> Comments on Francis' Comments.
>
>> >4. The dependency of complexity on the framework it is being considered
>> >within does not prevent objectivity, if the participants *agree* on a
>> >uniform such framework/language/goal (this may be as a result of a
>> >claimed privileged framework - natural kinds, etc.).
>>
This is what Rosen called for in "Drawing the boundary between subject
and object:Comments on the mind-brain problem". Theoretical medicine 14:
89-100 (1993). We need to move the boundary to include these
discussions.
>> Yes, but that merely puts subjectivity one level higher to
>> intersubjectivity, or better "group subjectivity". Again, different groups
>> are unlikely to agree about the framework.
>
> Correct, but that is where the problem belongs!
>
>> >The complexity of an organism from its own point of view, is the
>> >difficulty in predicting, modelling and controlling its _own_ state.
>> >Part of this will be the ease with which it can come to decisions about
>> >action (one would could only survive for any length of time as the
>> >donkey that is exactly mid-way between two piles of hay and can not
>> >decide which to go for in a protected environment).
Organisms are not "reactionary" systems as implied here. They are
anticipatory. [R. Rosen: Anticipatory Systems, 1985]
>>
>> That does not seem to me a problem of complexity: a random process would be
>> able to always make a decision and has a minimal complexity (at least in my
>> sense). One should just give up the assumption that decisions must
>> necessarily be based on some rule-like order.
>
> 1. Only part of this internal modelling problem is reflected in the ease of
> decision making. Others would be the accuracy of prediction. e.g. in
> controlling
> internal blood-sugar levels the organism's thyroid gland does have to decide a
n
> output in terms of amount of insulin to produce, but also it must make the
> correct
> one - it has an implicit internal model of the relationship of insulin to
> blood-sugar
> and also an implicit goal in the desired level.
>
> 2. Random processes are only simple relative to some languages of description
.
> e.g.
> it is difficult to produce randomness on a Turing Machine (and there it is onl
y
> random relative to another process). A gas is simple only because of the choi
ce
> of a
> coarse-grained description of it - in other words disregarding a lot of its
> detailed
> behaviour and attributing this to an atomic (in the sense of unanalysed)
> "randomness".
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------
> Bruce Edmonds,
> Centre for Policy Modelling,
> Manchester Metropolitan University, Aytoun Bldg.,
> Aytoun St., Manchester, M1 3GH. UK.
> Tel: +44 161 247 6479 Fax: +44 161 247 6802
> http://bruce.edmonds.name/bme_home.html
It is interesting to me how much of this was done well by Rosen as far back
as the 1960's. See the "Rosen Bibliography" @ http://views.vcu.edu/complex
Respectfully,
Don Mikulecky
http://views.vcu.edu/complex/mikulecky/mikuleck.htm