> Paulo Garrido wrote:
>
> >
> > In set terms: the first direction of flow means that to
> understand
> > an entity X1, one should take it as a set, one should be able
> to
> > discriminate the elements x1, x2 ...xn of X and to establish
> the
> > relations Ri holding among them, as elements of X.
> > The second direction of flow means that to understand an
> entity
> > X1, one should be able to take it as an element of a set XX,
> > discriminate the other elements X2,...Xn of XX and to
> establish
> > the relations Ri holding among them, as elements of XX.
> >
> > I dont see any reason apriori to exclude any of the directions
> of
> > understanding flow. (In particular both give rise to infinite
> > regresses, which can only be stopped by some postulated
> > nominalistic stops like "the fundamental particles" or "all
> that
> > is"). Its seems to me that one may gain from putting the two
> > directions of understanding flow to work together.
> >
> > Paulo Garrido
>
> Paulo:
>
> What about differences of logical typing? These are qualitative
>
> differences that are more than just differences in levels of
> inclusiveness or exclusiveness. .... The simplest
> example is that the class of all chairs is of a different
> logical type
> from the chair you are sitting in.
Right. I think that is not contradictory with my example with set
terminology. The 'belongs_to' relation is not the same as the
'is_included' relation. One of the consequences thereof is that,
as you point, there is a logical type difference between a set and
its elements. That is because the 'belongs_to' (at the contrary of
the 'is_included') relation is not transitive. If one can says
that some giving molecule is an element of a chair, it would make
no sense to say that the same molecule is an element of the class
of all chairs.
> ... Hence you get arguments that go on forever about the truth
> about truth and scientific proof.
I dont know if this relates to your point, but my observation
about infinite regresses was suggested from the consideration of
Marshall Clemmens that "To deal with something as a irreducible
whole means that you do not understand it at all". This
consideration entails that if some particle shows to be
effectively a-tomic, then one cannot understand it.Lets one say
that the direction of reducing an entity to components is
analytic a priori and the reverse direction I observed is
synthetic a priori. With the meaning of understanding established
by this framei) or the process (flow) of understanding is infinite
in both directions
ii) or it must stop somewhere in hitting an understandable.
> To understand what is going on, you need to experience what I
> think Don
> calls the relational complexity of the system. Simply stated,
> one needs
> to experience the various qualities of the system. These
> qualities are
> not derivable from each other, yet they are still of the same
> complex
> system. I would say that these different qualities are of
> different
> logical types. So they do not relate to each other in a way
> that can be
> computed or logically compared.
Only as a comment: Im not so sure. The class of computational
functions named as 'recursive enumerable non recursive' has enough
strange properties that make it a natural candidate to be studied
in the frame of 'organisms' or 'complex systems'. Or so it seems
to me.
> ....I think he is also saying
> that going up and down a simple system that has multiple levels
> will
> never get you to the point where you can understand these models
> in the
> context of their relation to other models of the same system
> which are
> of differing logical types.
Well, I dont see why the two directions of understanding flow
should necessarily be up and down in some sense. Besides, along
what said above, it seems that 'elementing' an entity X inside a
set XX seems to create a new logical type.
> ...But this does not mean that we ought to consider it mystical
> or beyond
> our grasp. Far from it. It just means that it requires a set
> of
> thought modes that most Cartsian/Newtonian followers would
> consider
> irrational, unreliable and not worthy of trust. Without going
> into the
> arguments here, I would just like to suggest that this other set
> of
> thought modes I am refering to can be used in such a way so as
> to
> improve their reliability to the point where they are worthy of
> our
> trust.
>
I completely agree. Just a comment suggested by my reading of
Bohm, "Wholeness and the Implicate Order". Cartesian/Newtonian
thought modes are valid in some domains of existence, at least as
approximations. Problems arise when one tries to push them beyond.
Its the old story of "new wine in old barrels". Different thought
modes for the flow of understanding to go on are clearly
necessary. But one should not fall in the trap of judging them
absolute as the Cartesian /Newtonian modes were judged.
Best
Paulo Garrido