Re: The Basics of Free Will

Francis Heylighen (fheyligh@VUB.AC.BE)
Fri, 12 Sep 1997 12:29:04 +0200


Bruce Edmonds:
>4. There are grave problems with identifying a coherent meaning of FW
>in an absolute sense, since there seems to be no way, even in principle,
>to check for the existence of FW (other than metaphysics). The events
>of the universe seem equally explicable with and without FW.
>
>5. A pragmatic approach to free-will gets around many of the
>philosophical problems associated with it. The key question becomes
>when is it useful to attribute it to systems and when not. The
>differing degrees of usefulness means that FW is not an all-or-nothing
>concept.

As usual (unlike Don Mickulecky), I agree with Bruce's generally pragmatic
approach. Let me just add a few comments.

1. I don't believe the issue of determinism is relevant. From a pragmatic
point of view, determinism is a red herring. Quantum mechanics, chaos
theory, the theorem of Goedel and other epistemological limitations have
made it clear that we will never be able to build complete predictive
models of the world. If in principle you cannot predict what will happen,
if becomes meaningless to discuss whether the unpredictable phenomenon is
"really" determined or not. Practically, the world is indeterministic. Yet,
this is different from stating that it has "free will".

2. "Free will " is typically associated with conscious human beings, who
can consider different alternatives and choose the one they prefer. This
assumes the presence of a "rational" or "conceptual" mode of cognition,
where the mind can conceive different possible states of affairs which do
not necessarily exist (or have existed) in reality. Such rational cognition
is based on verbal language, where the rules of syntax allow the generation
of an infinite number of combinations of conceptual units or words. These
different combinations represent different states of affairs, from which
the "will" can select one as being the preferred one.

"Will" itself does not need to be anything more than a learned or inherited
selection criterion or selector. The essence is the generation of
alternatives or potentialities. This is where human cognition differs from
animal cognition. Animals do have a "will": they can choose among
alternatives, but the alternatives must be given to them by the
environment. They cannot imagine situations they have not encountered
before. In that sense, animals have no (or Bruce might say "less") free
will.

>2. Therefore (if it exists at all) anything corresponding to a
>meaningful conception of FW emerges during our development from an egg
>to our adult form.

Although the present simplified theory of Free Will seems to be of the "all
or none" type, I agree with Bruce that in practice there is some continuity
involved. Since free will in my view depends on the learning of language,
that is, conceptual units and syntactical rules to combine them, the more
units and the more rules an individual knows, the larger the number of
potentialities that individual can consider and thus the larger the variety
from which (s)he can choose. In that sense, the free will of a baby is
virtually zero, the one of a three year old relatively small, and the one
of an adult rather larger, depending on the general level of education and
intelligence. Historically, it seems likely that people in primitive
societies (say prehistory or farmers in the Middle Ages) would have had
less "free will" than we have.

____________________NEW_ADDRESS_________________________________________
Dr. Francis Heylighen, Systems Researcher fheyligh@vub.ac.be
CLEA, Free University of Brussels, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
Tel +32-2-6442677; Fax +32-2-6440744; http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/HEYL.html