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Cliff Joslyn (joslyn@kong.gsfc.nasa.gov)
Tue, 13 Jun 1995 14:40:14 -0400 (EDT)


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From: Dr Munawar A Anees <dranees@klcyber.pc.my>
To: Cliff Joslyn <joslyn@kong.gsfc.nasa.gov>
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 1995 00:29:40 GMT+8
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Science: Searching for the Soul?
by
Dr. Munawar Ahmad ANEES
Editor-in-Chief, Periodica Islamica

In the 1980's, William Gibson's Neuromancer and Johnny Mnemonic, were works
of mere fiction. Today the cyberpunk genre, that Gibson introduced, has
certainly come of age. The ever-growing cyberspace--with its infinite
labyrinths--may be the most profound frontier since the Industrial Revolution
began. Little did Gibson realize that his stories served to raise the art of
science fiction to the level of an ontological precursor.

If Gibson's technothrillers are any criterion for futuristic judgement,
then what are we to make of the "real" science? Is science likely to assume
the attributes and powers of an ontological agent? Is it likely to
influence our moral values? Is it going to be the primum mobile for the
moral and ethical discourse? One is prompted to raise such questions when
looking at the pace of development in seemingly disparate disciplines:
biological sciences and information technology.

In their most visible substantive form, biological sciences today are
represented by biotechnology: a mosaic of knowledge base inferential to
genetics, evolutionary biology, molecular biology, and other cognate areas.
As an enabling technology it is radically unique in its manipulation of life
itself. No other scientific or technological course of knowledge has such a
great proximity to life.

In contemporary terms, the ontological assault of science seems to have
commenced with the allegedly beneficent conclusion of the "test-tube baby."
It gave us our first lesson in ontological moralizing influence of science.
What was the ontological perspective to this rather simple mixing of human
gametes in a test tube? First and foremost, it achieved human reproduction
sans sexual intercourse. This was antecedental to sexual and reproductive
mores humankind has known across cultures for centuries: the Immaculate
Conception notwithstanding.

Later years showed us that, coming in the wake of recombinant DNA technology
and cryogenics, the derivative knowledge from this technique flourished to
give us a host of new concepts and practices. To begin with, motherhood was
bifurcated into "biological" and "social" domains. Surrogacy came to be
practised, with several variations on the theme. Similarly, fetal genetic
engineering and sex pre-selection came to the forefront. And older issues
such as "life," induced abortion, consciousness, and personhood acquired
completely new semantics.

One may argue that the ontological dimension of science predates modern
biotechnology. That unforeseen developments, consequential to scientific and
technological innovations, are the rule rather than the exception, at least
since the time of Copernican heliocentricism (1540). If true, then the
biological interventions stand only to accentuate ontological uncertainty
through an intimate manipulation of the very building blocks of life. That is
what sets them apart from ontological impact of other branches of human
discourse.

The development of a technique known as Gametic IntraFolicular Transfer
(GIFT), for instance, is a classic example of a moral urgency elicited by the
new reproductive technologies. In order to fulfill the Catholic obligation
to stay "close" to Nature, GIFT offered an alternative to in-vitro
fertilization (IVF) in the sense that GIFT-assisted fertilization occurred
where Nature has ordained it to be, in contrast with the IVF procedure.
However, it is doubtful if the same sort of barricades could be erected to
fend off scientific "intrusions" into many other precincts.

In the context of moral impingement by new reproductive technologies GIFT is
only the tip of the iceberg. We are increasingly finding ourselves surrounded
by a multitude of moral predicaments. The "property" paradigm of gametes,
pre-implantation of genetic biopsies, cloning of cells of human origin, and
germ-line cell therapy are some of the perplexing issues facing us. Not to
speak of concerted attempts to rejuvenate the evil monster of eugenics
(Muller's Germinal Repository in Escandido, California, is a case in point,
among others), and racial and gender bigotry perpetuated through
sociobiological predispositions. Thus, it is not only the ontological
dimension of science that spells danger for the received moral and ethical
code but the potential for social abuse of the technological prowess.

What concerns us here is that the ontological moralizing influence of science
is making knowledge contingent upon "technique." That is to say that
"technique" is becoming antecedent to the art of knowing. To illustrate, we
may return to the case of the "test tube baby." Before Edwards and Steptoe's
work on IVF, our legal and moral codices were totally alien to social,
psychological, political, economic, or even religious dimensions of such
actions. Once the silence was broken, we were dumbfounded.

This paradigm of contingency may be extrapolated to several other areas. For
instance, at the time of discovery of the molecular structure of DNA, we did
not have the inkling that this will one day lead to a multi-billion dollar
enterprise: Human Genome Project. At this point, one should have a guarded
view of these developments. There must be a fine line between how scientific
and technological progress interacts or conflicts with a given value system
vis-a-vis prompting our ingenuity to carve new moral and ethical guidelines
for a virgin cognitive landscape. Because the "technique" creates a
phenomenon for which moral and ethical precedents are absent, it obviously
comes to possess an ontological advantage. At the same time, the existential
nature of the "technique" gives it the instrumental contingent. This, in
essence, is what we mean by the contingency of knowledge.

If someone believed that the intractable debate on mind-body problem enjoyed
some immunity from the ontological onslaught of science then here is some
food for thought. Just to make a preliminary assessment of what the
contingency of knowledge may mean for us, we turn to some emerging concepts
that are suitably grouped as Neuroepistemology or Neural Darwinism. According
to Reed, Gerald Edelman (the 1972 Nobel laureate for research on the
structure of antibody) has attempted to explain:

how, due to natural selection, the epigenesis of self-regulation in the
nervous system necessarily leads to a system capable of perception of
meaningful features in the environment, despite being made up of
extremely varied components. He intends to explain phenomena at a number
of levels, usually treated by different disciplines, and he successfully
integrates important phenomena in neuroanatomy, neurochemistry,
neuroembryogenesis, the evolution of behaviour, ethology, and the
development of behaviour.

Vandervert, arguing for neurological positivism, offers another scenario:

Neurological positivism proposes that the preinferential, undebatable
basic data and order for all that can be known by any creature are in
the algorithms of its neurological order (its neurological computational
characteristics, organizations, and functional interaction with
environment); and further, that the data for all other positivisms
(social, experiential, and logical) exist as high-level homological
[having common descent] transformations of the neurological order.

And among the converts to the lure of neuroepistemology is none other than
the co-discoverer of the DNA, Francis Crick. Through his work on visual
consciousness, Crick, is putting arguments for thinking "in terms of neurons,
both their internal components and the intricate and unexpected ways they
interact together...[By conducting research on neurons] the mysterious
aspects of consciousness might disappear, just as the mysterious aspects of
embryology have largely disappeared now that we know about the capabilities
of DNA, RNA, and protein...We can hope to understand more precisely the
mechanisms of such mental activities as intuition, creativity and aesthetic
pleasure...Free will may no longer be a mystery." (Pp. 256-261)

Looking at the postulates of neuroepistemology, one is apt to think in terms
of the return of (now discredited) positivism in science. Hardly so. Crick,
for instance, brings the philosopher to a ridicule by saying that:

the study of consciousness is a scientific problem. Science is not
separated from it by some insurmountable barrier...There is no
justification for the view that only philosophers can deal with
it...they must learn how to abandon their pet theories when the
scientific evidence goes against them or they will only expose
themselves to ridicule. (Pp. 257-258)

Given the newly acquired instrumental dexterity (which is likely to be
greatly enhanced in the future through an awesome computational ability, see,
for example, Forrest [1993] on the application of genetic algorithms),
neuroepistemology is not hesitant in laying claims over the traditional
domain of morals and ethics. Sperry's pronouncements on the ideological
revolution are indicative of what might be a plausible agenda for the
future:

the inherent system of values already inbuilt in human nature by
evolution and forming a basic common denominator from which all human
value systems are built, I arrive at a system of beliefs and associated
values that by its very nature carries intrinsic ethicomoral directives.
My ultimate criteria for meaning and value...are accordingly based on
this single integral reference frame, consistent with empirically
verifiable reality and the worldview of science in its reformed
macromental description. In a sense, the theologist's "divine will"
translates into that which is in harmony with and contributes to the
creative pattern of evolving nature, and thus works with the forces that
made and move the universe and created humankind. (P.249)

Some theological currents, at least from the Christian perspective, have
begun to echo Sperry's contingent thinking. According to Schmitz-Moormann:

Evolution has become the standard way of understanding the world
process. Theology has to express traditional faith in the context of the
contemporary world. Since the common worldview has profoundly changed,
from a static world of being into a dynamic world of becoming, theology
needs to change its language and its understanding of the universe as
God's creation. This understanding of an evolving world is to be used as
a theological source.

Thus, it is clear that scientific thinking and practice (the internal
critique on the sociology of science notwihstanding) are moving in a
direction characterized by:
1. The potential for enhanced instrumentalism
2. Amplified contingent value
3. Attempts at value clarification
4. A tacit theological acceptance of science-driven values

We can, therefore, argue that the pre-immanence of science and technology, in
relation to an ethicomoral status quo is a fertile ground for the development
of new cognitive niches. Is it possible that scientific dynamism would, one
day, override a static ethicomoral code? That the cognitive substratum for
moral action would become more and more contingent upon our scientific
"literacy." That moral action would simply be an extension of our scientific
output?

The possibility of development of new cognitive niches in the future is
pre-encoded in the Neuromancer metaphor, to say the least. It is no secret
that today the entire repository of human knowledge is directly accessible by
anyone connected to an online network. Virtual reality has presented itself
as a reality. Electronic democracy is wooing its widespread constituencies.
Electronic cash, electronic universities and even electronic nuptials are no
longer the exclusive domain of a sci-fi writer. They all are here, virtually!
With millions of computer keyboards clicking their presence onto the
InterNet, the combined human intelligence stands at the threshold of a new
era of "information singularity."

Thus, is it premature to speculate that a confluence of knowledge products
from biotechnology and neuroepistemology will not conspire for a
trans-disciplinary unification with artificial intelligence (AI), artificial
life (ALife), chaos and complexity, self-regulation and self-organization,
cybernetics and linguistics? We already know that the application of genetic
algorithms for automated indexing and even software programming is giving us
new tools for knowledge engineering. Only our absurdity will keep us blind to
their future growth.

I do not know if Einstein ever met Magritte before this meeting in Brussels.
But I can see the two metaphors heading for a union. At this point in time,
Einstein enjoys a distinct advantage over Magritte within the confines of the
contingency of knowledge. Whether this advantage would lead to a
mutually-exclusive existence of the two, or otherwise, remains to be seen.
Whether there would be a multi-processor based metaphysics or the received
text would reign supreme is a question that we ought to think about for the
best answer.

The contemporary mode of science and technology appears to be pulsating to a
new beat. The traditional dichotomies like reductionism as opposed to holism,
subjectivism as opposed to objectivism, relativism as opposed to absolutism,
and quantitative as opposed to qualitative are likely to crumble, sooner or
later. If and when that happens, what are we going to make of our ethicomoral
code?

*******

***Disclaimer: This "omniscient" writer has not foreseen his results from the
outset.

***Further reading

Charlesworth, William R. "Darwin and Developmental Psychology." Developmental
Psychology 28(1): 5-16, 1992.

Crick, Francis. The Astonishing Hypothesis. London: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

Davies, Paul. The Mind of God. London: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Dennett, Daniel. Consciousness Explained. New York: Viking, 1992.

Forrest, S. "Genetic Algorithms: Principles of Natural Selection Applied to
Computation." Science 261:872-878, 1993.

Fuller, Steve. "Is Relativism Obsolete?" Science Studies 4(2): 5-16, 1991.

Nozick, Robert. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995.

Reed, Edward S. "Neural Regulation of Adaptive Behaviour." Ecological
Psychology 1(1):101, 1989.

Roele, Marcel. "Religious Behaviour as a Utility- and Inclusive
Fitness-Optimizing Strategy." Social Science Information 32(3):387-417, 1993.

Schmitz-Moormann, K. "Theology in an Evolutionary Mode." Zygon 27(2):133,
1992.

Sperry, Roger W. "Search for Beliefs to Live By Consistent with Science."
Zygon 26(2): 237-258, 1991.

Stonier, Tom. Information and the Internal Structure of the Universe. London:
Springer-Verlag, 1990.

van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. "What Epistemic Values Should we Reclaim for
Religion and Science?" Zygon 28(3): 371-376, 1993.

Vandervert, Larry R. "Neurological Positivism's Evolution of Mathematics."
Journal of Mind and Behavior 14(3): 278, 1993.

Wuketits, Franz M. "Life, Cognition, and Intraorganismic Selection." Journal
of Social and Biological Structures 14(2):184-189.

---------------
Copyright 1995. This paper was presented at Einstein Meets Magritte: An
Interdisciplinary Reflection on Science, Nature, Human Action, and Society,
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free University Brussels), Brussels, Belgium, May
29-June 3, 1995. Please do not cite or quote this paper without prior written
permission. Author's current address: Dr. Munawar Ahmad Anees,
Editor-in-Chief, Periodica Islamica, 22 Jalan Liku, Kuala Lumpur-59100,
Malaysia / Tel: [+60-3] 282-5286 * Fax: [+60-3] 282-1605 / E-mail:
dranees@aol.com / 72260.227@compuserve.com / drmanees@delphi.com *
dranees@klcyber.pc.my

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