You are using the "human product" argument. I must admit this is your strongest
card because I more or less use it myself. I define memes as socially emitted
stimuli, implying that they are human *products*. To me such a definition is
unproblematic because my memes are physical shadows of the mind. Thus, although
I distinguish between perceptual and physical patterns, I *relate* them. This is
more than Dawkins does. By smearing them he destroys the fine relation between
them.
The cow-meme as I have defined it is not the English word "cow" but the mental
image of a cow. This image is the same regardless of language. But if we don't
distinguish between physical and mental patterns then we must acknowledge that
there is no fundamental difference between the mental image of the cow and the
image emitted by the cow itself. Dawkins Memetics is probably able to save itsel
f
by introducing the "human product" definition into the theory. This can,
however, only be done by ignoring the fact that Gestalts/consciousness are NOT
human products. (Memetics has ignored it so far, why not again?) But regardless
of how memetics tackles this, any honest thinker should be deeply concerned abou
t
the fact that memetics implies that the mental image of a cow is fundamentally
the same as the physical image emitted by the cow itself.
Onar.