Norman K. McPhail wrote:
> Paulo Garrido wrote:
> >
> > Marshall Clemens wrote:
> >
> > > As pointed out by Marvin Minsky amoung others, this is the
> > > glaring flaw
> > > with 'absolute' holism: once you say something is a whole and
> > > cannot be
> > > broken down (reduced) into the interaction of simpler
> > > components, that
> > > is the end of the discussion. To deal with something as a
> > > irreducible
> > > whole means that you do not understand it at all, except
> > > possibly
> > > describing its input-output behavior.
> >
> > Just a comment:
> >
> > Implicit in the above sentences is a direction of flow of
> > understanding from the whole to the parts. From a formal axiomatic
> > point of view, one may ask why the direction of understanding
> > could (or should) not be reversed. Ie, if to understand an entity
> > doesnt mean exactly to be able to put the entity inside the frame
> > or context of a larger entity. Being by this that the entity may
> > be understood.
> >
> > In set terms: the first direction of flow means that to understand
> > an entity X1, one should take it as a set, one should be able to
> > discriminate the elements x1, x2 ...xn of X and to establish the
> > relations Ri holding among them, as elements of X.
> > The second direction of flow means that to understand an entity
> > X1, one should be able to take it as an element of a set XX,
> > discriminate the other elements X2,...Xn of XX and to establish
> > the relations Ri holding among them, as elements of XX.
> >
> > I dont see any reason apriori to exclude any of the directions of
> > understanding flow. (In particular both give rise to infinite
> > regresses, which can only be stopped by some postulated
> > nominalistic stops like "the fundamental particles" or "all that
> > is"). Its seems to me that one may gain from putting the two
> > directions of understanding flow to work together.
> >
> > Paulo Garrido
>
> Paulo:
>
> What about differences of logical typing? These are qualitative
> differences that are more than just differences in levels of
> inclusiveness or exclusiveness. With differences of logical types, many
> time you can't get from logical type A to logical type A'. They are a
> part of the same complex system, but you can't make any causal
> connections other than they are of the same system. The simplest
> example is that the class of all chairs is of a different logical type
> from the chair you are sitting in.
>
> Another example is a statement about the truth value of scientific
> proof. Here you have at least four different logical types involved in
> the same complex system. Without getting into the issue itself, these
> types do not mix. Each can be understood in a way that is irrelevant to
> the others. Hence you get arguments that go on forever about the truth
> about truth and scientific proof.
>
> To understand what is going on, you need to experience what I think Don
> calls the relational complexity of the system. Simply stated, one needs
> to experience the various qualities of the system. These qualities are
> not derivable from each other, yet they are still of the same complex
> system. I would say that these different qualities are of different
> logical types. So they do not relate to each other in a way that can be
> computed or logically compared. This is why these confusions and errors
> of logical typing are so common.
>
> In other words, I think what Don is saying is that unless you take into
> account these experiencial logical typing differences, you will never be
> able to understand such a complex system. I think he is also saying
> that going up and down a simple system that has multiple levels will
> never get you to the point where you can understand these models in the
> context of their relation to other models of the same system which are
> of differing logical types.
>
> So to understand a complex system (Don's definition), one has to
> experience and model the various logical types. This relational model
> of a complex system of models of logical types is a way to begin to
> understand how self referencing complex systems can self organize.
> What's more, this relational complex system of logical types is quality
> based. To me, this means that it can only be understood from within
> this semantic, relational, qualitative and experiencial process. So it
> is subjective.
>
> But this does not mean that we ought to consider it mystical or beyond
> our grasp. Far from it. It just means that it requires a set of
> thought modes that most Cartsian/Newtonian followers would consider
> irrational, unreliable and not worthy of trust. Without going into the
> arguments here, I would just like to suggest that this other set of
> thought modes I am refering to can be used in such a way so as to
> improve their reliability to the point where they are worthy of our
> trust.
>
> Norm McPhail