality between material and non
material nature" as you call it. It will be interesting to see how all
this turns out.
> >
> >the chair is replete with organization and other attributes which are more
> > central
> >to its chairness than the wood which is easily replaced by steel or plastic
> >without changing it from being a chair
> >
>
> My point is that this is stated from a human perspective only, not a
> general inference about nature. "Being a chair" and being "repleat with
> organization and other attributes" are all observer defined meanings and
> not an inherent part of the natural object, unless we define the system of
> study (the natural object) to be both the chair and a human observer, in
> which case we can speak of it as a chair. If we define the system of study
> to be the chair and a termite, there is no "chair" in that system, nor many
> of the other organizational attributes we as humans would define.
I agree with your point and would only add that these are questions of
logical typing. This is where hermeneutics is so crucial. So far as I
know, it is the only to work through non phycisal questions and
uncertainties like this.
To do this, we first need to spell out and hopefully agree about what
our terms mean. Then, when there are obvious differences such as what
we commonly mean by the notion of chair, we can at least get a hint that
there are some logical typing differences involved. Of course, how we
humans view a chair and how we might imagine a termite might view a
chair, are not of the same logical type. Thus we can easily avoid these
logical typing errors and confusions.
I think this is what Don means when he says that our mental model of
chair is semantic. This semantic or perhaps functional context ought
not to be confused with the natural system which can include a vast or
perhaps even infinite number of variations. These differences between
our mental models and the natural systems are logical typing differences
too. Of course, the hypothetical termite's view of the thing is a third
logical type.
By the way these differences are all non physical even though the
natural system itself is physical. This an important thing to grasp.
All the differences are non physical. All the differences are data.
The data can take an infinite number of forms. It is not necessarily
quantitatively computable. It is a quality difference that for some
reason can make a physical difference.
I think that questions are crucial to learning and improving our
understanding. This is why I think that sometimes it makes sense to ask
some very dumb silly questions. Sometimes, the very fact that they are
so non sensical can be a clue. So here is my dumb question: Why does
non physical data make a physical difference? I dare you to ask a
dumber question than that.
Now I'm going to read Don's response to your e-mail and see where we
differ and are of like mind. I have this sinking feeling that I've
blundered and stumbled into areas that will make no sense to anyone. Oh
my! Someday I hope I'll learn to stop embarassing myself like this.
Norm