(.....)
>Yes, the relational order of convection cells is something we, as
>observers, perceive and describe. Without our role as conscious agents,
>they would have no meaning. But that's true of ALL the properties of the
>fluid, not just the rotation of the cells. I think it would be stretching
>credulity to claim that this relational property ONLY exists in virtue of
>our cognition. Certainly objective, physical measurement procedures are
>available, in the form of instruments which extend our senses, if not
>replace them (this is "weak objectivity" in the sense of consensual theory
>construction).
>
Unfortunately I am not acquainted with Benard cells, but I understand your
point (I think). But does that mean these relations really exist as do the
primitives between which they are relations? Of course relations can be
recognized and even measured by sophisticated tools. But the designs of
these tools are precisely the functional equivalents of our own
constructive perceptual activities! That is: the primitives between which a
relation is constructed (and measured) are taken to really exist, and their
relation is taken as a man-made construct. However, as soon as this
relation has been established and recognized, it may be treated as really
existing (e.g. as measured by a smart instrument), and it may in its turn
become a new primitive for an even more sophisticated relation.
Thus, a hierarchy is possible of relations and primitives: a relation is
dealt with as a new primitive for the next higher level, and a primitive is
dealt with as a relation for the primitives at the next lower level.
However, when a heterarchy is at stake, it is no longer possible to
distinguish between primitives and relations, and the nominalist game of
(really existing) primitives and (constructed/assigned) relations breaks
down. In a relational model of an organism, for example, at one and the
same moment a term may be a) a relation between two other terms, and b) a
primitive term; cf. Rosen's treatment of mappings and sets. Here a realist
versus nominalist debate is no longer relevant, because the observer is no
longer the only subject in the room.
What about the idea that the question of the ontological status of
relations in a complex system (of which a relational model could be made)
is equivalent to question of the system's capacity to generate sense? To my
understanding, this is where second order cybernetics touches the old
phenomenologist stuff (especially Merleau-Ponty's "Visible and Invisible").
Arno Goudsmit