First, would you not prefer to post these discussions on the list? I have
copied this reply to the list, and you might want to post your original
reply so that readers can access it without my comments.
Thanks for the response and for thinking about this. My attempts to clarify
somewhat, in response to your questions, and to guess at what my own
answers should be, are embedded below, bracketed with the identifier **JJK**.
At 09:43 PM 1/16/98 -0800, you wrote:
>Hi John:
>
>Michael Rogers here. I am new to the list. I have reviewed your post and
>have the following comments:
>
>1. I am somewhat confused by the plurality of terms denoting the same or
>very similar concepts (logical/dimensional/mathematical/objective for
>instance). It would be helpful to me to limit the excercise to only the
>minimum number of terms necessary to pose your "problem".
>
**JJK** Its a good point, but because this digs at the foundations, so to
speak, these terms all begin to loose their precise meanings, whice are
based on certain foundations. Hence, my tendency is to use them variously
as an indication that I am referring to something basic that they all
share. "Objectivity" requires an "it/not it" or "observer/observed" basis
-- ie., some form of distinction from which one can be "objective." All
measurement (quantification) requires dimension which is thus fundamental
to mathematics, logic has been variously included or associated with
mathematics so I mention them together to indicate that I am lumping them
ontologically. Logic requires distinctions, which imply dimensions. All of
these are in contrast to "wholism" as a pure consideration which does not
involve such distinctions, except between what is whole and what is not.
The minimum terms would then be "unity" vs. "separation" as ontological
concepts; but these are not the terms that are necessarily used in various
fields. This distinction is parallel, or identical, to the distinction
between mind/spirit vs. body/matter, and of course has other names. Hence,
I feel it is necessary to relate them to terms that are in common use,
because I believe we should agree that we are taking about the same basic
split at the most fundamental level. Now this seems to get confusing with
different usages of words. Take "mind" for example. If we are talking about
human mental functions, we may conclude that these are based on physical
structure and semiotics and thus is very much part of the "separated" view.
If we take "mind" in a very Platonic sense, then it might be more
associated with Spirit and some concept of wholism. As another example, I
think that Plato's (Socrates'?) original idea of "form" is not the way the
word is used today, to mean almost exactly the opposite. We speak of
physical form or morphology (study of form) and these are very worldly
concepts; whereas Plato's form was more of the nature of in-form-ation or
something that comes from Spirit/mind to inform or create the physical
world. Fritzjof Kapra, for example, ciezes on the idea of "form" vs. matter
but equates "form" with pattern, and James Jeans equated Plato's "form"
with mathematics "God is a mathematician." But I think both of these usages
falls short of Plato's original concept, which was form as something
outside the separated existence that we can perceive. Others may correct my
interpretation of the Greek philosophy, but this is what I have picked up
so far.**JK**
>2. Your first analysis of H1, where you question whether logic is
>appropriate to validate the hypothesis (as the hypothesis is based on
>purely logical distinctions). Are you saying that this is self-referential?
**JJK** I think I'm saying that they are ontologically similar, not really
self-referential because we don't see logic/math as really the same thing
as physical/material existence, so each is referencing an "other." We tend
to oppose these in some sort of epistemic ontogeny, but I am claiming (not
the first, I'm sure!) that they share a common origin. **JJK**
>If so, how is this any different than saying that it is reasonable? Any
>rational argument, I assume, is based on logic.
**JJK** I'm less sure about this because if "reasonable" or "rational" are
the same thing as "logical" why do we have different words for it? I think
there is the possibility that reason supercedes logic. I'd get at it this
way -- logic is fully dependent on one's starting assumptions, and is
deterministic from there. However, change the assumptions and logic yields
different results. Reason however (at least the way I'm connoting it)
supercedes this because it also considers the "reasonableness" of the
assumptions. Reason can test one's worldview (see epistemology section on
testing worldviews in my autevolution paper
http://www.bayside.net/NPO/BMI/autevol.htm). Now it is also possible that
reason can be employed to test direct experience of wholeness, as in deep
meditation or revelation experience. I don't think such information can be
subjected to logic, which nearly always results in rejecting the
experience. But reason, on the other hand, could convince one of the
consistency, value, universality, fruitfulness, etc. of knowledge from such
experience - in other words, the acceptableness of the worldview. Now,
again, not everyone uses the word the same. In the famous saying "The heart
knows reasons that reason knows not of," we have this basic paradox of
definitions. Same with "rational," but my impression is that "rational" is
more often referred to something logical, vs. something purely subjective.
**JJK**
If you are asking if logic
>is a means to truth/validity/reason, that is clearly circular (see Sextus
>Empirusus, 4th century). This points to the fundamental empistmological
>question, the basis for knowledge. Is logic a sound basis for knowledge? As
>Sextus and Kurt Godel have demonstrated, this may be impossible to secure.
>What is your point here?
**JJK** You've stated it rather well with the 4th Century references. My
intent is to get at the basis for knowledge (epistemology) and question the
belief that reality can be determined by its association with mathematics
(for example), or that logic/math can be used to capture "all that is." If
we can agree (or better yet, prove) that this is not so, then we must leave
room in our models for many things for the invasion of reality in
non-logical, i.e., non-objective form. I think that's one thing that
quantum physics has concluded, but it is not accepted epistemologically in
other disciplines. The definition of knowledge can't be so variable within
what we call "science" unless we want to talk only about "sciences" and
keep them forever on separate tracks.
I think you got the point. That logic is not a valid basis to evaluate H1
because it would be circular. Logic would conclude that objectivity is the
only road to knowledge, but that is because logic was created by that road.
**JJK**
>3. H2 - I assume that when you postulate the forces as "real", there is no
>basis for this, i.e. it is arbitrary within the limits set out above?
>
**JJK** Correct. It is a theoretical reality, but my point is this is not
different from other such theoretical "realist" claims, some of which have
been overthrown by subsequent theories (with new realities) and some of
which remain. I am taking a semi-realist perspective here by postulating a
theoretical construct as a means for approximating with is "realy there."
This tradition is currently being questioned by "instrumentalist" views,
which maintain that no theory should claim to be based on real assumptions
- that the only reality is what can be observed. But I believe this makes
instrumentalism circular, as argued above under H1. I agree with a
quasi-realism, (explained very well by Rohlich in "From Paradox to
Reality") which maintains the quest for better and better approximations to
reality (in one's assumed "real" elements on which theory is constructed)
while recognizing that there is a certain necessarily instrumental quality
to anything we can devise, because our perspective is of the separated
(called by physicists "classical") world, and because of this sense
perception we are forever doomed (in science at least) to express our ideas
about reality from this view.
>4. W3 - Given your initial assumptions, I see no reason why W1 and W2
>should be seen as mutually exclusive. In fact, it is pleasing that they
>needn't be. Obviously, that is what needs to be demonstrated.
**JJK** I agree that they needn't be mutually exclusive and that IS the
first point to demonstrate (philosophically). There is a second point,
however, which is that both are necessary for a complete description of
reality. In other words, we cannot simply choose the objective side and
ignore the rest unless we are content with limited ideas. There is also a
third point, which is that these two "realities" can intersect in
significant ways. That is, they can actually make a difference in predicted
outcomes that might be based on solely one perspective. The existence of
wholeness isn't just an alternative way to look at the same facts. It also
invades those facts and becomes causal (I tend to conclude). **JJK**
>
>In conclusion, I like the concept, but I see significant holes in your
>argument, and too many loosely defined terms. This is not necessarily a
>damning criticism, as proving such assertions are likely ultimately beyond
the
>scope of human intellect, at least as long as we employ the logic we now
>utilize (I would refer you back to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem). It
>could benefit, as you point out, from
>more development and refinement.
>
**JJK** Yes, I agree. I think it is a valuable thing to discuss and to
refine into a very clear statement of the problem, and that's not very easy
because of the different usages of words and the compartmentalized way that
science tends to be structured. Also, I think that most practicing
scientists don't tend to get involved in non-objective considerations on
work time. While many or most of the greats were so involved personally and
privately, they too recognized the potential damage that could be done to
objective theory. One has to be careful and absolutely rigorous in
demonstrating a true ontological inadequacy in "classical" concepts (here I
go again substututing terms! - equate this with objective, etc.). But we
have the better part of a century in physics now that has done just that,
and it has held up. I don't claim that everything else reduces to this
wierd physics, but just like chemistry is involved in biology, wierd
physics (and its epistemology) is probably also involved in a causal but
not reductionistic sense (i.e., it doesn't explain all of the "higher"
level system phenomena, but does introduce certain causal elements). **JJK**
>Best Regards,
>Mike Rogers
>
>PS - I have proposed a similar argument, with similar conclusions, but
>based on
>a wholly different set of "forces". I base my belief system/worldview on
>the interplay between certainty and uncertainty. You can find more details
>of this at my site: http://www.vfr.net/~rogers
>
**JJK** I'll check it out. Thanks. First impression is that we could
probably find a direct correlation here -- yet another set of equivalent
terms if by "uncertainty" you mean ontological uncertainty rather than
epistemic uncertainty. Yes, that would work equally well. The different
terms this can be put in is why I posed it as a thought problem (with
arbitrary but sufficient terms to identify the two sides), rather than
suggesting that I could identify the best terms that everyone would find
agreeable. **JJK**
>
>
>
>
-----------------------------------------------
John J. Kineman, Physical Scientist/Ecologist
National Geophysical Data Center
325 Broadway E/GC1 (3100 Marine St. Rm: A-152)
Boulder, Colorado 80303 USA
(303) 497-6900 (phone)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)
jjk@ngdc.noaa.gov (email)
(303) 497-6513 (fax)