>> I challange ANYONE to come up with better. I suspect we will
>> hear no reply to this, but that the enterprise will go on
>> (again) if Rosen's work didn't exist! C'est la vie!
>
Here's Cliff's reply:
> At the risk of rudeness (always risked when talking w/Don :) ), I'll
> just say again:
>
> *) I read all of LI deeply;
>
Yes, we HAVE been through this before. Your memory seems VERY
selective! My problem with statements like that above is that your
discussions of states, etc. fell back into a reductionist pattern as
if your own review was forgotten to you.
> *) It's chock full of errors;
Often exaggeration is a sign of lack of substantial things to say.
Yes there were a few errors, you caught most of them in your review.
At that time you didn't seem to think they were the type that hurt
his argument. Have you changed your mind?
>
> *) I don't know enough category theory;
>
O.K. That's fair. However, category theory is only essential for the
proof to be followed, not to get the gist of the argument. The first
part is category-theory freea and gives a good summarry of what is
accomplished via category theory. The logic stands on its own. It DOES
attempt to make a rigorous, dichotomous classification of systems into:
1) simple mechanisms
2) complex systems
It then goes on to show that ORGASNISMS (i. e. LIFE) are complex and
closed under efficient causation. This definition CAN BE DEALT
WITH VIA CATEGORY THEORY, but need not.
> *) You liked my review
Yes,but I would like it better if you also acted like you believe what
you wrote, especially in these discussions. Otherwise you might
publish a retraction?
>
> *) We had a horrible argument before you read my review, which was
> never sastifactorally completed. In particular, I leave you with this
> question:
Discourse and disagreement don't amount to "a horrivble argument" in
my mind. Quoting a flip remark by someone named Val Turchin or
something like that was hardly a substantial way to discuss the issue and
that's where you seemed to think it was so horrible after I criticised
that practice.
>
> What is it about category theory that allows us to transcend the
> limits of assuming universes of discourse a priori? In other words, if
> I posit a function f : A -> B, A and B are specified in advance. In
> this formulation, Rosen's scheme collapses to an expression of
> recusrive function theory (not very interesting).
>
There's the quote from your authority again. I see nothing in the book
or his other works OR YOUR REVIEW which substantiates the last statement.
As I said before, it misses the point completely. The point is that he
spenda many chapters leading to the use of relational biology rather than
the Nwewtonian Paradigm to look at the problem. He then uses relational
diagrams to give a clear distinction between simple mechanisms (nmachines)
and complex systems. He shows that if you approach a complex system as
if it were a simple mechanism, you get a certain kind of infinite
recursion, so HIS DISTINCTION WORKS! He also show that another kind of infinite
recursion occcurs if you attempt to find an end to the quest for
efficient cause in simple mechanisms. Then, in an analogous way to
Newton, but in relational terms rather than mechanistic ones, he shows that
THE RECURSION CAN BE CLOSED IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND ORGANISMS. This always
involves final cause. He gives examples of his M-R (metabolism-repair)
systems as realizations of systems which fullfill the requirement he developeed
for complexity....all in rigorous terms.
> But, he claims that if I posit an entailment relation
>
> f
> A ---> B
>
> in category theory, that I transcend functional ideas, and A and B can
> not only remain unspecified, but indeed can BECOME specified in virtue
> of their participation in such a complex network. This becomes,
> basically, a notation for emergence.
Rosen's use of category theory stems fronm the necessity of having a
mapping on mappings. In particular, entailment mappings (answers to
the question WHY? with regard to each part of the system are not all
alike due to the different causalities extant in a complex system.
Most importantly, the closure under efficient cause comes about because of
final cause. For a house (not complex)
material cause = bricks, mortar, etc.
Efficient cause = the builder
formal cause = the plans
final cause = the intent to provide a dwelling place
Here efficient caiuse is external.
In Rosen's mappings for complex systems, final cause closes the diagam
and efficient cause is within the system.
My student, Jeff Prideaux, is on this network and has read Rosen's
book, a lot of his earlier work, and you review. He is busily
translating Rosen's work into realizable examples. I call upon
him to begin sharing those results with you. Jeff are you there?
Once he does that, I think it will become clear to you where you
have missed the point and why I am so unhappy with the irresponsible way
you keep trying to convince everyone that they need not spend the
time and effort to master this important contribution.
Best wishes, Don Mikulecky
P. S. Yes ROSEN AGAIN.....and again...and again....(how's that for
an infinite recursion).