>Do I distort Camus too much to suggest that the ultimate "freedom"
>is deeply wrapped up in the choice of whether or not to suicide?
>Also freedom is often confused with license. Part of the issue is
>whether or not it is ever possible to escape the consequences
>of our actions. . . .
I am hoping, Don, that you read the paper on A Scientific Concept of Freedom.
There are probably few readers competent in this area - accessible to me at
any rate! - and you may be one of them.
The paper does not try to _define_ freedom, but rather attempts to describe
how it works, at whatever level of organization may be under consideration,
in terms of the general principles involved.
> I've only scanned [the paper], but am troubled. Let me
>quote Orlando Patterson's "Freedom:Freedom in the making of Western culture"
>the introduction: "Freedom, like love and beauty, is one of those values
>better experienced than defined." He goes on to quote
>Lincoln, and others on this issue and "liberty" as another example.
>The rest of the book is more or less a substitute to a definition
>and that's the way it seems to need to be. Similar to Pirsig's discourse
>on "quality" in Zen and the Art of motorcycle Maintainence.
>Patterson speaks of how opposing political parties can be fired
>up by the notion of liberty for all and yet seem to be totally
>out of phase.
Yes. Clearly there are many different meanings current. The question might
be asked, what do they have in common that is valuable i.e. most useful?
As a first principle, I think, freedom involves an open system without
arbitary restrictions. So, let's set aside the use ot the terms liberty and
freedom to confuse and deceive, as a screen for special interests who
intend, in effect, to operate by restricting information.
I agree entirely that the basis of the notion, which includes but cannot be
reduced to the "feeling of being free", is to be found in primary human
experience. How to think about this this has been explored in some detail
by a number of philosophers, including Merleau-Ponty (The Phenomenology of
Perception) and Karl Popper. What they describe are ways in which the
phenomena of direct experience are brought into relation with conceptual
thought i.e. language and scientific theories, and how these relate to the
"real world" (which of course is not the same as the world which we each
perceive or experience).
Now, the usual reaction is to throw up one's hands in the face of this
complexity and to suppose that everything is relative to one's experience
and point of view, etc., or to fall back on a familiar theory. The feelings
involved may well resemble those of encountering an apparently intractable
software problem, with the added difficulty that, for most people, there is
little awareness of the problems and no motivation. A scientific approach
can do better than this, however, with its characteristically conscious
approach to the appropriate use of methods and concepts.
>There is something important about these things scientifically, but
>it rests in the idea that they make the case for there being something
>more than syntax in our language. Also, in line with Godel, the
>language is incomplete to the extent that it is consistant.
>I could go on, but I think you get my point.
The point that I get is that you see a lot of difficulties, both specific
and general/methodological. There are many aspects to this. A major
problem, I agree, involves language, which is one of the tools of thought -
very useful, essential to human life, but not the whole story, as some
scientists seem to believe. (They don't really believe it, of course, in
practical life.)
For language is indeed incomplete. Korzybski compared it to a map,
limited in scale and what it can represent, etc., a very restricted
selection of the realities out there. Moreover language needs to be
adapted in order to reflect as clearly as possible the relationships we
seek to describe and perhaps influence. For this reason a cybernetic
framework needs to be recognized explicitly, as the only framework adequate
for describing the interrelations involved in giving real effect to our
intuitive sense of possible freedoms.
To summarize two key points in the paper alluded to above:
(1) through negative feedback, purposive effects can be partially freed
from the direct influence of random contingencies;
(2) a hierarchical structure of progressively more comprehensive goals,
purposes and values helps to liberate the overall system or organization
from lower level disturbances, as long as the higher level goals are
governing.
This works on many levels. For example, I can have investments in mutual
funds to spread the risks and gain security. Freedom can only be relative
to circumstances and organization, of course, and that is the key to the
safeguards it requires. The notion may or may not seem simple, but it has
many ramifications.
Cheers and best wishes!
Bruce B.