Yes, I agree that this is the philosophical problem at its root, and that
ecology and evolutionary biology are horribly confused on these points,
causing these fields to be disconnected with each other and internally
paradoxical. Nevertheless, if we were properly armed with a deep
understanding of internal vs. external, or as has been discussed on this
listserver earlier, part vs. whole, what would be the result? One cannot
combine the two perspectives because our frame of reference is part of the
dichotomy. We must see the world as consisting of parts that form wholes
and wholes that can be analyzed partly in terms of parts; whereas in
reality they are one thing. I think this is why science can only
approximate reality - our frame of reference cannot perceive the unity of
these views which is closer to the real thing. So, for example in ecology,
it is dependent on what one chooses to study - how the units are identified
vs. the whole. Even a unit identified as a "forest" is not so easy to
define. Is it a real unit with respect to nature or only with respect to
human interests? Do other species perceive a forest? Is there such a thing
as a forest if no species perceives it as such? "Forest" is a label for an
external environment, but it has meaning only in reference to the unit it
is external to. "Forest" is also a unit in a global system, but again it
has meaning as a part only in that larger context . One can argue that it
is a "real" feature of the landscape, but that is true only at a specific
scale.
But I think we can get lost in these philosophical aspects -- the point is
once WE determine what questions are important to us, those questions will
imply certain scales of analysis at which the units can be identified, and
then we can study them with respect to their external context.
Then the distinction between a unit and its context ends up being an issue
of scale and interest. Were we perhaps better off before we realized how
involved this is with our own perception?
By the way, despite the discussion so far, I still think "context" is the
best english translation for Umwelt, because it can refer, for example to
the global context that gives meaning to a forest class, the forest context
that is perceived by a forest-sensitive organism, or the mental refection
of these contexts necessary to consider them. Recall the definition I gave
from Webster: "2: the interrelated conditions in which something exists or
occurs."
At 04:05 PM 6/10/98 -0400, you wrote:
>This is the response to Arno Goudsmit and John Kineman on
>Umwelt.
>
>The distinction of Umwelt vs. Innenwelt by Uexkull or medium vs.
>unity by Maturana looks like a vain attempt of biologists to solve
>the problem of subjective vs. objective by reducing it to the
>distinction of internal and external. The solution is simple:
>external is ojective, internal is subjective, and semiotics sipmly
>establishes a correspondence between internal and external.
>
>Of course, this mechanistic semiotics does not work well and
>people started amending it. Uexkull recognized that Umwelt requires
>interpretation; it simply does not exist without interpreter.
>There is no 'generic' meadow, but there is a meadow for an ant
>and a meadow for a cow, which are entirely different things.
>Learning means Umwelt-building. This is all fine. But then,
>what is the reason for distinguishing internal and external if
>external is as subjective as internal? (of course, subjective
>does not mean unpredictable).
>
>The same misunderstanding can be found in evolutionary biology.
>Most biologists believe that adaptation is a specific relationship
>between a body and environment (internal and external). They
>forget that the body parts have more adaptations to each other
>than to the environment. Only few people are familiar with
>Schmalgauzen's theory of stabilizing selection (1941), which is
>selection for a better internal organization (including coadaptation
>of parts). Evolutionary theory will become much more deep if
>we did not use internal/external dichotomy.
>
>The distinction between internal and external appears only if there
>are TWO observers (or better say agents). Each agent has its own
>Umwelt (which I interpret as Umwelt + Innenwelt). If agent A is
>more intelligent than agent B, then its Umwelt is larger. This
>means that agent A sees more than agent B. An object that is
>present in Umwelt A and not present in Umwelt B is external for B.
>
>A human being is not a single agent (or observer); it is rather a
>hierarchy of agents. This hierarchy is close to the Aristotle's
>hierarchy of souls. Thus, a human is able to observe itself
>as a lower-organized agent. For example, we can observe our own
>physiology as if we observe another person. In this case, there
>are multiple agents in one system, and for each pair of them we can define
>external and internal. For example, everything outside of my
>body is external if I observe myself as a physiological agent.
>This distinction between internal and external is entirely
>different from the trivial one that I described in the first
>paragraph.
>
>-Alexei
>-------------------------------------------------
>Alexei Sharov Research Scientist
>Dept. of Entomology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061
>Tel. (540) 231-7316; FAX (540) 231-9131; e-mail sharov@vt.edu
>Home page: http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/alexei.html
>
>
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)